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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with two types of employment among poor rural women in 
Bangladesh: wage employment and self employment. 
For women in wage employment, the determinants of wage rates and the 
amount of wage employment obtained are analysed. Existing theories of wage 
determination do not adequately explain the variations in wage rates among female 
wage workers. An alternative explanation in terms of a modified supply-demand 
framework is developed. This framework explains the existence of 
underemployment and the variations in wage rates in terms of the reservation wages 
of these women. Empirical tests confirm the hypothesis that wage variations are 
associated with factors influencing the reservation wages of women. 
In the presence of underemployment in the villages, the amount of employment 
was not influenced by supply considerations but was determined on the demand side. 
The elasticity of employment with respect to wage rates was, however, low. 
Therefore the amounts earned were not positively influenced by the acceptance of 
low wages. 
In the absence of the availability of an unconstrained amount of market 
employment at exogenously given wage rates, the amount of self employment was 
determined by equating the productivity of such employment with the opportunity 
cost of labour in housework. Self employment, therefore, was found to be influenced 
by family responsibilities and by the amount of capital invested in an enterprise. The 
latter influenced the productivity of self employment. 
Self employment was financed by the Grameen Bank (a special financial 
institution lending to landless households). The probability of becoming a Grameen 
Bank member was not influenced by the landless women's initial resource 
VI 
endowment. The efficiency of resource use was not affected by a woman's family 
situation or families' resource endowments. 
Self employment activities were found to generate higher average rates of 
return to labour than the average wage rates. Average employment and earnings were 
also higher. The benefits of self employment were also indicated by the fact that the 
Grameen Bank members had a larger number of meals and larger expenditure on 
clothing than other landless women in the village. 
These findings have important policy implications in terms of the expansion of 
self employment opportunities. However, it has been noted that other direct and 
indirect costs and benefits of lending to the very poor need to be researched before 
policy conclusions are reached. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
This study is concerned with the employment and earning opportunities of poor 
women in rural Bangladesh. Such opportunities include wage employment and self 
employment. ^  
The wage employment of women in developing economies such as Bangladesh 
is characterised by features which are not only different from the female labour 
markets in the industrial and more advanced developing economies, but which are 
also different from the male labour market in their own country. The adequacy of 
the theories developed in the context of the employment and earnings in male labour 
markets therefore need to be assessed, and if necessary modified. 
Existing theories of wage determination do not adequately explain wage 
variations among unskilled rural workers faced with underemployment. The 
determination of employment has not been systematically addressed. Alternative 
explanations of wage and employment determination are thus key issues in this 
study. 
Similarly, theories of labour allocation for self employed workers do not take 
into account the special characteristics of women who are engaged in housework as 
1. In the subsequent analysis, self employment is used lo denote direct income generating 
employment in an enterprise organised by the worker herself or by her family. Other family members 
may also contribute labour inputs. Family employment and self employment is used synonymously. 
well as self employment. An explanation of the labour allocation process for this 
group of women is developed. 
Women who currently participate in wage employment in the rural areas of 
Bangladesh come from families living in poverty. This study analyses how far wage 
employment or self employment for women can help ameliorate poverty. 
Comparisons are made between the earnings from two different types of 
employment. Since self employment depends crucially on the availability of finance, 
an analysis of the extent to which poor women have access to institutional loans 
which are specially directed to them is carried out. 
This is not only relevant to an understanding of the situation of the women who 
are currently participating in these two types of employment, but also to an 
understanding of the prospects for expansion of employment in the traditional sectors 
for other women who live in poverty. 
There are relatively few studies of female labour markets in Bangladesh. This 
is contrary to the increasing interest in studies of female labour markets in industrial 
economies where female labour force participation is high and issues of gender 
equity are prominent.^ An analysis of the female labour market in Bangladesh is 
important not only for gender equity but also to enhance the income of households 
living in poverty. 
1.2 Background 
Poverty and landlessness 
Poor women from households that do not possess agricultural land or other non-farm 
productive capital are the concern of this study. The widespread poverty among the 
rural population of Bangladesh is well known. With a per capita income of US$ 160 
2. Killingswonh and Heckman (1986) review a large number of such studies. 
(World Bank 1988) and skewed distribution of land and other productive assets, it is 
not surprising that 63 per cent of the population live below the poverty level (Khan 
and Hossain 1989).^ In rural areas, the poor population is concentrated among 
landless people. Though 85 per cent of the rural population depends on agriculture 
for income, 30 per cent did not own any agricultural land in 1977. Those who own 
less than 50 decimals (0.2 hectares) of land are considered to be virtually landless. 
Nearly 50 per cent of households were in this group (Januzzi and Peach 1980). 
There is evidence that these percentages have increased in recent years (Hossain 
1985a). These households depend on wage employment for their living. 
Self employment in off-farm activities does not require land ownership but the 
landless do not possess the capital, human or financial, required by such off-farm 
employment. Lack of capital is a direct consequence of landlessness. The landless 
do not have access to formal financial institutions. 
The rate of educational attainment is low for the rural population in general and 
women in particular. The rate of literacy among rural women aged over 10 years is 
only 16 per cent. Though data on the educational level of landless women are not 
available at a national level, various micro studies indicate very low rates of school 
attendance and literacy. Education is a low priority because of poverty (Islam 1977, 
Scott and Carr 1985). 
Wage employment implies poverty because wage rates are low, real wages are 
declining and the employment available is not sufficient to meet demand. A number 
of studies provide evidence of declining or stagnant real wage rates (Ahmed 1985, 
Khan and Hossain 1989, Muqtada and Alam 1986). Low wage rates and insufficient 
employment are the results of a slow growth of the economy, especially of the 
agricultural sector. The performance of the economy is shown in Table 1.1. The 
3. Estimates of poverty level incomes are obtained from the value of a recommended minimum 
consumption bundle. For Bangladesh the most recent estimate of a poverty level of income for a 
person is taka 3500 per year (Hossain 1988a), estimated at 1985 prices. In subsequent analysis, a 
reference to a poverty level of income indicates this amount 
rate of annual growth of real GDP shows fluctuation over the years. The same is true 
for the annual growth of real value added in agriculture. 
Table 1.1 Bangladesh: annual rate of growth of real GDP in constant (1972-
73) prices 
Year Annual rate of 
growth of real 
GDP (per cent) 
Annual growth of 
real value added in 
agriculture (per cent) 
1980-81 6.8 5.4 
1981-82 0.8 0.9 
1982-83 3.6 4.6 
1983-84 4.2 1.6 
1984-85 3.7 0.8 
1985-86 4.7 4.0 
1986-87 4.0 0.1 
1987-88 1.8 -1.1 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, various years. 
Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka-
Agricultural value added at constant (1972-73) factor cost grew at the rate of 
2.8 per cent per annum from 1973-74 to 1983-84 (Rahman 1987). This is just above 
the growth rate of population (2.3 per cent per annum). Annual rate of growth of 
employment in crop production was only 1.6 per cent between 1975-76 and 1982-83 
(Hossain 1985b). 
Female labour force participation 
The neglect of female labour markets in Bangladesh in theoretical and empirical 
studies largely results from the low participation of women in paid and self 
employment The analysis of hired labour has mostly been from the point of view of 
the role of hired labour in agricultural-rural development. The female labour 
markets of Bangladesh are not relevant in this context because women only 
contribute a minor portion of agricultural labour. In the rural areas of South Asian 
countries, self employment has been the dominant mode of labour among men and 
women. Wage employment is not viewed as being prestigious. Hirashima and 
Muqtada observe tha t ' The social status of hired labour households was extremely 
low in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but there was not much clear social 
distinction between employers and employees in Southeast Asian Countries' 
(1986:5). The importance of wage employment is rising as population growth 
swamps land availability for small farmers and agricultural modernisation takes 
place. But in Bangladesh the participation of women in wage employment is still 
very limited. Participation in family employment in agriculture may be low because 
of women's household responsibilities as well as the prevalence of social views that 
women do not engage in agricultural field operations. 
National data report very low participation rates for women in productive 
activity. The Census of Bangladesh 1981 (BBS 1984) and the National Labour 
Force Survey of 1983 (BBS 1986a) report work force participation rates among 
women as being 3.3 and 5.0 per cent respectively. These figures are much lower 
than other South and East Asian developing countries. 
The low participation ratio of women reported in national statistics may also, 
however, be due to misreporting or inadequate understanding of women's activities. 
Traditional productive employment in a family's agricultural enterprises often 
closely resembles the housework activities of women and thus leads to misreporting. 
The enumeration of occupation on the basis of primary involvement will classify 
most women as housewives even if they perform substantial amounts of productive 
employment; the same hours worked may classify a person as being engaged in 
economic activity if she/he were not involved in housework. These data problems 
imply that the analysis of women's economic activities should include their 
housework and productive roles in an integrated framework rather than neglecting 
their productive employment simply because they spend more time on housework. 
Census data do not provide a breakdown between self employment and wage 
employment. The Labour Force Survey indicates that 70 per cent of women 
participating in productive employment were in wage employment (BBS 1986a). 
The participation rate in wage employment among all women was thus 3.5 per cent. 
The fact that more than two-thirds of participating women were in wage employment 
may also result from the under-reporting of self employment. 
A few village surveys provide data on participation rates of women in income 
generating employment. In two areas covered by Rahman and Islam (1986) the 
participation rate was 7 per cent and 14 per cent. Hossain (1988b) reports the 
participation rate as 8 per cent. These studies use either the criterion of primary 
occupation or a minimum number of hours required to be worked, for women to be 
classified as participating in the labour force. Again, a breakdown between types of 
employment is not available. If the 70 per cent wage participation figure from the 
Labour Force Survey is accepted, women's participation in wage employment in 
these villages ranges between 5 per cent and 8 per cent. 
The importance of wage employment for women, however, is not adequately 
indicated by such data. The rate of participation in wage employment is higher if 
poorer households only are considered. The previous studies do not give a 
breakdown of labour force participation rates of women by different income or 
landownership groups. In the present study all women working for wages come 
from landless households. In the villages studied 50 per cent of the landless 
households had women wage workers. 
Special self employment opportunities 
To increase women's participation in income earning activities, more productive 
employment opportunities need to be created. Alternative self employment could 
provide a solution to the low income and underemployment not only of the women 
currently engaged in wage employment but also for many other poor women from 
landless families. It is thought that labour force participation may be highly elastic 
with respect to the rate of retum per hour. The availability of remunerative 
employment would be likely to draw many women currently viewed as tradition 
bound housewives into the paid labour force. 
Landless households living below the poverty line cannot save to acquire 
investment capital. They are not eligible to borrow from formal lending agencies 
because they cannot provide collateral. Credit from non-institutional sources may be 
available only for emergencies. Lx)ans from moneylenders may be available at very 
high rates of interest. Therefore investment in self employment would require 
provision of finance from specialised lending agencies. 
It is not clear whether such poor women can generate remunerative self 
employment for themselves even if they are given access to financial resources. It 
has already been mentioned that these women do not possess any formal education 
or training, and do not have any experience in organising economic activities. 
Whether or not these are real obstacles can only be assessed by analysing 
externally financed self employment activities. This study therefore analyses the self 
employment activities of poor women financed by the Grameen Bank. This is a 
specialised financial institution which provides loans only to landless households. 
The Grameen Bank considered that the provision of financial resources could initiate 
new economic enterprises and generate employment for women borrowers and their 
family members (Yunus 1985, 1987). 
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This study investigates the extent to which assetless rural women with poor 
education came forward to take advantage of this approach and the impacts of these 
loans. 
Activities organised by Grameen Bank loans provide an opportunity to analyse 
the factors that determine women's allocation of labour inputs to self employment. 
Existing theories of allocation of time by self employed workers are modified to 
analyse the choice of labour allocation in self employment by landless women. 
Finally, a comparison of the returns from wage employment and self employment 
opportunities created by Grameen Bank finance is made. This provides insights into 
the prospect for self employment to reduce poverty. 
1.3 Organisation of the analysis 
After a review of the sources and nature of data used in the study (Chapter 2), the 
fu-st part of this thesis (Chapters 3 to 6) consists of an analysis of the wage 
employment of rural women. 
In Chapter 3 the characteristics of various aspects of rural wage labour markets 
for women are discussed. Chapter 4 reviews the existing theories of wage 
determination and the problems encountered in their application to the rural economy 
of a developing country. That chapter also examines the applicability of these 
theories to the sample of female wage workers in mral Bangladesh. A new approach 
to the analysis of the determination of wages and employment is suggested in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. The new approach is used to formulate hypotheses 
about variations in wage rates and employment of women and these are empirically 
tested. 
Chapters 7 to 10 discuss the role of Grameen Bank activities in generating 
income and employment for landless women and the principles of labour allocation 
in self employment. Chapter 7 introduces the special banking procedures followed 
by the Grameen Bank. Chapter 8 reviews the theories of allocation of time that may 
be relevant for self employed women. It also develops a framework to explain the 
time allocation of women and other family members engaged in the Grameen Bank 
financed self employment enterprises. The hypotheses developed from this 
framework are empirically tested. 
Chapter 9 compares the retum to labour from self employment with the 
opportunity cost of labour in terms of wage employment. The basic consumption 
levels for these two groups are also compared. The chapter examines whether the 
Grameen Bank helps to improve the situation of women in landless families. 
Chapter 10 examines the extent to which poor women have access to the 
Grameen Bank and whether initial resource endowments influence the efficiency of 
the use of resources in enterprises organised with Grameen Bank funds. Only if poor 
women have equal access to the Bank and have similar opportunities to use resources 
efficiently, will this type of self employment be able to help the poorest households. 
The last chapter brings together the findings and the policy implications for 
expanding women's employment and earnings. The need for further research is 
noted. 
Appendix A provides an English version of the questionnaires used in the 
surveys. Appendix B provides descriptive statistics of the data. Appendix C 
provides a description of the econometric tests used in the study. 
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Chapter 2 
The data base 
2.1 Sources of data 
Most of the primary data for this study was collected by field surveys of samples of 
wage worker women and self employed women in Bangladesh. 
The analysis of wage employment in Chapters 3 to 6 relies on data collected by 
surveying a sample of 77 female wage workers from four villages. Some qualitative 
information about the female labour market and the village economy was also 
collected. Interviews with the female workers were designed to provide information 
on personal and family characteristics, employment and wages and their opinions on 
issues related to this study. Some questions were asked of the women's employers. 
Analysis of the self employed workers contained in chapter 7 to 10 is based on 
information from a group of women who borrowed from the Grameen Bank. This 
group was compared with women who did not join the Grameen Bank. A survey 
was conducted among women from five villages in which the Grameen Bank 
operated. It collected information about the economic activities organised with 
Grameen Bank loans. It also collected data on the characteristics of members and 
non-members of the Grameen Bank. 
2.2 Data on the wage worker women 
The sample of women wage workers comes from four villages in two administrative 
units (upozilla) where a Grameen Bank branch was not in operation. These two 
11 
upozilla, namely, Mirzapur and Bhanga, are taken from two different ecological 
zones. These zones were selected to give some diversity in terms of cropping 
patterns and cultural characteristics. Bhanga was comparatively low lying and 
contained many villages with a low cropping intensity. This district is distant from 
the capital and its district town is small. This area is also culturally more 
conservative than Mirzapur. 
Mirzapur lies comparatively high, and is thus suitable for irrigated winter crops. 
This results in a high cropping intensity. This district has direct road connection 
with the capital and is culturally less conservative than Bhanga. 
Two villages were selected randomly from each of these areas. From these four 
villages all women participating in wage employment in the village labour market 
were included in the sample. This gave a sample size of 77 women. This is referred 
to as the 'wage worker sample'. 
Three other women came from outside to live in these villages. They 
participated in wage employment in road construction outside the village. The road 
construction project offered regular employment to only a small number of women. 
It did not provide wage employment opportunities to other rural women in the areas 
studied. This construction was organised by a special agency and was not a 
component of the village labour market. The wages and employment of women 
involved in this activity were determined by the policy of the agency organising the 
project. The inclusion of these women would have been misleading for an analysis 
of the determination of wage and employment of women in a village labour market. 
These three women were therefore excluded from the sample. 
The rate of participation of rural women in wage employment is very small and 
any larger sample size would have required that a wider area be covered. Constraints 
of time and research facilities made such an extension impossible. 
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The objective of data collection in this sample was the study of the details of 
the female wage labour market. The data collection was financed by Winrock 
International. The data collection was completed by the author with the help of eight 
field investigators. Six were selected from Dhaka, the city where the author's office 
is located. One person with high school education was selected from a village in 
each of the areas. These two local persons helped to establish contacts with the 
villagers and win the confidence of the female workers who had to provide 
information on various aspects of their lives. 
The questions about income and employment referred to the twelve months 
ending in the month previous to the beginning of the survey. The main survey was 
preceded by a few weeks of pretesting and finalising questionnaires. Since the 
reference period was required to be the same for each interviewee, the survey of the 
workers was completed within two weeks. On average, each investigator 
interviewed one woman worker each day. Once the respondent was able to give 
time, it did not take the whole day to complete a questionnaire. But some effort was 
needed to contact the person and to fix an appointment for the next day. After the 
completion of interviews with the workers, information from the employers was 
collected. 
At the end of each week the questionnaires that had been completed during the 
week were checked for inconsistencies. If further crosschecking was required, or if 
there were any problems relating to the interpretation of replies, the questionnaires 
were taken back to the respondent during the next week. The data provided was on 
the whole reliable. The respondents, especially the female workers, were highly 
cooperative because of the opportunity to discuss their problems with an educated 
outsider. It was made clear to them that this survey would not give them any direct 
benefits, but could help them indirectly as policy makers would be made aware of 
their problems. 
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To understand the working of the labour market, some background information 
on the location and characteristics of the areas was required. This information was 
provided by government officials in local offices and the relatively well informed 
and experienced villagers. 
This information included the importance of various economic activities for the 
village households, the cropping patterns, cropping intensity, agricultural wage rates, 
communication facilities and aspects of land distribution. This information helped to 
confirm that the villages selected were not unusually rich or poor and did not possess 
any abnormal characteristics such as being dominated by a single landlord or 
moneylender. 
The interviews with the women wage workers started with personal 
information. This is not only useful as background to any type of analysis based on 
household survey data, but is also a natural starting point for discussion with a newly 
acquainted person. (The respondent usually reciprocated by asking questions about 
the personal and family background of the interviewer.) This part of the 
questionnaire obtained information on the demographic and economic characteristics 
of the worker and her family. These included her age, marital status, number of 
children bom, education (school attendance), age of the smallest child, family size 
etc. The major emphasis was on the worker's own income and employment. Data on 
her total employment over the last year and the earnings from that work were 
obtained. Data about other adult male and female members in the family and their 
incomes were also obtained. The economic standing of the family was important for 
this study. Information was thus collected on the possession of productive and other 
assets, including land. 
The interviews were held during the last two weeks of April, 1985, the first two 
weeks of the Bengali calendar year 1392. The data set relates to the Bengali 
calendar year preceding that fortnight. In the rural areas of Bangladesh, all activities 
are performed in relation to the Bengali year. Few people use the months of the 
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Roman calendar in everyday life. The first Bengali calendar month corresponds to 
April 14 to May 13. The other months follow approximately the same pattern. There 
may be a variation of one day from year to year. 
A direct question about total employment and earnings over one year would not 
bring a very accurate answer because employment was generally undertaken on a 
casual basis for a few days in different months. Similarly wages were received 
irregularly, following employment. To help the respondents recall their employment 
and eaming histories, questions were asked for each month. Thus for each month a 
woman was asked about the employer with whom she worked, the number of days 
worked and the length of those workdays. 
The enquiry also included details about wage rates. This involved a breakdown 
of how many meals were provided, what payment a woman received in crops and 
clothing, and what amount she was paid in cash. The next task was to convert these 
into a money wage equivalent. This conversion was done by using the market price 
of the meals and commodities received in that month. For agricultural commodities 
it was not difficult. On the basis of reports by most workers a monthly price list of 
the commodities in which payment was made was prepared. It was cross checked 
with the information from employers. This list was used for conversions for all the 
workers in the same area. 
Clothing provided included sarees which did not vary greatly in quality. Their 
prices were easily available as they were regularly bought and sold in village 
markets. 
The valuation of meals was the more difficult part of the conversion process. A 
full meal consists of cooked rice with a small amount of curry. On the basis of the 
opinion of the employers and the workers, a reasonable amount of rice (dry weight 
before cooking) for one meal was taken as half a kilogram. Even if there were 
variations in the size of the meal when women ate in their own houses, the variation 
was likely to have been much smaller when they ate in the employer's house. When 
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they ate in the employer's household, there was a tendency to eat as much as 
possible. The rice provided to the workers was cooked along with the employer's 
own. The fuel used in cooking was ignored. The meal was valued at the market 
price of uncooked rice. A mark up was added to cover the price of the curry. These 
valuations were less complicated than would have been the case in an urban area 
where the variation in the type and amount of foods consumed and their prices is 
often wide. Some omissions of small variations obviously occurred, but the value of 
such omission in terms of the quality of curry or the quantity of rice was usually 
minor. 
Data collected on the basis of memory recall obviously ran the risk of being 
inaccurate due to memory lapses. Attempts were made to overcome such problems 
by cross checking. The women's employment patterns were related to the cropping 
patterns in the villages. A comparison pointed out inconsistent replies. Information 
was also cross checked with the employer of each woman. The women's eagerness 
to provide correct answers helped in obtaining accurate information. Whatever 
lapses remain, are not likely to be systematic. 
A monthly round of interviews over a 12 month period might have been more 
accurate, but could not be undenaken because of resource limitations. 
In any case whether the quality of data would have been significantly improved 
by repeated surveys is a matter of doubt. If women were interviewed frequently, 
such interference with their own work might have meant that they lost their 
enthusiasm for providing correct answers. Employers of these women and their 
household members would have been suspicious about the motive of such 
interviewing. It would have been embarrassing to visit a povert\' stricken family 
several times without being able to be of any help to it. Studies which attempt such 
repeated interviews select a sample of workers who are cooperative and willing to 
provide such information regularly (Rahman and Islam 1986). This leads to an 
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unrepresentative sample. Thus the choice of relying on a single interview based on 
memory recall was desirable on grounds other than resource constraints. 
The employers of the female workers were interviewed to provide information 
for cross checking. They were also requested to express their opinions on the 
operation of the female labour market. 
An English version of the questions asked of the female workers is contained in 
Appendix A. It describes the content of the questions but does not state the exact 
way in which the questions were asked. Many of the questions had to be explained 
in different ways and some required supplementary questions to bring out the 
information needed. 
A summary of data on the variables used (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) for an analysis 
of wage and employment among female workers is presented in Appendix B. 
Characteristics of the villages of the wage worker women's sample 
It has been noted that the two upozilla from which the villages were selected had 
different ecological characteristics. Other characteristics of the areas also differed. 
The two villages in each area were quite close to each other. The villages in 
Mirzapur were 11 kilometres apart and in Bhanga they were only 7 kilometres apart. 
The villagers in each area speak the same local dialects and are culturally very 
similar. The villages of Mirzapur will be referred to as Mirzapur 1 and Mirzapur 2 
and the villages of Bhanga will be referred to as Bhanga 1 and Bhanga 2. 
The distances of the villages of Bhanga upozilla from the district head-quarters 
of Faridpur are between 25 to 30 kilometres. They are connected to Faridpur by mud 
roads. The capital city Dhaka is 70 kilometres from Faridpur. Thus these are remote 
villages in the interior. 
The villages in Mirzapur are 25 to 32 kilometres from the district town of 
Tangail. They are located within 5 to 10 kilometres of the Dhaka-Tangail highway 
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and thus have good communication with the district town and the capital city (which 
is 50 kilometres away). The time taken to communicate with Dhaka is not 
proportional to the distance. The villages of Bhanga do not have direct road access 
and a large river has to be crossed by ferry to reach Dhaka, while Mirzapur has easy 
and rapid communication with Dhaka. The location of these two areas is shown on 
Map 1. 
In the Bhanga villages 60 per cent of the land is low lying and 10 per cent 
elevated. Most land in Bhanga upozilla is deeply flooded during the monsoon 
months of June to August. A number of large rivers, namely, Sitalakhya, Kumar and 
Arialkha, flow through the upozilla. Some of the rivers and their branches touch the 
selected villages. Most of these rivers are navigable. 
In the villages in Mirzapur, low and highland account for 19 and 20 per cent 
respectively. The rest is medium elevation. A number of small channels criss-cross 
the villages, but these are thickly silted and only small boats can ply them in the 
rainy season. 
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Map 1 Map of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and the loaction of the 
villages surveyed 
W E 92° 
International boundary 
• National capital 
• Important district towns 
G Villages for survey of 
Grameen Bank members 
W Villages for survey of 
wage workers 
26"-. 
-22°N 
24°-
BAY OF BENGAL 
90°E 
Source: Rashid, H.E., Geography of Bangladesh, University Press limited, Dhaka, 
1977:94. 
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Table 2.1 presents data on some of the characteristics of these villages. All the 
selected villages in the two areas are similar in terms of dependence on agriculture. 
Therefore both the ownership of cultivable land and cropping intensity are important 
in identifying similarities or differences among villages. The ownership of 
cultivable land per household is very small, at 0.52, 0.66, 0.55 and 0.52 hectares in 
Mirzapur 1, Mirzapur 2, Bhanga 1 and Bhanga 2 respectively. The cropping 
intensity shows large differences between the two areas, though for the villages in 
each area cropping intensities are very similar. 
A final indicator of the difference between the two areas is given by the extent 
of female literacy. In the villages in Bhanga only a very small percentage of women 
are literate. 
Since the landless households are the potential suppliers of women wage 
workers and large landowners are the employers, the percentage of households in 
each category may be relevant for the labour market. Between 16 and 37 per cent of 
households in these villages did not own any cultivable land. As shown in Table 2.1 
only a small percentage of households in each village own more land than 2.02 ha (5 
acres). 
2.3 Data on self employed women: the female members of the Grameen Bank 
Primary data were collected by field surveys of a group of female members of the 
Grameen Bank and some non-members. These surveys were conducted from August 
to October, 1985. 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of the villages selected for the study of female wage workers 
Characteristics Mirzapur 1 Mirzapur 2 Bhanga 1 Bhanga 2 
Number of households in the village 187 162 143 110 
Total population 979 1000 900 605 
Distance from Dhaka (km) 53 50 70 75 
Distance from the district town(km) 25 32 25 30 
Culuvable land per household (ha) 0.52 0.66 0.55 0.52 
Percentage of households 
with land above 2 ha. (5 acres) none 4 2 4 
Percentage of landless households 44 26 45 41 
Cropping intensity^^^ 229 230 127 146 
Percentage of literate women 18 16 3 6 
Rank in terms of remoteness from capital city 1 1 2 2 
Major crops produced Boro HYV 
Aus 
Aman 
Boro HYV 
Aus 
Aman 
Jute 
Boro HYV 
Pulses 
Jute 
Aman 
pulses 
(a) Cropping intensity is defined as the total croppcd acreage over a year divided by the total cultivated area. 
Source: Survey of villages for wage worker women's study, 1985. 
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The objective of data collection was to analyse the impact of Grameen Bank 
lending on women's incomes. This was a part of a larger research project undertaken 
by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka, which aimed at the 
overall evaluation of the Grameen Bank's operations. The author was responsible for 
the collection of data among the female borrowers. In the collection and coding of 
data, she was helped by a number of field investigators and research assistants. 
Twenty per cent of the branches of the Grameen Bank, (five branches) that had 
been in existence for more than three years were randomly selected. The samples 
were selected from the older branches because the loan operations would not have 
made adequate progress in new branches. In cases where the number of members 
was still small, supervision by the Bank's field staff may have been too close to 
indicate independent decision making by the female borrowers. 
Within each branch one village was randomly selected from those villages 
where both male and female borrower 'centres' were operating. A centre is the group 
of borrowers in a village; the role of centres and the loan procedures are described in 
Chapter 7. Having both male and female centres was the usual situation; a male or 
female centre only was a transitional or preparatory phase. The selected villages are 
shown in Map 1 on page 18. 
Households in each of these five villages were stratified into eight groups (four 
landownership groups and farm and non-farm households in each group). A 
proportionate random sample was then drawn from each of the eight strata to obtain 
a sample of 40 households from each village. This will be referred to as the 
Grameen Bank village households sample. 
From the households which had no women members of the Grameen Bank, the 
housewife (the most important woman in the household) was interviewed. From 
households which had a woman member in the Grameen Bank, that woman was 
interviewed. The Grameen Bank member was usually also the housewife. Some 
problems of comparability may remain when the characteristics of the women 
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members and non-members are studied. Analysis of some of the issues require a 
comparison of the Grameen Bank members with the corrparable women in 
households which do not have a member in the Grameen Bank. It is difficult to 
judge who would be a 'comparable woman' in a non-member family. The most 
obvious choice was the housewife. 
The women were interviewed through structured questionnaires to collect 
information on the families' assets, income, and investment. Information on the 
woman's own income and employment was also collected. The interview included 
questions about access to food and clothing. This survey also included questions on 
the woman's personal characteristics, the personal characteristics of the male head of 
the household and the composition of the family. The content of the questionnaires 
is contained in Appendix A. 
In this sample, 34 families had women members in the Grameen Bank. One of 
the major interests in this study is to examine how the women members of Grameen 
Bank utilise the borrowed funds and generate employment and income for the 
family. For this purpose the 34 women borrowers from the above sample were not 
adequate. This information was therefore collected from a larger sample which 
included all women members of the Grameen Bank from the five sample villages. 
This gave a sample of 151 women of whom 132 women used borrowed funds in 
organising productive activities. These two samples are referred to as the 'borrowers 
sample' and the 'loan users sample' respectively. 
The Grameen Bank women members of these samples were interviewed to 
obtain information on the amount of loan obtained and the details of the running of 
her Grameen Bank financed enterprise. These details include the capital engaged in 
the enterprise, labour input from male and female members of the household and 
income generated by the activity. 
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Summary statistics on the variables used (Chapter 8, 9 and 10) in the analysis of 
Grameen Bank member women's employment and production activities are 
presented in Appendix B. 
The initial selection of the sample, pretesting of questionnaires and collection 
of village level information required a month. The two surveys were conducted with 
the help of 10 field investigators and were completed in another month. 
The interviewees were again welcomed by the Grameen Bank's women 
members. Their association with Bank staff and other Grameen Bank members had 
led them to realise the importance of discussing their situation and problems with 
others. As the women viewed the Grameen Bank loans very positively, they tried to 
provide accurate information. Even with good intentions, however, accounting for 
the details of family income and labour inputs into an enterprise was often difficult. 
In such cases, cooperation from the other family members who contributed labour 
inputs was useful. 
The survey of women from non-borrowing households, was also carried out 
without much difficulty. The poorer women especially were always happy to 
respond to interviews as this gave them a chance to discuss their situation. The 
principal problems encountered in this survey related to the collection of data on 
productive assets, especially land, owned by the rich households. There exists a 
government imposed upper ceiling on landownership of 13 hectares (33 acres) by a 
household. Households owning land above that limit will not reveal the extent of 
their land ownership. Some people owning more than 10 hectares are sometimes 
hesitant to reveal their full landownership. The landownership of very large 
landowners is thus likely to be underestimated. But these problems only relate to a 
small number of households and the actual value of this variable for large 
landowners has not been used in the analysis. Landownership was used to stratify 
households into broad landownership groups. 
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Characteristics of the selected villages with Grameen Bank members 
The five villages from which the samples of Grameen Bank member and non-
member households were selected come from three distant parts of the country and 
separate ecological zones. The Grameen Bank expanded in phases, covering villages 
in different parts of the country with various ecological, geographic and development 
characteristics. It must therefore be expected that the randomly selected villages will 
show diverse characteristics. The villages come from districts of Rangpur, Tangail 
(two villages), Gaibandha and Gazipur. 
Table 2.2 presents the characteristics of these villages. The distance of the 
selected villages from the city and district towns shows a wide range. Three of the 
villages are close to the capital city and have good links with it. These three have 
fast communication with both the district town and the capital city. The rank of each 
village in terms of remoteness is based on the combination of distance from the 
capital and communication facilities with the city and other business centres and the 
district headquarters. In Subsequent analysis the areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 will refer 
respectively to the village in Gazipur, two villages in Tangail, the village in Rangpur 
and the village in Gaibandha and will thus be in order of remoteness from the city. 
All the villages are predominantly agricultural. The average amount of 
cultivable land owned by a household and the average cropping intensity of the 
village are presented as two important characteristics. The selected villages capture 
some variation in terms of these characteristics. 
Education of women is an indicator of a village's level of conservativeness and 
its attitude towards women. Table 2.2 presents data on the percentage of women 
who had a high school education. The extent of literacy is not taken into account 
because once the Grameen Bank starts operating, its members are given literacy 
training. Therefore, the percentage of literacy would give an exaggerated picture of 
women's education. 
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T a b l e 2 . 2 Character is t ics of the vil lages selected for the study of G r a m e e n Bank financed self e m p l o y m e n t 
Character is t ics Gaz ipur Tangai l 1 Tangai l 2 Rangpur Gaibandha 
(area 1) (area 2) (area 3) (area 4 ) (area 5) 
Year of establishment of Grameen Bank 1981 1980 1979 1982 1982 
Number of households in the village 95 165 177 249 221 
Total population 518 988 904 1452 1092 
Distance from Dhaka (km) 48 80 65 250 220 
Distance from the district town (km) 15 0 5 4 8 
Cultivable land per household (ha) 0.61 0.36 0.28 0.52 0.52 
Percentage of households 2 2 none 12 5 
with land above 2 ha (5 acres) 
Percentage of households 72 52 82 62 77 
owning less than 0.2 ha. (50 dec) 
Cropping intensity^^) 183 243 217 207 208 
Percentage of households with women 4 9 3 5 3 
with high school education 
Rank in terms of remoteness (defined in text) 1 2 3 4 5 
Major crops produced Aus Aman Aus Aman Aman 
Aman Aus Boro HYV Jute Jute 
Boro HYV Jute Aman Boro HYV Rabi 
(a) Cropping intensity is defined as the total cropped acreage over a year divided by the total cultivated area. 
Source: Survey in Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
26 
Chapter 3 
Characteristics of the female labour market in rural Bangladesh 
The characteristics of the female labour market in rural areas are interesting in their 
own right as they reflect the wellbeing of workers and the labour market processes 
which influence it. An understanding of these characteristics is also necessary to 
develop a framework for the analysis of the determination of the wages the female 
workers receive and the employment they obtain. 
3.1 The organisation of female labour markets and their interlinkages 
In rural areas, especially for female workers, employment contracts are mostly 
informal. Since most of the women are illiterate, the question of a written contract 
does not arise. 
Formal or legal rules to guide the terms of employment and to fix wages and 
working hours do not exist. In most cases minimum wage legislation does not cover 
activities performed by women and even where it does, it is not effective in practice. 
Trade unions do not exist in rural areas. 
Employment is usually given to female workers on a casual basis. Agricultural 
production is a discontinuous, seasonal process involving much labour use in certain 
periods and very small amounts in others. Therefore the use of hired labour, whether 
in agricultural operations or in complementary activities, is related to the crop cycles. 
In response to such seasonal demand, most hired labour, male and female, is casually 
employed. 
The casual workers are hired to undertake a given task, and they are paid for the 
number of days it takes to complete it. For example, when a woman is engaged to 
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thresh wheat, she would work (either singly or with other hired women) until the task 
is completed. Such an arrangement is different from the casual employment of urban 
unskilled workers recruited daily from a place where labourers gather. In the 
following discussion, the term casual employment is used to describe employment 
contracts for a short and unspecified length of time and which may be different from 
daily employment. Studies of male labour markets in Bangladesh do not attempt to 
differentiate daily employment from other types of casual employment. 
In some areas a type of seasonal labour contract has emerged. A worker is 
employed for two to four months continuously. This takes place in the crop season 
when the volume of activity is high. 
Table 3.1 shows the importance of different types of contracts for women. 
Casual employment is dominant both in terms of the number of women involved and 
the number of days worked. 
In the Mirzapur villages, on average, 12 women obtained seasonal employment 
for 95 days during a year. Some of these women also worked on a casual basis 
during the rest of the year. Including these (who have double entries in Table 3.1), 
30 women worked on a casual basis. Only three women were employed on a regular 
basis. They claimed that they worked throughout the year (360 days on average) and 
enjoyed leave of only five days on the occasion of two major religious festivals. 
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Table 3.1 Importance of different terms of employment for female wage 
workers 
Terms of Women employed^^^ Total hours of employment 
employment 
Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Regular 3 9 789 10 
Seasonal 12 36 11957 15 
Casual 74 96 57692 74 
All types 77 77538 99 
(a) Percentages in this column will not add up to 100 because some women work in both seasonal 
and casual employment. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
In the two villages of the Bhanga area, neither regular nor seasonal employment 
contracts were observed. All 44 women obtained only casual employment. 
A number of studies of the male labour market in Bangladesh (Muqtada and 
Alam 1986, Islam and Rahman 1985) suggest that casual employment also 
dominates male workers' contracts. However, compared to the situation of female 
workers in the present study, the above studies show that a larger percentage of male 
workers are engaged on a regular basis. This is primarily because of the greater use 
of male labour for almost all agricultural operations. Women are employed for a few 
agricultural operations only. Farmers who are not themselves active in farm 
management engage male workers on a regular basis. The regular employees then 
perform a managerial role, organising production activities, managing the application 
of various inputs and supervising the hired casual workers. Women employees are 
not assigned similar roles because even in rich households, the families' own women 
engage actively in household activities. Hired women provide only supplementary 
labour. 
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Another special feature of labour contracts in rural labour markets are the daily 
hours of work. Depending on the type of work and the workload, a woman may start 
at dawn and work into the night. When a job has to be completed, it is more usual 
for a woman's workday to be extended than for more women to be engaged. The 
employer benefits by avoiding problems associated with the provision of extra space 
and the supervision of more workers. Women agree to work long hours because they 
are afraid that they may end up working fewer hours and days in total if more women 
are employed. Since these women do not obtain as much employment as they want, 
they prefer to work as many hours as possible. 
Table 3.2 shows the length of working days. Only 2 per cent of working days 
were less than a half day. In 81 per cent of cases women worked more than eight 
hours a day. 
Table 3.2 Distribution of employment among female wage workers according to the length of the working day 
Length of the working Days of Percentage of 
day (hours) employment workdays 
0.01 - 4.9 192 2 
5 .00-7 .9 1413 17 
8.00 - 9.9 3455 40 
10.0 & above 3519 41 
Total 8579 100 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
The total number of households employing female wage labourers ranged 
between 13 and 25. None of the employers hired more than three women 
simultaneously and most employers hired only one or two women at a time. Thus no 
one employer captured any major part of the market; none could exen monopsonistic 
30 
influences. Since employment is mostly casual, women are free to work with any 
employer, though for convenience many women work mostly with an employer who 
lives close by. Oligopsonistic collusion was not observed among the employers. 
The number of employers is too large for such collusion. In addition, they may not 
feel the necessity to collude because they do not feel any threat of a labour shortage 
or of a demand for unduly high wage rates. 
Interlinkage with credit markets 
'Interlinkage' describes a situation where transactions in two (or more) markets are 
linked: the transacting parties are the same so that the prices in the two markets are 
interdependent. As a result of the joint transaction, the price in each market may be 
different from that which would be obtained if the transactions were carried out 
independently. Such transactions take place because otherwise one of the markets 
would not exist at all, or because one of the parties (the weaker one), might not have 
access to one of the markets. Various types of risk and uncertainty may underlie the 
attempt to interlink markets (Bell 1988). In exchange for this advantage to the 
weaker party, the employer may influence prices and quantity to obtain more benefit 
than would be the case if the markets were independent. 
The most common form of interlinkage is between labour and land. 
Observation of the linkage between these two markets inspired the initial analysis by 
Bhaduri (1973) and this was followed by a rich development of theories and 
empirical studies of interlinked markets. The analysis of land and labour market 
interlinkages is not relevant to the present analysis because none of the families of 
the wage working women owned any arable land or cultivated leased land. 
Interlinkage between labour and credit markets has also received attention 
because of its implications for wage rates. In a study of two villages in Bangladesh, 
Islam and Rahman (1985) found differences in wage rates between a group of 
creditor workers and those who did not take credit from their employer. 
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In the present sample of wage worker women, 38 per cent of the women had 
loans from their employer. These women would not have been able to obtain loans 
from other sources because they could not provide any collateral. The employer-
lender knew the women personally, knew their needs and most importantly, was able 
to assess the credit risk. 
Most of the loans thus made are small. The average amount was taka 195, 
equivalent to about the average earnings from 22 days of wage employment (Table 
3.3). 
Table 3.3 Distribution of the size of loans taken by female workers from their 
employers 
Amount of 
loan (taka) 
Number of 
borrowers 
Percentage 
of women 
Average 
amount borrowed 
0 47 61 0 
1 - 100 10 13 62 
101 -300 14 18 170 
301 - 500 5 7 420 
501 & above 1 1 764 
Total workers 77 
Borrower-workers 30 
100 
39 
99 
195(a) 
(a) Average loan only among the borrower women. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
Ahhough the loans are small, they often play an important role in financing 
some essential expenditure in times of urgent need. Loans are taken for essentials 
such as food, medical and educational expenses. 
All the loans provided were free of an explicit interest charge. This form of 
credit influences the prices in the linked market and thus the effective interest rate 
may not be zero. Interlinked prices are discussed in the next two chapters. 
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Some authors overemphasise non-economic considerations in rural labour 
markets. One may observe cases of mutual help among employers and employees 
(Rudra 1984) as well as cases of the exploitation of the weaker parties. Theories of 
interlinkage provide an interpretation of some of the cases of mutual help in village 
labour and credit markets. 
3.2 Gender segmentation of labour markets and activities for female workers 
Gender division of labour within the household and within markets is characteristic 
of all societies and all historical phases of development to date (Boserup 1970, 
Amsden 1980, Khoo 1987). The rural labour market in Bangladesh is no exception. 
In a labour market for skilled workers, job segmentation may be created by 
employing women in jobs requiring less training and hence lower turnover cost than 
fully skilled jobs. Women are assumed to be less committed to the labour market 
and to move in and out of the labour market more frequently. In rural Bangladesh, 
labour market segmentation does not take place on the basis of human capital 
criteria, because almost all the work is unskilled. It may be argued that the physical 
effort required by some jobs leads to job segmentation, but only a few jobs, such as 
ploughing, require great strength. Yet in Bangladesh women are excluded from all 
agricultural field work. 
In family farm units women participate only in those activities which can be 
performed within household premises. This social constraint determines the type of 
work women may perform. Within agriculture, this type of work includes crop 
processing and storage and the rearing of livestock and poultry. The tradition of 
working within household premises has emerged from religious customs. It is 
reinforced because there is no shortage of male labourers for outside activities. 
Paid employment of women consists of activities which are potentially 
performed by the women of the employers' household. 
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Most of the female wage workers studied were employed primarily in crop 
processing activities, sometimes in combination with domestic activities which 
included cooking, cleaning and child care. Sometimes women are hired only to 
perform domestic work. None of these activities require any special training. These 
activities are performed with the same techniques that have been used for 
generations and are easily learnt by simply observing others doing the same job. 
Over the year almost all women were involved in a combination of domestic 
work and processing a few types of crops. Due to this overlap and because all these 
activities may be viewed as unskilled work, the distribution of women by type of 
activity has not been attempted. 
Job segmentation implies that total employment opportunities for women are 
limited and that they are accordingly underemployed. Since female workers are 
affected by job segmentation, they generally oppose it. In the survey they stated a 
willingness to work in jobs that are not currently available to them although this may 
require work in the field alongside men. 
As female labour is cheaper than male labour, the question of why 
segmentation persists arises. This segmentation of the labour market is in contrast to 
India where women are employed (even preferentially to male workers because they 
cost less) in such field operations as transplanting, weeding and harvesting. In some 
parts of Bangladesh tribal women, who have different cultures and religious 
traditions, work in all agricultural operations in their own field or as hired workers. 
Since segmentation is more serious for Muslim women, religion may have had a role 
in Bangladesh in initiating this tradition which is being continued by the existence of 
an economic rationale. ^ 
When employers were asked about the reasons for their preference for job 
segmentation, they defended their position on the grounds that it protected 
1. In countries such as Indonesia Muslim women participate in field operations. A combination of 
strong Javanese cultural influences with economic incentives has established a different tradition 
(Hart 1978). 
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traditional, cultural and religious mores. In addition to the role of customs and 
tradition, an economic basis for the persistence of segmentation may be that women's 
ability to perform field operations is not proven. Employers may feel that if women 
are employed in the field, they might require more supervision and this would be 
cosdy. 
3.3 Wage rates and forms of wage payment for women 
In the rural labour markets of Bangladesh wages are usually paid as a mixture 
of cash and kind. Payments in kind may include meals provided during the workday, 
payment in the form of crops processed on the employers farm, and clothing. 
Many women receive a part of their wages in the form of meals consumed 
during the workday. Provision of meals is also convenient for the employer. If a 
meal is not provided, the worker will have to go to her house to eat her meal. The 
employer will have to check the length of the breaks taken for each meal. Moreover, 
the total hours of work put in per day will be reduced. This is inconvenient when 
there is urgency in completing a task. When the poor women are employed to cook, 
they may steal some of the cooked food if they are not provided with a meal. Thus 
provision of meals reduces the need for watching the employed women. Payment in 
the form of crops is convenient for the employer. The producer-employers do not 
have to sell the product to obtain cash to pay wages. 
Table 3.4 gives the importance of each type of payment. In 16 per cent of the 
days, payment included a cash component. Payment in kind appears to be quite 
important. In 77 per cent of the days of all employment, payment included a 
component in kind, other than meal. In 86 per cent of the days women's wage 
included food, either as the only payment or in combination with other components. 
In many cases there is no cash payment at all for female workers, the entire wage 
being paid in kind or only as food. 
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Table 3.4 Forms of wage payment in the female labour market 
Form in which Number of Per cent Percentage of 
wage was paid receipients of total days during which each 
workers^^^ type of payment was made 
Only meal 18 23 6 
Only kind (non-meal) 3 4 2 
Only cash 50 65 11 
Meal plus other kind form 69 90 75 
Meal and cash 7 9 5 
Total 77 99 
(a) These percentages do not add up to hundred because some women obtained wages in more than 
one combination so that there are multiple entries. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
The percentage contribution of each type of payment to the total wage bill is 
shown in Table 3.5. In terms of the percentage of the total amount of payment, 
meals was the largest category. 
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Table 3.5 Contribution of different forms of payment to total wage of all women 
during the year 
Form of 
payment 
Total amount of 
payment (taka) 
Per cent of total 
payment 
Meals 
Cash 
Kind 
58,131 
12,070 
22,058 
63 
13 
24 
Total 92,259 100 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
Wage rates of unskilled rural wage workers in Bangladesh are low and women 
wage workers constitute the lowest paid group. The average wage received by the 
women studied was taka 10.7 for a days work (of average hours). The average wage 
rate per hour is taka 1.20. At the exchange rate prevailing in the year of the survey 
(1985) this gives a wage rate of US$ 0.35 per eight hours of work. 
Even though there was a 20 per cent variation (measured by the coefficient of 
variation) in the wage rates, the highest rates are still low. The distribution of wage 
rates is given in Table 3.6. 
The very low wage rates in rural Bangladesh are due to the low levels of 
productivity of agriculture and other rural sectors and a consequent low level of 
reservation wages. Various other factors may be responsible for the determination of 
the level of reservation wages of women, which in turn determine the wage rates. 
The logic behind the wage determination process is described in Chapter 5. 
Wages are so low that even if a woman obtained employment for 285 days a 
year (which is usually set as the full employment standard and which 95 per cent of 
these workers did not obtain), she would not be able to earn an amount sufficient for 
two persons to live above the poverty level (of taka 3500 per person per year). 
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Table 3.6 Distribution of wage received by the female workers 
Wage rate per Number of Percentage 
hour (taka) women of women 
0.01 - 0.8 3 4 
0.81 - 1.0 9 12 
1.01 - 1.2 26 34 
1.21 - 1.4 31 40 
1.41-2.5 8 10 
Total 77 100 
Average wage rate (taka) 1.2 
Source: Survey among wage worker women, 1985. 
Alhough wages for male labourers are also low, wage rates for unskilled male 
workers are higher than wage rates for female workers. The average agricultural 
wage for male workers was taka 3.30 per hour. Thus the female wage rate was only 
36 per cent of the male wage. Similar differences in wage rates by gender are 
indicated by other studies.^ Cain et. al. (1979) obtained a female wage rate of taka 
3.0 which was 30 per cent of the male wage rate (which was taka 10.0) in the same 
period and within the same area of Bangladesh. Similar evidences of wage 
differentials are reported by the Rural Industries Study Project (1981) which found 
female wage rates in small scale rural industries to be 42 per cent of the male wage 
rate. National level data (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 1986a) reports female 
wage rates to range between 40 to 50 per cent of the male wage rate. 
2. Bardhan (1984a) found that the female wage rate is significantly lower than the male wage rale in 
West Bengal in India. Rosenzweig(1984) using National Sample Survey data for India, found that the 
female wage rate was 79 per cent of the male wage. Kelkar reports that in some parts of India 'despite 
equal remunerations acts women generally get 40 to 60 per cent of male wages' (1987:78). 
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3.4 Underemployment and seasonality of employment 
The existence of a large volume of suq)lus labour among rural workers in the densely 
populated developing countries of South Asia is commonly accepted. 
Surplus labour in these labour markets is, of course, very different from 
unemployment in industrial countries. Due to the prevalence of casual employment 
those who need wage work do not usually remain unemployed for the whole year. 
Unemployment takes the form of underemployment during a part of the year. 
The formal definition of an unemployed person, that is, a person who did not 
have work and who had been looking for jobs at the prevailing wage rate, was used 
in the 1974 Census of Bangladesh. This indicated a rate of unemployment of less 
than 1 per cent. This was clearly absurd. Realising the inapplicability of this 
concept, the 1981 Census did not attempt to measure unemployment. 
Census definitions of formal unemployment obviously do not apply in labour 
markets in which people do not actively search for jobs (Sen 1975) and who cannot 
remain without any work when there is no provision for unemployment benefits. 
These problems led to the use of a time criterion for measuring 
underemployment. Underemployment is defined as the difference between the days 
of employment obtained per worker and a hypothetical norm for the number of days 
for which a worker should be working (Krishna 1973, 1976). This norm is set by 
allowing a number of days of the year for weekly holidays and annual leave. 
Whether the maximum supply available should take weekly or annual holidays 
into account is a matter of judgement. Caution is needed about the standards used 
for the calculation of underemployment rates and the interpretation of those rates. ^  
This study uses an artificial standard of 285 days (with a provision of 52 days 
of weekly holidays and 28 days of annual leave) as full time employment for women 
3. Muqtada(1975) and Masum(1982) used the norm of 288 and 300 days, while Khan et al(1981), 
Rahman and Islam(1986) use 283 and 270 days respectively. Ahuja (1978) sets the norm of female 
labour supply as 225 days. 
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in wage employment. On this basis, the women in this study were unemployed for 
56 per cent of their time. The underemployment rate was 48 per cent in the villages 
in Mirzapur and 69 per cent in the villages in Bhanga. These underemployment rates 
are much higher than the underemployment rates for male workers reported by other 
studies using similar standards. In a review of the labour market studies for 
Bangladesh, Islam (1989) concluded that underemployment among male workers 
ranged between 25 to 33 per cent. Wallace et al. (1987), however, show even larger 
underemployment rates among women wage workers from landless households. 
Underemployment rates calculated from their data were 77 per cent and 80 per cent 
in two villages using the same standard as the present study. 
Table 3.7 indicates the magnitude of underemployment faced by the wage 
worker women studied. Only 7 per cent of the women worked for 285 days or more. 
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Table 3.7 Distribution of female workers by length of unemployment 
Percentage of 
days unemployed 
Number of 
workers 
Percentage 
of workers 
0 5 7 
0.01 - 20.0 4 5 
20.01 - 40.0 4 5 
40.01 - 60.0 18 23 
60.01 - 80.0 37 48 
81.0 and above 9 12 
Total 77 100 
Average percentage 
of unemployment 
56 
Source: survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
This time criterion measure of underemployment does not take into account the 
fact that some workers may not be willing to work for the number of days used as the 
artificial standard but others may be willing to work every day without taking a 
weekly break. A modification of the time criterion has been used in a few studies of 
India (Visaria 1981, Paul 1988, Sundram and Tendulkar 1988). This modification 
replaced the standard norm of labour supply by actual information on supply, based 
on a question about how many days a person wanted to work or was available for 
work. 
For the present sample of women, this actual supply may be taken as 365 days 
(or 360 days), because when asked about this, they indicated that they would like to 
work for the whole year. This measure gives a 70 per cent underemployment rate for 
the women studied. This rate, however, cannot be compared to other studies of 
Bangladesh that use standard supply formulations. 
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Seasonality of employment 
Because employment in the rural areas of South Asia is dominated by agricultural 
activities, it is characterised by fluctuations related to cropping patterns. As women 
are mainly employed for post-harvest activities, their employment shows pronounced 
seasonal fluctuations. A number of studies (Khuda 1978, Cain et al. 1979, Khan et 
al. 1981, Rahman and Islam 1986) show the seasonal fluctuations in the employment 
of male and female workers in Bangladesh. In a monsoon dependent agriculture, the 
workload is highly concentrated into periods in which it is urgent to complete key 
tasks. This urgency is felt simultaneously by most employer households. A 
relatively large number of workers is required in these periods. Seasonal pressure 
affects monthly demand for workers, the demand for days worked and the demand 
for hours worked each day. 
Table 3.8 shows the seasonal patterns of employment for the female workers. 
The variation (as measured by the coefficient of variation) in the number of workers 
over the months is greater than the variation in total employment. The coefficient of 
variation of average days for which workers are employed in each month is smaller 
than the variation in the number of workers who obtain employment in each month. 
The largest number of women is employed in the second month of the year. 
The total number of days for which they are employed is also largest in this month. 
Only 8 per cent of the workers are then unemployed. The number of days of 
employment in this month was 46 per cent less than the total supply. Two major 
crops are processed at this time: wheat and a high yielding variety of winter rice. In 
the six other months, less than 60 per cent of the workers obtained employment. 
The average working hours during a day varied similarly to total employment, 
although the extent of the variation was somewhat smaller. 
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Table 3.8 Monthly variation of employment among female workers 
Month (a) Number of 
women 
employed 
Total 
days of 
employment 
Average 
days of 
employment 
per worker 
Daily 
hours of 
employment 
April - May 59 961 16.3 9.8 
May - June 71 1244 17.5 9.5 
June - July 58 1062 18.3 9.5 
July - Aug 29 417 14.4 8.9 
Aug - Sept 47 514 10.9 7.7 
Sept - Oct 41 456 11.1 8.1 
Oct - Nov 36 540 15.0 8.8 
Nov - Dec 41 761 18.6 9.5 
Dec - Jan 26 426 16.4 8.1 
Jan - Feb 44 542 12.3 8.1 
Feb- March 61 881 14.4 9.1 
March -Apr 51 776 15.2 9.3 
All months 77 715 13.4 7.6 
Coefficient 
of variation 
over 12 months 
24.3 36.9 16.5 7.6 
(a) The first Bengali calendar month corresponds to April 14 to May 13. The other months follow 
approximately the same pattern. There may be a variation of one day from year to year. The above 
table relates from the middle of each month to the middle of the next, thus giving the actual 
distribution for Bengali months for which data was obtained. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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3.5 Personal and family characteristics of female workers 
Marital status 
Distribution of the wage workers according to marital status compared to the 
distribution of adult women according to marital status (on the basis of national data) 
is presented in Table 3.9. 
Among the wage workers studied only 8 per cent come from the never married 
group. The national figure gives 24 per cent of adult women as unmarried. The 
national figure of married women among adult is 64 per cent and this is close to the 
percentage of married women among these wage workers which was 61 per cent. 
Table 3.9 Marital status of female workers surveyed and a comparison with 
national data 
Marital status Number of 
workers 
Percentage 
of workers 
Per cent of 
adult women 
(aged 18 yrs 
or above) in 
Bangladesh 
(1981) 
Unmarried 6 
Currently married 47 
Widowed and divorced 24 
8 
61 
31 
24 
63 
13 
Total 77 100 100 
Source: Women wage workers, Survey of wage worker women; All adult wom.en, Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics, Census of Bangladesh 1981: Analytical Findings and National Tables, 
Government of Bangladesh, 1984. 
The percentage of divorced and widowed women, however, is much higher 
among the women studied than in the national figures. Widowed or divorced women 
are naturally under greater pressure to find wage employment than other women. 
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Age 
The average age of the women studied was 32 years. There are no upper or lower 
legal age limits for entering full time employment. A few very young and very old 
women are thus found in wage employment. The age distribution of female workers 
is given in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 Age distribution of female workers 
Age group Number of Percentage 
(years) workers of workers 
1 0 - 2 0 7 9 
2 1 - 3 0 36 47 
3 1 - 4 5 27 35 
4 6 - 6 0 6 8 
Above 60 1 1 
Total 77 100 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
Family type and the number of male earners 
The type of family in which the female workers live is shown in Table 3.11. 
Nuclear families dominate though joint and extended families also constitute a 
significant percentage. Although unmarried, divorced and widowed women 
constitute 39 per cent of the sample workers, only 17 per cent of them come from 
female headed households (defined as famiUes where there is no adult male). 
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Table 3.11 Type of family in which the female workers live 
Type of family Number of female Percentage of 
wage workers female wage workers 
Nuclear 63 82 
of which 
i. male headed, nuclear (50) (65) 
ii. female headed, nuclear (13) (17) 
Extended 10 13 
Joint 4 5 
Total 77 100 
(a) A nuclear family is defined as where the parent/s live with unmarried children only (or without 
child). 
An extended family is one where there are other relatives in the family apart from the parent/s and 
children but there is no more than one couple. 
A joint family is one which includes two couples with or without other members. 
(b) A female headed family is one where there is no adult male. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
The lack of male earners in the family is an important reason pushing women to 
take up wage employment. Twenty per cent of these women did not have any male 
earners in their family (Table 3.12). The average number of male earners was 1.1 
per family. The average number of male earners was 1.4 if all the landless 
households in the villages are considered. 
Table 3.12 Number of male earners in the families of female wage workers 
Number of 
male earners 
Number of families Percentage of families 
of female workers 
0 15 20 
1 45 58 
2 12 16 
3 5 6 
Total 77 100 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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Age of the youngest child 
The distribution of the age of the youngest child of the female wage workers is 
presented below. It is observed that a large number of these workers have a small 
child. 
Table 3.13 Distribution of female workers by the age of their youngest child 
Age of the 
youngest child 
(in years) 
Number of 
women wage 
workers 
Percentage of 
women wage 
workers 
Without child 13 17 
0 - 2 . 0 14 18 
2 .1-5 .0 23 30 
5 .1-7 .0 13 17 
7.1 - 10.0 2 3 
10.01 & above 12 15 
Total 77 100.0 
Source: Survey of female wage workers, 1985. 
Ownership of productive assets and male earnings 
The families of the female workers had almost no assets. None of the families of 
these women possessed any productive land. Thirty two per cent of these families 
did not even own their homestead land. The average value of productive assets 
owned by these families was only taka 185. 
The income of the male earners, (where there were any) was extremely low 
(Table 3.14). 
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Table 3.14 Male income per family member in the families of female workers 
Male income per 
member 
Number of 
families 
! Percentage of 
families 
0 
1 - 1750 (a) 
1750 - 3500 (b) 
3500 & above 
15 
55 
6 
1 
20 
71 
8 
1 
Total 77 100 
(a) Taka 1750 is half the poverty level income per person per year. 
(b) Taka 3500 is the poverty level income. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
All cases were below the poverty level. In fact, most of the families' incomes 
were below half the poverty level. The average annual male income per family 
member was taka 680. The poverty of these families and the female workers 
themselves was very apparent from the appearance of the thatched houses in which 
they lived, the lack of clothing among the children and the very worn out dresses 
used by the women themselves. 
The poverty in which these women live indicates that the participation of 
women in wage employment is dictated by economic pressure.'^ 
Importance of kinship relations 
Kinship plays an important role in the social and economic life of any village. An 
attempt to assess the importance of kinship in the female labour market was made. 
All women workers claimed to have kinship relation with the employer. But they 
4. Khandker(1987) argued that the participation of women in market work is not dictated by customs 
or social tradition but is determined by the economic forces which creates a difference between the 
value of market work and the value of subsistence and housework. In our study we could not attempt 
a formal analysis of the statistical difference between the economic situation of women wage workers 
families and other landless families because our major objective was to analyse the employment and 
earnings of female workers. Data were not collected for other households. 
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emphasised kinship because they considered it face-saving to say that they did not 
work in the house of an unknown person. According to village custom, employees 
usually address employers by some kinship term. As all the workers had kinship 
relation with the employer, it could not be assessed whether it made any difference in 
their wage rates. 
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Chapter 4 
Wage determination in low income surplus labour economies: a review of 
theories and evidence 
This chapter reviews theories of wage determination and their application to 
Bangladesh and similar countries. The objective is to determine whether the existing 
theories provide a meaningful explanation of wage determination for the female 
workers studied. 
The competitive model forms the basis for explaining the determination of any 
price. The theories of wage determination based on competitive principles are 
widely applied. Human capital theory has been developed to explain earning 
differentials in labour markets operating on competitive principles. 
Extensions of competitive theory have been used to take into account various 
specialities in rural labour markets in low income surplus labour economies. Two 
important extensions include seasonal variation in wage and employment, and 
interlinkages between the labour and credit markets. 
The most important phenomenon unexplained by the competitive theor>' is the 
persistence of a large volume of unemployment and underemployment among 
workers in developing countries. 
Classical subsistence theory provides an alternative explanation of wage 
determination in the presence of underemployment. The efficiency wage version 
provides an alternative economic basis to the subsistence theory. Though they are 
based on separate principles, they have broad similarities in their predictions. 
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Other explanations of wage determination have been developed. These include 
the recruitment cost based theory and wage bargaining theories. Both these theories 
take into account the presence of underemployment. 
Because there have been few studies of the wage determination process in the 
rural labour market in Bangladesh, India, with similar characteristics in its rural 
labour markets is used to illustrate the various theories. 
Finally, the major theories are applied to explain wage determination for the 
female workers studied. 
4.1 Competitive theory and the role of human capital 
The general principle of competitive theory suggests that the wage rate will be 
determined by the interaction of demand and supply in the labour market. The price 
of labour (the wage rate) will adjust to clear the market and there will be no 
involuntary unemployment. The demand for a particular type of labour is given by 
the marginal product of that labour. Therefore, for a given supply of labour, the 
marginal product of labour determines the wage rate. In such a situation a 
homogeneous group of workers forms a single commodity with the same marginal 
productivity; the workers in that group will command the same price and there will 
be no wage variation among them. 
The competitive framework may be extended to analyse wage differences of 
heterogenous workers on the basis of their productivity differences. Productivity 
differences are created by differences in investment in human capital. The influence 
of human capital on the wage rate was first emphasised by Becker (1964). All recent 
work on wage and earnings takes human capital into account. 
In simple terms, investment in human capital postpones earnings but improves 
the productivity potential of an individual. The foregone earnings during the 
learning period are compensated for by higher returns in the future. Investment may 
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include formal education and on the job training, both of which influence wage rates 
positively. 
The competitive wage determination process may be impeded by such labour 
market imperfections as the existence of trade unions and minimum wage laws. It 
may also be impeded by imperfections in the capital market. As a result, wage 
determination on the basis of marginal productivity may not always occur, even in 
industrial countries. 
In developing countries like Bangladesh, institutional factors may be considered 
favourable to competitive wage determination. Trade unionism and minimum wage 
legislation are absent, especially in rural areas. However, the absence of these 
impediments is by no means a sufficient indicator that a competitive wage 
determination process is operating. The prevalence of large scale unemployment, 
which according to the model should be removed by a downward adjustment of the 
wage rate, is evidence that the competitive model is not operating. In addition, rural 
wage workers in Bangladesh and other developing countries, are engaged mostly in 
unskilled manual work. The variation of wage rates among these workers, who 
appear to be homogeneous, is an issue that does not seem to be explained within a 
perfectly competitive framework. 
There are reasons for viewing the role of human capital variables in such a 
labour market sceptically. The workers are too poor to make an investment in 
human capital and most jobs do not require any skill. 
Even if there are differences in their ability, it is difficult to capture these 
differences in terms of variables such as age and experience. In the rural areas of 
developing countries the role of experience may not be important in activities for 
which hired labour is used. Most of the operations can be mastered within a short 
period and the impact of experience may not be felt at all. Age cannot be used as 
proxy for experience as is commonly done in human capital models. Workers do not 
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enter the labour force at the same age because there are no institutional rules 
regarding compulsory education or minimum age for labour force participation. 
Some researchers implicitly assume that the rural labour markets in these 
developing countries do not consist entirely of unskilled workers. They therefore 
attach importance to experience and skill. Education and on the job experience are 
given the same role as that developed by human capital theory. In addition, other 
personal characteristics which may influence productivity even among unskilled 
workers, are identified. Age, health and nutritional standards are among these. 
Recent attempts to explain wage variation by recognising the heterogeneity of 
rural labour, use various combinations of these factors. Only those studies of India 
and Bangladesh that used the characteristics of workers to explain interpersonal 
variations in the wage rate within a village are reviewed here. A number of studies 
use a competitive demand supply equilibrium model to analyse interregional 
variations of wage rates, but they are beyond the scope of this study. 
Rajaraman (1986) in a study of four Indian villages, identified the heterogeneity 
of workers in terms of age and landownership. Age was represented by dummies for 
four different age groups. Dummies for the higher age groups had a significant 
negative impact while the lowest age group had a positive (though not significant) 
impact. Landownership had a positive effect on wage rates. While age was taken to 
represent productivity directly, landownership was expected to influence 
productivity through its impact on nutrition. 
The difficulties of interpreting age as a human capital variable in this context 
have already been discussed. Similarly, the impact of landownership on nutrition is 
indirect and uncertain. Rajaraman's argument is that landownership raises income 
and thereby enhances efficiency and thus raises the wage rate. This discussion enters 
the realm of efficiency wage theory. It could then be considered whether wage 
income itself also enhances productivity. The problems associated with the use of 
efficiency wage theory and its relevance is discussed in the next section. While 
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Rajaraman uses a competitive framework to explain wage differentials, she does not 
make it clear whether any underemployment was observed in her sample and if so, 
how this fits into a competitive framework. 
In the analysis of wage rates in a sample of a large number of villages in India, 
Rosenzweig (1984) used age and education as explanatory variables representing the 
eff iciency of a worker. But this approach proved to be unsuccessful. His estimates 
did not show any of these variables having a significant influence on wage rates. He 
concluded that agricultural labourers in villages form a homogeneous group in terms 
of productivity. This conclusion cannot, however, be derived from Rosenzweig's 
regression results since not all the workers were paid the same wage. The reasons 
for wage variations among workers within a village remain to be clarified. This 
study also does not take underemployment into account. 
Ryan (1982) and Ryan and Wallace (1987) used more direct measures of 
productivity and examined their influence on the wage rate of rural labourers. These 
studies used experience, age, square of age^ and weight-for-height as human capital 
variables influencing productivity. All these variables showed a significant positive 
impact on the wage rate for male workers, but were not significant for female 
workers. Thus these studies could not explain variations of wage rates among female 
workers within a village. They did not elucidate why this set of factors is relevant to 
the explanation of wage variations among male workers but not for female workers. 
The Ryan and Walker 1987 paper indicated that the workers in the villages from 
which their samples came faced large scale underemployment. It is difficult to 
understand how the human capital factors that they identified exert their influence. 
Dreze et al. (1986) tested the relevance of various theories of wage 
determination for a village in India. They found difficulty in relying on the 
competitive framework because there was involuntary underemployment. They also 
1. Square of age takes into account the non-linear effect of age. That is, up to a point age may 
enhance productivity, but after that it may have a negative impact; this change in the type of influence 
is captured by square of age. 
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observed that "sharp and known differences in the quality of labourers exist and yet 
the same wage applies to all' (Dreze et al. 1986:33). This runs counter to the 
predictions of competitive wage determination. 
A study by Cain and Mozumdar (1980) is the only study based on data from 
Bangladesh which tried to examine the relevance of competitive theory to intra 
village variations in wage rates. The regression analysis examining the factors 
influencing wage variations concluded that age and the square of age have 
significant positive and negative influences respectively. This would be expected 
when age reflects efficiency through physical capability. The fact that the peak 
season wage was significantly higher than the slack season rate, provided additional 
evidence in favour of competitive wage determination. 
Cain and Mozumdar's analysis of the variation in the hourly wage rate refers 
only to male workers. Thus the analysis does not throw light on the process of wage 
determination for female workers. Moreover, the conclusion accepting competitive 
wage determination may be questioned on the following grounds. 
First, the authors report the existence of involuntary underemployment among 
the workers in the village studied. The conflict between this and the working of 
competitive forces which should have cleared the market was not resolved. 
Another important weakness of their analysis is that, in the regression analysis, 
variables based on predictions resulting from different theories are combined. 
Competitive theory, efficiency wage theory and non-economic factors are all used 
together. In each of the equations some non-economic variables were found 
significant in explaining wage variations. There is no reason why all these factors 
should work together with competitive forces. The influence of variables related to 
each theory should be tested separately. 
Table 4.1 presents a comparison of the results obtained from the empirical 
studies discussed above. Two findings emerge. The influence of human capital 
55 
variables in explaining wage variation is rather weak. It is quite irrelevant for the 
female wage rale. The number of significant coefficients are few for the female 
wage functions. Again, there is a large variation in the type and significance of 
variables across studies and for male and female samples within the same studies. 
This makes generalisation impossible and casts doubt on the appropriateness of the 
use of these variables and of the applicability of the competitive framework. 
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Table 4.1 A comparison of the influence of human capital factors on wage rates in the studies of wage determination in India 
and Bangladesh 
Name of the study Sign and significance of the coefficients of human capital factors 
Wage equation Age Square of Educa- Exper- Square of Land Body weight/ 
for males age tion ience experience owned standard weight 
Rosenzweig (1984) + NS - N S + NS + NS 
Rajaraman (1984) + Sig -Sig +C&- NS (a) 
Ryan (1982) + Sig -Sig + Sig + NS -^Sig 
Ryan et al(1987) + NS + Sig -Sig + Sig 
Cain & + Sig -Sig 
Mozumdar(1980)(^) 
Wage equation for Females 
Ryan (1982) + NS - N S + NS - N S -NS 
Rosenzweig (1984) - N S + NS + NS + NS 
Rajaraman (1986) + NS -Sig + Sig 
+ NS(c) Ryanet al (1987) + NS + NS - N S 
(a) Four equations were estimated for four villages. In two villages this coefficient was positive, in two villages in was negative 
(b) This study uses the ratio of weight with the standard at each height, while the other study uses the standard at each age. 
(c) This study is for a sample of workers from Bangladesh; all other studies arc for Indian samples. 
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Seasonality and competitive wage determination 
Though it is more or less agreed that there is substantial underemployment among 
rural workers in South Asian countries, underemployment is not uniformly spread 
over the seasons. The phenomenon of seasonality has been included only in a small 
number of studies of wage determination. 
Ryan's study (1982) regards the seasonal variations in wage rates and 
employment as an outcome of the competitive process as the demand for labour 
shifts between the peak and the slack seasons and different competitive equilibriums 
are achieved. He includes a peak season dummy as an explanatory variable in the 
analysis of wage determination. Thus this analysis ignores the existence of 
involuntary underemployment in any season. 
Ahmed(1981) considers wage determination in peak and slack seasons as 
separate processes. Because there was no unemployment in the peak season, Ahmed 
concluded that the wage rate was competitively determined. He resorted to the 
concept of subsistence wage to explain slack season wage determination. This is in 
contradiction to his own conclusion in the same paper, that subsistence wage theory 
is not able to explain the variation of wages in his sample. Thus an explanation of 
slack season wage determination remains to be derived. 
Interlinked markets and wage variation 
Interlinkage between the female labour market and the credit market has already 
been noted. A large number of studies discuss the issue of such interlinkages, but 
most of the studies relate to labour and land market linkages. It has been mentioned 
(Section 3.1) that land and labour market interlinkage is not relevant for the present 
study because the female workers' families do not cultivate any land. The following 
discussion concentrates on studies related to labour and credit market interlinkage. 
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Basu (1983) develops a theoretical framework to show how the existence of an 
interlinkage between labour and credit markets may explain the dispersion of prices 
of either labour or credit within a village or between nearby villages. 
Basu takes into account the interdependence of wage and interest through the 
utility function of a worker which is a function of these two rates. In a competitive 
market, this utility index plays the role that price plays in a conventional market. 
The value of this utility index, the amount of employment, the wage rate and rate of 
interest are then determined competitively. 
Several implications follow from this framework. For example, the rate of 
interest need not equal the opportunity cost of funds to the lender-employer. In 
particular the following more general relationships are established. A landlord who 
charges an interest rate below his opportunity cost will pay a wage less than the 
marginal product and vice versa. Thus the interlinkage of markets is responsible for 
the apparent absence of a competitive wage. 
For any two borrower-employees the person who pays a lower interest will 
receive a lower wage rate as well. These interlinkages can also explain the 
frequently observed phenomenon of differing wage rates between neighbouring 
villages. It follows that the interest charged by an employer may be zero. 
The shortcomings of this approach arise from the assumptions about the nature 
of credit and labour markets. Basu's assumption is that high potential risk in the 
credit market lies at the core of the interlinkages. Potential risk may be neutralised if 
the credit market is tied to the labour market. Basu does not take into account that 
there may be some risk element in the labour market as well. In the peak season 
there may be a potential risk of not obtaining enough labour. This may encourage 
the employer-lender to interlink the markets. This may lead to entirely different 
outcomes in terms of prices. Such a situation was found by Binswanger et.al. 
(1984). This study shows that when there is a fear of labour shortage, the workers 
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with better bargaining power may obtain loans at a lower rate of interest and obtain a 
higher wage rate as well. 
Basu's theory implies that the wage variation between borrower and non-
borrower workers will be explained by the excess of interest payment (over the 
opportunity cost of capital). It can also happen that, simply for being able to borrow, 
the borrower-worker receives a lower wage even after adjustment is made for the 
rate of interest. This inadequacy is built into Basu's model because he assumes that 
as long as workers are prepared to pay the opportunity cost of a loan by foregoing 
wages, they would have no problem in obtaining a loan. This may not always be the 
case. Merely obtaining a loan may be viewed as a privilege. 
The present study of female workers is concerned with a surplus labour 
situation. It may be expected that Basu's conclusions will be relevant. In a labour 
surplus situation Islam and Rahman (1985) found that credit tied workers received a 
lower wage than untied labourers. Bardhan and Rudra (1981) noted the same 
phenomenon: the workers who receive credit from the employer receive a lower rate 
of wage in some villages in West Bengal. However, these studies did not present 
any information about the variation of the wage rate with the interest charged or the 
amount of loan. 
In the context of poor rural workers, the uncertainty in the labour market may 
be given an interpretation different from mere scarcity of labour in the peak period. 
The workers may not have sufficient means to sustain themselves over the period of 
lean seasons and thus ensure that they will possess enough energy to work in the 
busy season. Provision of low paid and low productivity employment during the 
slack season can provide a solution, but this is not feasible either in view of a wage-
efficiency relationship, a higher reservation wage or because of supervision 
problems. Consumption credit can bridge the gap. This gives interlinkage a role to 
play. 
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Doubts exist about the extent of interlinked transactions among casual 
labourers. Datt (1989) argues that interlinkages are more likely to occur among 
attached workers. However, there is no reason why interlinkage should not occur 
among casual workers as long as the workers live in the same village and continue to 
depend on the lender for future casual employment. The importance of interlinkages 
was found to vary among the different regions within India (Bardhan and Rudra 
1978, 1981). 
A more basic point to note is that Basu (1983) formulated the effects of 
interlinkage by modelling interhnkages in terms of a competitive wage determination 
process. However, if the prices in the two markets are viewed as a composite price, 
interlinkage would be consistent with the subsistence or the efficiency wage models 
of wage determination. Empirically, the extent of interlinkage could explain wage 
variation among labourers by working simultaneously with variables that are 
relevant either in competitive wage determinadon or in other models. 
4.2 The subsistence theory of wages 
In the various versions of the subsistence theory, a person's subsistence requirement 
is seen as the criterion of wage determination. If this subsistence requirement is 
higher than the equihbrium wage rate, there will be unemployment. This may 
happen in a situation where the level of productivity is so low that a market clearing 
wage will not ensure a worker's subsistence. In what follows, we discuss the two 
versions of subsistence theory: the classical theory and the nutrition based 
subsistence theory. Both provide distinct logic for establishing wages at the 
subsistence level. This group of theories shows that characteristics such as family 
size and land ownership rather than human capital variables may influence wage 
rates. 
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Classical subsistence theory 
Classical subsistence wage theory was formulated as a long run phenomenon. In the 
application of the theory, it is therefore important to identify the time context. 
In the long run real wages would be set at a level which ensures the 
reproduction of labour. In this sense subsistence refers to a physical requirement and 
population growth is taken to be an increasing function of real wage. The classical 
view is that there is a constant tendency for real wage rates to retum to the 
subsistence level. An increase in wages paid may bring a temporary improvement in 
living standards, but this improvement will soon be swamped by increased rates of 
population growth. If wage rates fall below the subsistence requirement, 
malnutrition, disease and death will reduce the labour force and wages will rise to 
ensure its survival. Thus wages will meet the subsistence requirements of the worker 
in such a way that the reproduction of labour is ensured. 
Wage rates determined by physical subsistence imply a stable real wage rate 
over time and across regions. The test of the applicability of the subsistence wage 
theory is most often based on this criterion. A large number of studies of the Indian 
labour markets examine the regional and temporal stability of real wage rates. While 
the majority of the studies show significant regional differences in the real wage 
rates, several studies fmd regional stability of wage rates. The emphasis of the 
present study is not on the regional variation of wage rates and the two types of 
findings are therefore not reviewed in detail. Bardhan (1970), Lai (1976), Ghose 
(1980), Mundle (1984) and Unni (1988) are among those that show regional 
differences in real wage rates. Rodgers (1975), Bhalla (1979) and Kumar and 
Sharma (1983) are among those studies that show wage stability. Mere stability of 
real wage rates cannot be used to prove that wage rates have been determined by 
subsistence. A direct assessment of the appUcability of the subsistence theory 
requires that the determinants of such subsistence are identified and prevailing wage 
rates are compared with the wage rate predicted by the theor>'. The implication of 
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the personal and family characteristics for the subsistence amount needs to be 
clarified. This has not been demonstrated by the proponents of the theory. 
Thus the question of wage variation within small regions or within a village 
remains to be explained and classical subsistence theory does not appear to be very 
helpful for that purpose. 
Classical theory distinguishes between a strictly economic concept of a 
subsistence wage based on physical requirements and a culturally determined level 
of wage. Ricardo (1817) was explicit about the presence of a culteral element in the 
subsistence wage. "Wage rate is expected to vary with customs and habit and over 
time and among countries'(Ricardo 1817:96). Lewis also mentions that the 
'conventional wage depends on social attitudes' (Lewis 1972:77). Sharif (1986) in a 
review of various meanings of 'subsistence' emphasises the role of time and society. 
If a subsistence wage is defined as one determined by cultural norms, customs 
and tradition, it is difficult to verify whether a subsistence wage prevails. Many 
authors are inclined to accept that rural wage rates are determined by traditional 
subsistence levels without a systematic examination of the determinants of wage 
rates. For example. Khan observes that "In any given time period and for any given 
community, there is some kind of minimum below which wages become 
unacceptable even if the altemative is unemployment. It is however, very difficult to 
identify the process of establishing this minimum subsistence and the considerations 
determining its lever( 1984:195). He found a decline in real wage rates over time and 
attributed it to a change in the norm of subsistence level. Lewis(1954) maintained 
that in surplus labour economies it may be correct to think that wage is being 
determined on the basis of subsistence requirements as had been postulated by the 
classical economists. He did not, however, provide any theoretical reason or 
empirical evidence of wages being determined by subsistence. His arguments are 
more in favour of a wage rate determined by 'a more objective index, ... the average 
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product of the farmer' (Lewis 1954:148-149) which represents the opportunity cost 
in alternative employment. 
According to the classicists' argument, there is a possibility that at any point of 
time wages may fall below or be above subsistence needs (Malthus 1836). Thus in 
classical theory the short run wage rate is not determined by the subsistence level. 
Another important shortcoming of the classical approach is that it does not 
specify the reasons why the wage rate is inflexible at the subsistence level even in 
the short run and what forces would prevent it from falling and clearing the market. 
The reliance on custom based wage rates is in line with the anthropologist's view of a 
village society based on tradition. But there is evidence that village producers are 
responding to economic forces and thus there is no reason why they should continue 
to pay wages on the basis of custom. If village tradition is to be relied upon to 
ensure subsistence through an adequate wage, what would the village system do for 
workers when they are unemployed? (Lipton 1983). 
Nutrition based efficiency wage theory 
Nutrition based efficiency wage theory may be viewed as a subsistence theory which 
provides an economic explanation for the provision of subsistence to the worker in 
the short run. It also tries to predict the impact of the personal and household 
characteristics of the worker on the wage rate and its variation. 
Nutrition based efficiency wage theories have been formulated since 
economists became conscious of the implications of poverty for the nutrition of 
workers and their efficiency. The theories start from the premise that at very low 
levels of income, efficiency or ability to perform work depends on nutritional levels. 
Nutrition is linked with the wage rate through consumption. Higher wages may lead 
to better nutrition and hence greater productivity. There may be other reasons for 
wage rates to influence the efficiency of a worker and thus demand for labour in the 
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labour markets of industrial countries.^ In this case the usual analysis of a separate 
demand for and supply of labour is no longer applicable. 
Leibenstein (1957) drew attention to the wage-nutrition-productivity 
relationships and discussed their implications.^ Later Mirrlees (1975), Rodgers 
(1975), Stiglitz (1976), Bliss and Stem (1978) and Dasgupta and Ray (1986) 
contributed to the theory and its empirical application. The analysis is based 
essentially on the wage-efficiency relationship. The consequent analytical 
framework of wage determination can be summarised as follows. 
Since wages influence productivity, the time unit provided by a worker is 
different from the efficiency units or effective hours provided. An employer will set 
the wages at a level that minimises the cost of one efficiency unit of labour. 
If at a wage rate higher than the market clearing rate, labour is more productive 
to such an extent that the wage cost is lower than it would be at the equilibrium rate, 
this higher rate will prevail. As a result less employment than the full-employment 
level will be given. Some workers will remain unemployed. Leibenstein was the 
first to point out and elaborate on this possibility. He stated that 'at very low wages 
there may be a labour deficit, because so litde work is done by each person. But at 
higher wages the work done per person increases so rapidly that a labour surplus is 
created' (1957:98). He showed that if there is an institutional requirement to employ 
all workers, in the presence of the wage-efficiency relationship, it may be 
worthwhile to pay them a wage greater than the minimum wage that clears the 
market. This may explain a part of the payment that may apparently resemble 
2. Several other reasons relevant for the wage and efficiency relationship in industrial countries have 
been identified. For example, high wages reduce shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and may have 
positive influences on the morale of the workers (Akerlof 1982). High wages are expected to reduce 
labour turnover and may atttact better qualified applicants. However, in the present study, only those 
models which focus on the developing country context arc emphasised. 
3. Marshall put forward the basic proposition of the efficiency wage theory as follows. \ . .In the last 
generation ... a careful study was began to be made of the effects that high wages have in increasing 
the efficiency not only of those who receive them, but also their children and grandchildren Highly 
paid labour is generally efficient and therefore not dear labour; ...a fact which will be found to 
exercise a very complicating influence on the theory of distribution.' (1920:510) 
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charity (since workers offer to work at a lower wage which also clears the market). 
The question remains whether such institutional practices prevail in rural societies. 
Mirrlees (1975) uses the 'productivity relationship' to bring out implications for 
a developing economy. He is not specifically concemed with rural (or urban) labour 
markets and therefore ignores institutional factors. According to Mirrlees, one of the 
important implications of the productivity relationship, is that wage rates need not 
change over time in the way that earlier economic theory may have led us to expect. 
Technological changes, capital accumulation or population growth should not have 
any influence on wage rates. Wages change only in so far as the wage productivity 
relationship changes. The theory also leads to the conclusion that employers will be 
willing to pay more to workers who contract for longer periods than those 
contracting for short periods and there will accordingly be a tendency to long term 
wage contracts. 
Stiglitz (1976) uses the model of wage determination based on the wage-
efficiency relationship to examine the consequences for the distribution of income 
and efficiency in the rural sector and among three different types of farms: the output 
maximising farm, the egalitarian family farm and the plantation farm. He argued 
that if output is shared by all family members, consumption per worker may not be 
enough, at any level of output, to provide the level of efficiency which would make 
each level of output feasible. Thus due to the relationship between wages (or output 
per worker in the family farm) and productivity, an egalitarian division of output in a 
family farm may not be possible in very poor economies. In such a case the farm has 
to raise the consumption level of some of the workers to raise their efficiency level 
so that production is feasible. In farms and economies which are poor so that the 
wage-efficiency relationships are applicable, but not as poor as in the above case, an 
egalitarian family farm is viable. However, such family farms will achieve a lower 
output level than the output maximising farm which gives the workers efficiency 
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wages. This analysis has relevance for the discussion of intra-family distribution of 
consumption. 
The operational aspects of the wage-productivity relationships are important for 
this process of wage determination. Bliss and Stem (1978) have looked at these 
issues and the related problems in detail. 
Using technical relationships between calorie intake and body weight, it is 
possible to determine the amount of energy that can be expended on work as a result 
of a specific food intake (given by a wage level). From this relationship, the 
efficiency wage can be calculated. However, direct estimation of the wage-
efficiency relationship is complicated by the fact that the relationship between the 
amount of food and productivity is a long term phenomenon. Moreover, basal 
metabolic rates may differ among persons. The data required to examine the wage-
efficiency relationship directly are almost impossible to obtain. 
Given these limitations, it is difficult to design direct tests of whether wages are 
determined at nutritional efficiency levels. 
Mirrlees (1975) and Leibenstein (1957) argue that the existence of 
unemployment and low income demonstrates the applicability of the theory. These 
are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the theory to be applicable. As an 
alternative, Rodgers(1975), Bliss and Stem(1978) take various predictions of the 
theory for market behaviour and compare them with actual behaviour. 
An important implication of the theory is that employers will prefer to pay a 
part of the wage in food which directiy enhances a worker's productivity and avoids 
the sharing of the wage with other family members. 
Payment of a part of the wage as a meal may, however, also be based on 
considerations other than efficiency enhancement. Food is often provided because of 
the advantage of saving time (Bliss and Stem 1982). If meals are not provided, the 
theory can hold if the income elasticity of food is high. 
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Since the efficiency impact of higher wage and larger food intake may be felt 
more in the longer term, this theory would imply the prevalence of longer term 
contracts. But the terms of a contract are determined not so much by this 
consideration, but more importandy, to suit the seasonal pattern of production, which 
makes casual employment more convenient. 
In a recent paper Guha (1989) discusses the relationship between consumption 
and labour efficiency if production is seasonal. A trade off emerges between the 
positive effects of a permanent contract on productivity and the wastage from 
seasonal idleness of labourers under such a contract. He proves that for certain 
shapes of the supply function of effective work by casual workers, coexistence of 
casual and permanent contracts is possible. When these contracts coexist, Guha 
(1989) shows that higher wage rates are offered to regular employees than to workers 
with short run contracts. This is the familiar conclusion put forward by Mirrlees 
(1975). Guha's conclusions may be used to affirm that the small proportion of 
regular contracts is not a sufficient basis for arguing that efficiency considerations do 
not prevail. 
Even if all contracts are casual and short term, an efficiency wage could prevail 
if all employers are aware of this consideration and provide efficiency wages on the 
belief that others will do so. 
The analysis of efficiency wages is based on the assumption that wages are 
consumed by the worker alone. When the dependency ratio varies between workers, 
or if there is a variation in other sources of income, consumption by workers with the 
same wage rate may be different. Such variations, combined with a differential basal 
metabolic rate and variations in the initial weight will mean that the relationship 
between wage rates and effective hours (or efficiency units) is different for different 
workers. 
Bliss and Stern (1978) predict that consumption obtained with the income from 
any other source (such as own cultivation) reduces the subsistence requirement that 
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needs to be provided by the employer and thus will reduce the wage rate. This 
suggests that well fed labourers will be hired preferentially so that employers can 
obtain the benefit of their better nutritional status. 
The problem of this prediction is that the landowning-labourers may be 
involved in their own land and seek wage employment only in the slack season. 
Wage rates may be low in the slack season because of lower demand as compared to 
the peak season. Thus even if the inverse relationship between land ownership and 
the wage rate holds, it may arise from considerations different from the efficiency 
wage hypothesis. 
The variation of dependency ratios will further complicate the picture. 
Rodgers(1975) in his attempts to apply this theory treats the expenditure of wages 
towards the consumption of other dependents as a form of taxation: only that part of 
the wage that is consumed by the worker will contribute to his/her efficiency. Thus 
wages should be positively related to workers' dependency ratios. 
The impact of landownership and the dependency ratio cannot be treated in an 
equivalent manner. Income from own land is more or less a permanent phenomenon 
and will not be purposefully varied to influence the wage rate. But if the wage rate 
increases with a rise in the dependency rado there may be some incentive to lower 
the participation ratio. 
Rodgers (1975) considers the peak and slack season uniformity of the wage rate 
to be an indication of the prevalence of subsistence wages on the basis of efficiency 
wage theory. In fact if this prediction holds, it may be a manifestation of the 
classical subsistence theory as well. This criterion had been used by various authors 
to judge the relevance of the classical subsistence theory. 
It seems that the criteria suggested by the efficiency wage theory are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the prediction of employment volumes or wage levels. 
Even in the absence of some of the predicted relationships, efficiency wages may 
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prevail. On the other hand even though some of the predicted results are found to be 
true, the phenomenon may have an alternative explanation. 
Efficiency wage theories have nevertheless been recently revived. Dasgupta 
and Ray (1986) use wage-productivity relationships similar to those used by other 
authors. In addition they define a reservation wage for each worker as a minimum 
wage per unit of labour power (labour power is conceptualised to describe an 
efficiency unit of labour in contrast to actual labour time) at which a person is 
willing to work. 
Each worker is assumed (by Dasgupta and Ray) to own different quantities of 
land which provide an additional source of income and consumption. The efficiency 
wage (a wage that minimises the wage per unit of labour power) to be paid to each 
worker is therefore a function of his land ownership. 
Reservation wages per unit of time and therefore the reservation wage rate per 
unit of labour power are also functions of landownership. All landless workers are 
assumed to have the same reservation wage and thus the minimum wage per unit of 
labour power will be the same for each of them. As land ownership increases, 
reservation wages increase due to a greater disutility of work. 
The market wage rate per unit of labour power is set by equating the reservation 
wage rate per unit of labour power with the marginal product of labour power. 
Bliss and Stern (1978) predicted that the landowning workers would have a 
lower efficiency wage and would be employed preferentially. Bliss and Stem 
presented this prediction for a situation where the employers behaved as 
discriminating monopsonists. Dasgupta and Ray's competitive equilibrium presented 
above leads to different predictions. They argue that labourers with non-wage 
income are potentially more attractive for employers because they can supply more 
effort than landless workers for the same wage per unit of time. However, they have 
a greater reservation wage per unit of time. In addition, the employers compete for 
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the services of such landed workers. The time wage of these workers is bid up so 
that they are paid a higher wage rate. 
In the analysis of the reservation wage, Dasgupta and Ray overlooked the fact 
that if landowning workers do not only earn rent but cultivate the land themselves, 
their labour supply will be forthcoming only in the slack season. The opportunity 
cost or disutility of providing more and more labour by a landowner will then be a 
rising function, contradicting the authors' contention that the disutility for an 
individual's entire labour supply will be the same for each worker. 
These authors are of the view that the variation in dependency ratios can be 
analysed in an equivalent way to the variation in landownership. But the difference 
between these two, as already noted, is that the dependency ratio for a family 
changes more easily than does its landownership. 
The above study assumes the same level of reservation wages for all landless 
workers. This is not realistic. Their non-land sources of income or the number of 
earners in the family may influence the reservation wage. 
Basu (1988) argues that the efficiency wage theory cannot explain the existence 
of disguised underemployment and is consistent only with open underemployment. 
He develops a framework of analysis involving first, the efficiency wage hypothesis 
and second, its perception by the employer. The productivity augmenting effect of 
wages paid by an employer is included in his profit function to the extent he can 
retain labourers. This model can explain both open underemployment and disguised 
underemployment. However, in a casual labour market, the extent of retention of 
labour may be low. Therefore in a casual labour market this model does not provide 
insights for wage determination and underemployment. 
Bliss and Stern in their later study (1982) attempted to test the predictions of 
nutrition based theory for an Indian village. Most of the predictions did not hold. 
There was substantial inter-seasonal variation in the wage rate. Payment of wages in 
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the form of meals was seen by the farmers to be a matter of convenience rather than 
a matter of workers' performance. Bliss and Stem (1978) also found large regional 
variations in wage rates for similar types of labour. Labour transactions were 
conducted on a day to day basis rather than by long term contract. They concluded 
that the efficiency wage theory does not have strong relevance to rural labour 
markets of India. 
In contrast, Bliss and Stem (1978) cited evidence from a plantation economy 
where some bonded labourers were employed on a permanent basis. The finding that 
the bonded workers had better nutritional standards than free labourers suggested 
that an efficiency wage process was operating. This also suggests that the 
institutional factors in a free labour market impede wage determination on the basis 
of efficiency wages. 
Rodgers (1975) applied some of the predictions to data from a number of 
villages in India. The wage rates did not vary to any significant extent between the 
peak and the slack seasons in five out of the seven villages and most wages 
contained provisions for meals. Rodgers accordingly suggested that wages were 
being determined by nutritional requirements. In these five villages, a high 
proportion of labourers were tied to employers through long term contracts. This 
was taken to be another indication of the relevance of efficiency wage theories. 
Rodger's conclusions however, have been criticised by Bardhan (1977) in a 
review of the wage and employment situation in India. Bardhan pointed out that the 
five villages in which Rodgers found wage stability were in areas with high cropping 
intensity, with most land being triple cropped. Multiple cropping implied stable 
labour demand, resulting in attempts at labour tying and some seasonal stability in 
wages. Rodger's observation that in one of the villages the wage rate showed a 
positive variation with a rise in the dependency ratio is not an adequate basis for 
concluding that the efficiency wage phenomenon works. Thus on the whole. 
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Rodger's conclusion that wages are being determined on the basis of efficiency wage 
theory is based on very weak empirical evidence. 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1986) attempted a direct test of the applicability of 
efficiency wage theory by examining the effect of weight-for-height and calorie 
intake of workers on their wage rates. They concluded that the theory was relevant 
for male workers because weight for height had a significant positive impact. 
Nonetheless, the basis of this conclusion is rather weak as the coefficient of calorie 
intake was negative (though not significant). The regression coefficients were not 
significant for the sample of female workers. The authors are of the view that the 
efficiency considerations do not work for women because they do not perform 
physically demanding tasks. However, among the male workers only a few 
operations are intensive of physical effort and some of the operations performed by 
women are physically demanding. 
Palanpur, the village surveyed by Bliss and Stem (1982) in 1974-75, was 
surveyed by Dreze et al. in 1984 to test the applicability of the various theories of 
wage determination (Dreze et al. 1986). Efficiency wages were not found to operate. 
This conforms to the results found in the earlier study by Bliss and Stem (1982). 
Dreze et al. (1986) used additional hindsight from the efficiency wage theory to test 
its applicability. These theories imply that resistance to wage cuts will come from 
the employers' side. This was not found to be tme in Palanpur village. 
Rosenzweig (1988) maintains that efficiency wages would imply that the ratio 
of male to female wage rates should exhibit stability across areas. The consumption-
productivity relationships for men and women are expected to have the same ratio in 
different regions of a country. Data from different regions of India did not show 
such stability, indicating that efficiency wage theory was not applicable in those 
areas. 
Strauss (1986) looked for direct evidence of wage-productivity relationships in 
Sierra Leone and found that such relationships existed and were significant. Despite 
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this evidence, he found wages to be unrelated to the caloric demands of the tasks 
performed. This might have been due to the lack of perception by the employers as 
well as to income-sharing by household members. 
The Cain and Mozumdar (1980) findings refute the application of efficiency 
based subsistence wage theory to a village of Bangladesh. They found that the 
dependency ratio and landownership had a negative (insignificant) influence on the 
wage rate. In an efficiency wage framework these would be expected to have a 
significant positive influence. 
Ahmed (1981) analysed whether the predictions of the efficiency wage theory 
held for Bangladesh. He presented evidence for Bangladesh as a whole to 
demonstrate that real wages showed a declining trend over 25 years and real earnings 
were unstable whereas the dependency ratio was fixed. In one village he found that 
wages were not seasonally stable and the incidence of labour tying was low. Only 16 
per cent of the wage labourers had long term contracts. An association between the 
dependency ratio and the wage rate was lacking. This evidence stands in contrast to 
the predictions of efficiency wage theory. Table 4.2 gives a summary of the results 
of the major empirical studies of subsistence wage theory. 
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Table 4.2 A summary of studies of the empirical application of subsistence 
wage theory 
Predictions of 
the theory 
Resuhs of studies by 
Dreze Rodgers Bliss 
etal. (1975) and Stem 
(1987) (1982) 
Ahmed Cain and 
(1981) Mozumdar 
(1980) 
Seasonal wage stability 
Temporal wage stability 
Provision of meals 
as wage 
Prevalence of long No 
term contracts 
Labour tying 
Wage related positively No 
with dependency 
Wage related negatively 
with landownership 
Wage reduction resisted No 
by employers 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No No 
No 
No No No 
No 
Conclusion on 
the applicability 
No Yes No No No 
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4.3 Other theories of wage determination. 
Recruitment cost and wage determination 
Bardhan (1979), in an attempt to explain both interpersonal and interregional 
variations in wage rates and unemployment, suggested a recruitment cost based 
explanation of wage variations. The theory attempts to explain wage variations 
resulting from variations in personal characteristics even in the presence of 
unemployment. Such an explanation is based on the association of recruitment cost 
of a worker with his/her personal characteristics. 
Recruitment cost arises from the uncertainty of obtaining enough workers at 
peak work times. Bardhan assumes a monopsonistic situation. As a result of some 
assumptions related to the behaviour of the recruitment cost phenomenon and the 
relationship between recruitment costs and the unemployment rate, he arrives at the 
following conclusions: wages are positively related to productivity enhancing factors 
and negatively related to recruitment costs per worker. The unemployment faced by 
a worker is positively related to the recruitment cost. These results conform with the 
common sense implications of the influence of these phenomena. 
Bardhan (1979) considers the impact of the dependency ratio, gender and 
landownership of a worker on his/her wage rate through their influence on 
recruitment cost. For example, a high dependency ratio lowers the recruitment cost 
as the worker is prepared to take up employment in any situation and thus would 
obtain a higher wage rate. Landownership creates the possibility of self employment 
and makes the labour supply less certain, thus raising the recruitment cost and 
lowering the wage rate. Women have a higher recruitment cost because of their 
family responsibilities and are thus paid lower wage rates than men. But many of 
these workers' characteristics may be given alternative interpretations. For example, 
gender differences in the wage rate may be explained in terms of market 
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segmentation. For female workers, higher dependency ratio may be associated with 
a larger responsibility for housework and thus a higher recruitment cost. This 
interaction may result in a negative relationship between dependency and the wage 
rate. Self employment on land may imply that the worker obtains employment only 
in the slack season for low wage activities. 
The usefulness of the theory is further limited by the unrealistic assumptions on 
which it is based. Bardhan's assumption of a monopsonistic labour market is highly 
unrealistic. All the large landowners in the village depend on hired labour. Medium 
and even small farmers have to hire labour to meet seasonal demand. In Chapter 2 it 
was pointed out that the numbers of employers in the villages are relatively large. 
The monopsonistic tendencies in village labour markets are overstated in this theory. 
In Bardhan's formal model some unrealistic assumptions are made about the 
nature of the recruitment cost function. The recruitment cost for a worker depends 
on the unemployment rate 'u' in a village and the characteristics of the worker. Let 
"c' be the recruitment cost of a worker and denote the factors which raise his/her 
recruitment cost. Bardhan assumes: 
5c/5u < 0 , 5^C/5U2 > 0 , 5c/5v > 0 , b^c/bv'^ = 0 
The assumptions related to the first derivatives are intuitively obvious, but those 
related to the second derivative do not have a rationale. Yet these assumptions are 
crucially important in the derivation of the model's results. 
Because of the unrealistic assumptions within the formulation of the theory as 
well as the overstatement of monopsonistic practices in rural labour markets, this 
theory did not receive other applications. 
The theory of implicit cooperation 
To explain the underemployment equilibrium in rural labour markets of developing 
countries, Osmani (1988) develops a game theoretic model which is based on the 
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notion of 'strategic behaviour'. He assumes that in making a wage bid, each worker 
considers possible action by other workers and the effect of those actions on the 
probability of his/her own employment. Since labour hiring arrangements in the 
casual market are made on a daily basis, Osmani takes this as a case comparable to 
that of a 'repeated non-cooperative game'. 'Implicit cooperation' of a self enforcing 
nature is possible in such a situation. He shows that under certain assumptions the 
wage rate achieved through such implicit cooperation may lie above the competitive 
level and at the same time be sensitive to the forces of supply and demand. In such 
repeated non-cooperative games, an individual worker will have the confidence to 
put up a non-competitive wage bid because he/she expects that no one else will try to 
undercut them, because that may be reacted to in the future. 
This theory, however, disregards employers' attempts to collude. When the 
workers attempt to maintain higher than competitive wage through implicit 
collusion, it is unlikely that the employers will not attempt to collude to bring wage 
rates down. Islam (1989) also notes the widespread use of migratory labourers who 
may not approach an employer for repeated employment. This challenges the idea of 
the prevalence of implicit cooperation because that is only possible for village 
workers who always work within the village. This cannot be an important criticism 
because the phenomenon of migratory labour is not equally important in all areas of 
the country and is not usually observed for female labourers. 
Osmani (1988) does not deal with the empirical issue of how to assess the 
extent of the existence of implicit cooperation. He relies on passing comments made 
by other authors which indicate that such a situation may occur. 
Wage determination through bargaining 
Rudra (1982) visualises the wage determination process as a combination of the 
ruling wage rate and a wage bargain between workers and employers. The bargain is 
necessary to settie the amount of increase that workers can obtain in any particular 
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season over and above the ruling rate. Rudra notes that the resulting wage rate will 
depend on the total number of workers and the total demand from all employers. 
A basic shortcoming of this approach is that it does not answer the question of 
how the basic ruling wage rate is determined and how interpersonal variations in 
wages may be explained. 
Rudra recognises that differing wage rates may prevail in a village because 'It 
may so happen that a few labourers might accept the offer at some earlier stage and 
start to work' (Rudra 1982:118). In such cases the analysis of interpersonal 
variations in wage rates means that the factors which create the differences in 
bargaining power among workers within a village will have to be examined. 
From the writings of Rudra, Datt (1989) adopted the idea that the village labour 
markets contain elements of wage bargaining and a uniform village wage rate 
prevails. Datt uses a formal Nash bargaining approach to wage determination and 
develops a model to explain inter village wage variation. Comparative static results 
from his formal model show that the higher the unemployment, the smaller the 
bargaining power of the workers and the lower wages will be. 
The difficulty with these theories is that they do not consider how bargaining 
takes place when neither the workers nor the employers are organised. However, 
these theories are not a major concern for the present study, since they do not address 
the question of wage variations among workers within a village. 
In both the Osmani (1988) and Datt (1989) models, wages are raised above the 
market clearing level through a process of bargaining. The resultant 
underemployment cannot be called involuntary. In this bargaining process, workers 
who are underemployed, are themselves bargaining to make wages higher which 
causes their underemployment. This is different from involuntary unemployment in 
formal labour markets where union activities raise wage rates above the market 
clearing level. In the latter case, the unemployed are 'outsiders' (Lindbeck and 
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Snower 1986) who do not participate in wage bargaining. These outside labourers 
are prepared to accept the equilibrium wage but are not allowed to do so by union 
activities. 
4.4 Applicability of the major theories to the determination of wages for female 
wage workers in rural Bangladesh 
Competitive wage determination with human capital 
The competitive wage theory neither explains the considerable underemployment 
among the poor female workers surveyed for this study, nor can human capital be 
considered an important factor when illiteracy is 91 per cent and jobs do not require 
any special skill. 
The relationship between the wage rates received by the female workers 
surveyed and their human capital characteristics as included in conventional earning 
functions are nevertheless examined (Table 4.3) to test the conventional hypotheses. 
If the relationship between the human capital variables and the wage rates received 
by the workers are significant, then it could be that even though these women's jobs 
are called ^unskilled', they require some experience and perhaps maturity (in terms of 
age). Age, square of age and experience are used as explanatory variables to 
represent productivity related factors. 
The results of the regression using personal characteristics as an influence on 
productivity are not statistically satisfactory (Table 4.3). The value of adjusted r 2 IS 
small and the value of F is not significant.'^ 
The coefficients of age and age squared have no significance. Experience has a 
negative coefficient, though it is not statistically significant. 
4 . The regression results in this chapter are unacceptable on the basis of their lack of conformity with 
the theory. Therefore further econometric tests about the acceptability of the regression are not 
applied. Such tests are applied to regressions in the following chapters. 
80 
Table 4.3 Regression analysis to examine the influence of productivity 
factors on the wage rates of female workers 
related 
Dependent variable: log of wage per hour 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient t-value 
Age 0.002 0.17 
Squared age -0.00003(c) -0.20 
Experience -0.003 -0.95 
Area dummy 0.13 2.62*** 
Constant 0.096 0.50 
Adjusted R^ 0.05 
Value of F 1.95 
Sample size 77 
Note: ** and * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels 
respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
A dummy was used to indicate the differences in the villages in two locations 
with different agricultural productivities. The dummy for locations has a value of 
one for the low productivity area and this has a positive coefficient which is 
significant. This implies that productivity differences between the areas do not exert 
an influence according to the expectations of competitive theory. This is not 
surprising since the markets do not clear. In such a situation, the dummy for the 
locations may be capturing differences other than productivity between the areas. 
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Influence of interlinkage and competitive wage determination 
Whether the wage rate varies with human capital factors when allowance is made for 
interlinkages between the labour and credit markets, is next examined. 
In the regression analysis a variable is included to represent the interlinkage 
with credit markets. Since loans were interest free, the amount of the loan is 
regarded as influencing the wage rate and is used as an explanatory variable. 
Table 4.4 Regression analysis to examine the influence of interlinkage along 
with productivity related factors on the wage rates of female 
workers 
Dependent variable: log of wage per hour 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient t-value 
Age 0.004 0.35 
Squared age -0.00005 -0.39 
Experience 0.003 -0.75 
Area dummy 0.12 2.56*** 
Amount of loan -0.0003 -2.04** 
Constant 0.08 0.44 
Adjusted R^ 0.09 
Value of F 2.44** 
Sample size 77 
Note: ***, ** and * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels 
respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
Table 4.4 shows that even after the inclusion of this variable, the influence of 
the earlier variables included in the previous regression remains unchanged. The 
amount of loans has a significant negative coefficient and the inclusion of this 
variable has made the F-value of the regression significant. Linkages with credit 
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markets must be regarded as an important variable in the analysis of wage variations. 
The implications of this variable will be discussed in greater detail when credit is 
included in an alternative framework of analysis of wage determination in Chapter 5. 
Classical subsistence wage theory 
The problems of classical subsistence theory in explaining variations of wage rates 
among workers have been discussed. Although the definitional intricacies as to what 
a 'subsistence wage' is, are substantial, a few broad indicators can be used to show 
that wages are by no means near to a subsistence level. 
Seventy nine per cent of the surveyed women reported that they faced a food 
shortage on some days each year. Their wages would have been adequate only to 
provide enough food (or slightly more than enough) for themselves during the days 
on which they were employed. Wages were clearly not adequate to sustain more 
than one person. As noted, this means that even if the women had been employed 
for 300 days a year at the average daily wage rate of 10.6 taka per day, they would 
not have been able to maintain another dependent at the subsistence level. At the 
present rate of employment the women could not maintain even themselves during 
the period when they were unemployed. 
A subsistence wage should ensure at least the worker's own subsistence 
throughout the year. It should provide some surplus for the family. The number of 
dependents should thus be positively related to the wage rate. On the other hand, the 
wage rate would be negatively associated with the male income of the family. Since 
income from male earners may be uncertain or unknown to the employer, this 
negative relationship is likely to hold with the presence of male earners rather than 
with male income. 
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Table 4,5 Regression analysis to examine the applicability of subsistence 
wage theory for female workers. 
Explanatory Dependent variable: log of wages per hour 
variable 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents in the family -0.03 -2.18*** 
Number of male earners 0.01 0.39 
Constant 0.26 4.30*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.04 
Value of F 2.39 
Sample size 77 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
A regression estimate to examine the influence of the number of male earners 
and the number of dependent members (non-eamers) in the family (presented in 
Table 4.5) shows that these effects are either not significant or significant in the 
opposite direction to that predicted by the theory. The regression is not meaningful 
on the basis of the F-test. 
Nutrition (or efficiency) based subsistence wage theory 
The wage rate among women was lower than the poverty level and they suffered 
considerable food shortages. This indicates that efficiency based wage rates do not 
apply. In an attempt to confirm this indication the predictions of the theory are 
examined. 
It may be tempting (as in Rodger's 1975 study) to hypothesise that because a 
part of most women's wages was paid in meals, efficiency wage considerations hold. 
The purpose of providing meals, however, was not to enhance the productivity of the 
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workers. It was seen more as an immediate benefit and convenience because tlie 
workers do not have to travel to their houses to have meals. ^ 
A regression of wage variation on percentage of regular employment obtained 
by a worker, the number of male earners and the size of family was perfomed. This 
was done to test whether their influence is in conformity with the predictions of 
efficiency wage theory. The effect of the last two of these variables has also been 
tested in the context of classical subsistence theory. The results are presented in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Regression analysis to examine the applicability of the efficiency 
wage theory for female workers 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: log of wage per hour 
Coefficient t-values 
Number of dependents -0.03 _2 21*** 
Number of male earners 0.01 0.44 
Percentage of regular employment -0.0008 -0.84 
Constant 0.27 4.35*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.03 
Value of F 1.82 
Sample size 77 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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Contrary to the expectation of the efficiency wage theory, the percentage of 
regular employment has a negative coefficient, the number of male earners has a 
positive coefficient and the size of the family has a negative coefficient. The 
coefficient and significance of these variables are contrary to the predictions of the 
theory. Thus it may be concluded that wage rates are not being determined on the 
basis of efficiency wage considerations. 
4.5 Comparison of the theories of vt'age determination and their applicability 
Table 4.7 presents a summary of the basic features of each theory and the predictions 
following from it. As was pointed out in the preceeding review, however, in most 
cases the predictions do not provide sufficient conditions to support the validity of 
the theories. 
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Table 4.7 A summary of wage determination theories and their major 
predictions 
Type of 
theory 
Criteria of wage 
determination 
Major predictions 
Competitive Demand equals the supply of labour; 
theory the marginal productivity of a 
worker equals his wage and 
his disutility of labour. 
Market clears and the wage rate 
will be the same for a 
homogeneous group of workers. 
Human capital 
theory 
For a heterogeneous group of 
workers, wage depends on the 
productivity of a worker. 
Wage variations depend on 
workers' age, education and 
experience etc. 
Classical Wage rates will ensure the 
subsistence long run subsistence of 
theory enough workers for the economy. 
Wage depends on 
physically and culturally 
determined subsistence. 
Nutrition based 
efficiency wage 
theory 
Since wage influences productivity, 
there will be a wage which 
minimises the total labour cost 
of producing any output. 
Long term contracts will be more 
frequent, meals will be provided 
as part of wages, there will be 
wage stability over seasons 
and areas. Wage rises with 
a larger dependency burden. 
Wage bargaining Workers bargain collectively with 
theory the employers to arrive at 
an agreed wage. 
Uniformity of wage within a village. 
Workers with lower bargaining power 
receive lower wages; this occurs in 
areas with lower productivity. 
Recruitment Given monopsony power, employers 
cost theory set wage to maximise profit. 
Wage depends on recruitment cost 
because profit is defined as 
output minus labour cost including 
the recruiunent cost 
Wage rates will be higher 
for workers with lower recruiunent 
costs (who have smaller number of 
male earners, lower landownership, 
higher dependency ratio etc.). 
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Table 4.8 provides a summary view of the results of empirical studies applying 
different theories of wage determination to rural labour markets in India and 
Bangladesh. Among the studies for India, competitive theory seems to apply to the 
male labour market. The subsistence theory does not prove useful. Studies of the 
female labour market are few and their results have not been very illuminating in 
explaining the wage determination process. For Bangladesh there are few studies of 
the wage determination process and the female labour market has received virtually 
no attention. Therefore more research in this area is desirable both for theoretical 
interest and from the point of view of policy. 
Table 4.8 A summary of the empirical studies which applied theories of wage 
determination to India and Bangladesh 
Type of theory Number of studies for each country and type of sample 
India Bangladesh 
Male Female Combined Male Female Combined Present 
study 
Competitive theory 
with human capitals 
Applicability Yes No Yes Yes No 
Competitive theory 
including interlinkage 
Applicability Yes 
1 
Yes 
1 
No 
No 
Nutrition based 
subsistence wage theory 
Applicability Yes: 1 
No: 2 
No No 
Other theories 
Applicability 
3 
Yes 
Not 
applied 
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Chapter 5 
An alternative explanation of wage determination in tlie female labour 
market in rural Bangladesh 
An alternative explanation of wage determination for rural female wage workers in 
Bangladesh employs some modifications of the usual demand-supply framework. 
The special features of this approach are based on the survey information regarding 
the workers' labour supply as well as labour demand. The modified supply- demand 
framework is used to analyse the observed wage variations and the existence of 
underemployment. 
5.1 Labour supply of female workers: the theoretical background 
The mainstream neo-classical theories of labour supply are mainly concerned with 
the choice between work in the market and leisure. Such analysis extends the theory 
of consumer choice to include a choice of leisure time whose price is the market 
wage rate. The new household economics extends this analysis to take into account 
the fact that time has other uses than leisure and market work. It takes housework 
activities explicitly into account. However, the new household economics does not 
take into account family employment which may be important for rural workers. 
Clarification of the various types of work is pertinent at this point. Housework 
involves activities performed by household members. Such work directly satisfies 
the needs of the household members, including those who perform it. Tne difference 
between housework and market work is that no wage is paid for housework. The 
distinction between housework and family (self) employment is difficult to draw; 
neither are paid a market wage. However, output of family production may be sold 
in the market at market prices. Output of housework performed by a family member 
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is consumed only by family members. Examples of housework are easy to provide. 
Cooking, cleaning and child care by family members constitute housework. This 
does not preclude the possiblity that wage workers may be employed for these 
activities; they will then be counted in market employment. 
The basic theory of labour-leisure choice 
The labour supply decision of an individual is derived by maximising his/her utility 
function which consists of goods and leisure. The budget constraints include an 
income constraint given by wage earnings. The other constraint is the total 
availability of time divided between market employment and leisure. 
The model may be written formally as: 
Max U = U(X, L, A; e) 
Subject to X . P^ = (w* X Tj^) 
T m + L = D 
where U is utility, X is the bundle of a composite consumer goods, L is the amount 
of leisure, P^ ^ is the price of the consumer good, T^^ is the amount of market 
employment, w is the exogenously given wage rate and D is the total available 
time. "A' gives the individual's personal characteristics and 'e' gives taste which is 
not measurable. The equilibrium condition (obtained from the first order conditions^ 
which maximises the utility function subject to the given constraints) for the choice 
of leisure (or work) is given by: M U ^ / MU^ = w /P 
The equilibrium condition may be solved to give the following reduced form 
equation for the supply of labour in a cross sectional group where P is taken to be 
fixed: 
T ^ = f(w*,A). (5.1) 
1. The process of deriving the relevant first order conditions is to maximise the Lagrangian function: 
G = U(X, L, A) + X(w* . - Px) + e(Tm + L - D) with respect to X, Tn ,^ L. 
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This model can be extended to take into account incomes of other household 
members and property/ income. In the models used in this chapter, these are 
excluded not only to avoid complications which do not essentially alter the 
characteristics of the analysis, but also because the wage workers in the present study 
do not have property income and have very small incomes from other earners in the 
family. 
The role of housework and the time allocation by individuals 
Mincer(1962) first brought the role of housework into the analysis of the 
participation of married women in the labour force. He argued for the incorporation 
of non-market household production activities into the analysis of the labour supply 
of married women. This provides a scope for analysing the interdependence of the 
labour supply decision of household members. His methodology of doing this was 
simple: T o r the present purpose of constructing a simple model of labour force 
behaviour of married women it will be sufficient to utilise these concepts in so far as 
they help to select and elucidate a few empirically manageable variables to represent 
the major force of income and substitution contained in the market supply function' 
(Mincer 1962:66). Thus in analysing participation in the labour force, not only were 
income variables (own wage and potential permanent level of family income) 
included, having children under six years of age was used to reflect the differences in 
the demand for work at home. 
His approach is valuable for its pioneering attempt to point out the usefulness of 
not only the dichotomy between work and leisure, but also the trichotomy between 
housework, leisure and market work. This approach is useful but it does not really 
go into sufficient depth to analyse the nature of the home production function and its 
implications for labour allocation decisions (the direction in which Gronau(1977) 
takes the analysis). Nor does it take into account the time spent on consumption as 
distinct from leisure. 
91 
Becker(1965) takes a more innovative approach. Not only does he take into 
account the time spent on housework but he also treats the time spent on any activity 
(market work, housework, consumption, investment in human capital etc.) 
symmetrically. He envisaged a production process whereby market purchased 
goods, time and household capital are combined to produce the 'ultimate utility 
giving goods' or 'commodities'. The allocation decisions in this model depend on the 
"commodity prices' and the core of the analysis consists of the estimation of these 
commodity prices. In addition to household technology, they depend on the prices of 
market goods, and the shadow price of time. 
To explain the gender division of labour, Becker(1981) emphasised the fact that 
a household's technology (of producing those ultimate commodities) may be 
assymetric in gender. He extended the theory of comparative advantage and 
hypothesised that the family division of labour is determined by the choices based on 
intrinsic comparative advantage in housework. Such advantages were reinforced by 
specialised investments in human capital. 
Becker's (1965) model faced many criticisms. A shortcoming of this model 
was pointed out by Pollak and Wachter (1975). The model requires that household 
technology has constant retums to scale and no joint production. They point out that 
"when time is an input in the household production process, joint production is the 
rule and not an exception because the input of time into many household activities is, 
itself, a direct source of utility or disutility to members of the household engaged in 
that activity' (Pollak and Wachter 1975:266). Another criticism, particularly relevant 
for the present study, pointed out by Gronau (1976) is that in Becker's formulation 
the distinction between housework and leisure had disappeared and been aggregated 
into one entity, non market work. This renders Becker's formulation unhelpful for 
analysing the choice between market work, leisure and housework. 
Gronau(1976) uses the traditional utility maximisation framework and 
combines a home production function to predict choices about participation in 
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different types of work. The essence of his model is simple and may be put as 
follows. 
A person maximises the amount of commodity 'Z' which is a function of ^X' 
(goods and services) and consumption time^L'. That is Z = Z(X, L). ^Z' may be 
thought of as analogous to a utility function. X may be produced at home (Xj^) or 
purchased at market (X^^). Thus X = Xj^ + It is assumed that X^^ and X^ are 
perfect substitutes. Xj^ is a function of time in home production (H). Thus Xj^ = 
f(H). 
Z is maximised subject to: the budget constraint Xj^ = W*.N + V (where W* is 
the market wage rate, N is the time spent on wage employment, V is asset income); 
the home production function Xj^ = f(H); and the time constraint L+H+N = T (where 
H, L and T are home production time, leisure and total time available, respectively). 
The necessary conditions for an optimum are: ^ 
MZL / MZ^ = f ' (H) and f ' (H) = W* (G.l) 
The first condition implies that the marginal product of work at home is equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution between goods and consumption time while the second 
is the equality between the marginal product of housework with the wage rate. 
However he assumes X^^ and Xj^ to be perfect substitutes which may not be the 
case, especially in the rural areas of developing countries where the market produced 
goods are qualitatively different. In fact Gronau considers this possibility and 
derives the relevant equilibrium conditions in his more recent review of home 
production theories (Gronau 1986). 
One of the problems of new household economics is the omission of the fact 
that time input in different usage may itself have utility. This was termed as joint 
production. To overcome this problem, the utility function may be modified to 
2. Derived from the first order conditions for maximizing the Lagrangian function: G = f(H), 
L} + + V - Xj„) + e(T - L - H -N) with respect to L, H, N and X ^ . 
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include the utility of time spent in each type of work. Gronau (1986) used this 
modification to arrive at the following equilibrium condition: 
MZL / MZ^ = f ' ( H ) + d H a n d f ' ( H ) + dH = W * + d N (G.2) 
where dH is the direct marginal utility of being engaged in housework and dN is the 
direct marginal utility of wage employment time. 
Thus the choice between housework and subsistence production and wage work 
will depend not only on the valuation of the marginal returns from each type of 
production, but also on the utility or disutility of various types of work. 
In the rural areas of Bangladesh, the involvement in wage employment is 
considered as less attractive than housework or self employment (if each of them 
yield the same monetary benefit) and thus 'dN' is negative. Similarly, if self 
employment in their own enterprise brings them additional confidence and 
importance in the family, the women may prefer to engage in such enterprises by 
curtailing their housework time. 
This issue is similar to the economics of job satisfaction and compensating 
wage differentials. It may be worthwhile to point out the difference between the 
present concern and the theories of wage determination in relation to job satisfaction. 
The economics of job satisfaction covers the non-pecuniary costs and benefits 
associated with a job. Such factors include the risk of accident, job hazards, 
repetition and arduousness. In a world of perfect markets all these factors can be 
compensated for by wage differentials. Intuitively it is obvious that jobs with 
unpleasant characteristics will need to be paid at a higher rate than those with more 
attractive characteristics. Rosen(1974) suggested a detailed model of establishing 
wage differentials for jobs with different characteristics. The theories of 
compensating wage differentials are formulated along the line of a 'characteristics 
model' of demand analysis where a good is demanded for the characteristics it holds 
and the prices of the characteristics are the relevant considerations to bring about 
equilibrium in the market. 
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The compensating wage differentials suggested for formal labour markets are 
concerned with how an equilibrium is reached for jobs with varying characteristics 
where there is scope for the employer to vary the wage offer and/or to change the job 
characteristics (e.g, reduce noise by using sophisticated and expensive technology). 
On the other hand, in the present situation of rural labour markets the 
characteristics associated with each type of work are predetermined. The disutility 
of entering a specific type of activity is given by the societal situation and thus 
cannot be varied. Therefore, the above theory of compensating wage variations will 
not be applicable. In such a situation, the choice for the worker lies in adjusting the 
amount of labour input to different types of work on the basis of equilibrium 
condition given by G.2 in Gronau's model which incorporates the direct utility of 
each type of time use apart from the output produced. 
As noted earlier, another important problem with the application of the theory 
developed by Gronau to labour allocation in rural households of Bangladesh is that it 
does not take into account the question of self employment in direct income 
generating activities. Income from self employment would be a substitute for 
income from market employment and is thus different from housework and needs to 
be taken into account separately. 
Labour supply in a situation of choice between market employment, housework 
and self employment 
A competitive wage labour market together with the existence of opportunities for 
self employment and housework is used to derive equilibrium conditions for a 
worker with all possible opportunity costs of labour. Then the situation for workers 
for whom one or the other opportunity is not relevant can be compared. 
A model of the type developed by Gronau is used to incorporate self 
employment. This is done by including income from self employment along with 
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income from market employment and using a production function for self 
employment activity. / 
This model (Model A) is stated below (a list of notations follows): 
Max U = U(X, H, L; A) 
Subject to: 
i) the budget constraint: Y = P^^. X 
ii) the housework production function: H = A, B) and 
iii) the constraint of availability of time: 
and where 
Yf = P f . f (T f ,C) 
Another constraint in this maximisation problem is: 
w > Wj. which is assumed not to be binding. 
We assume that all prices are the same for all enterprises and all consumers. 
On this assumption, the subsequent analysis proceeds with the nominal magnitudes. 
Assuming normalized prices, in the above model, the objective function may now be 
written as U = U(Y, H, L; A) and the self employment production function may be 
written as Y^ = f(Tf, C). This model is based on separate consumption and labour 
allocation decisions. 
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Description of the notations used in Model A 
Notation Description 
A Characteristics of a worker influencing the utility function and housework 
productivity 
B Characteristics of the worker influencing housework productivity 
C Given amount of capital 
D Total time available during a day 
F Marginal productivity of time in housework 
f Marginal productivity of time in self employment 
H Output of housework 
L Time spent on leisure 
MUj^ Marginal utility of housework output 
MUL Marginal utility of leisure 
MUy Marginal utility of income 
Pf Price at which home produced commodity is sold 
Pj^  Price of consumption good X 
Tf Time spent on family employment 
Tj^  Time spent on housework 
Tj^ Time spent on wage employment 
U Utility 
^ Market wage rate 
w^ Reservation wage of a worker 
X Commodity consumed. For simplicity, we use X as one composite 
commodity. 
Y Total money income 
Yf Total income from self employment 
Y ^ Total earnings from wage employment 
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The equilibrium conditions which maximise the utility function subject to the 
given constraints are given by:^ 
M U L / M U Y = W* a) 
M U L / M U H = F ' b) 
M U L / M U Y = f ' c) 
a), b) and c) together give: 
W * . M U Y = F ' . M U ^ ^ f ' . MUY = MUL (d.l) 
which may be written as: 
w* = f ' and w* = F MUp^/ M U Y (d.2) 
These equilibrium conditions may be solved to give the following structural 
equations: 
T f = g ( w * , A , C ) (5.2a) 
T ^ = h(w*. A, B, C) (5.2b) 
T h = k ( w * , A , B ) (5.2c) 
The utility function may take into account the utility of time itself in different 
types of work. The problem then is to maximise U = U(X, H, L, T^ ,^ T^, Tj^). 
When this is maximised subject to the given constraints in the model above, the 
equilibrium condition is given by: 
w* . MUY + = P + M U j h = F MUY + = ^ U L (d.3) 
In (d.3) M U j j ^ , MU-pj^  and MU-j-f denote the direct marginal utility of market 
employment time, housework time and self employment time respectively. The first 
order conditions in (d.3) can be solved to give the amount of labour supplied to each 
type of work. In particular, if there is a set of characteristics (say, Q) of individuals, 
which influences MUj^^, MU-j^ and M U j f will now appear as variables in the 
structural equation giving the labour supply function . Thus, 
T ^ = g(w*, C, A, B, Q) (5.2d) 
3. This involves maximisation of the Lagrangian G = U{(Yf + Y^), H, L, A) + ^(D - Tf - T^, - T^ -
L) + e{H - F(Tn, A, B)} with respect to Yf, Y^ ,^ Tf, T^ ,^ T^ and L. 
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Equations (5.2b) and (5.2d) are similar to the formulation in equation (5.1) in 
Section 5.1, which takes into account only wage employment and considers the 
personal characteristics of the individual as variables in her utility function and 
thereby entering the labour supply function. However, equation (5.1) merely 
considers the influence of personal characteristics on the utility function, but the 
characteristics (namely B) which influence other uses of time (through the 
housework production function) do not enter the analysis unless explicitly taken into 
account. Equation (5.2b) also incorporates the role of the parameters in a self 
employment production function (for example C) in labour allocation decisions. 
Whether an interior solution for the hours supplied to the market is obtained (i.e 
positive number of hours are supplied to the market) will depend on the relationship 
between the market wage rate (w ) and a reservation wage (w .^). A positive supply 
occurs when Wj. < w*. The reservation wage is defined as the individual's implicit 
initial cost or the value of her time at the margin when she starts participating in the 
labour market. It measures the cost (physical, financial or psychic) of entering the 
market. 
When there is an interior solution, labour supply is expected to be a rising 
function of the wage rate when marginal utility of income is positive and leisure is a 
normal good.^ 
5.2 Labour supply of the female wage workers surveyed and its implications 
To identify the labour supply of employed women in the sample for this study, they 
were asked how many days they would work at the going wage rate. The women 
expressed a willingness to work for the whole year at the wage they were receiving. 
While the wage rate they received from different employers or in different seasons 
4. The derivative of the first order conditions of utility maximisation may be used to show that the 
impact of a change in the wage rate consists of two terms: the income effect and substitution effect. 
For a normal good the substitution effect will dominate. An increase in the wage rate which means a 
rise in the price of leisure, will reduce leisure and increase the supply of labour. 
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may have varied (the reasons for variation are explained below), the wage rate used 
here refers to the minimum wage they had been receiving. Thus the labour supply 
function for each woman is given by a horizontal segment extending up to the 
maximum possible physical limit. 
The minimum wage rate W j at which the woman is willing to work, gives the 
height of this curve. Figure 5.1 represents such a labour supply curve which shows 
that at the same wage rate O W j labour supply of V/ jS i is available; after this the 
supply becomes almost perfecdy inelastic. 
Wage rate per day 
Figure 5.1 Wage labour 
supply of a female worker 
in a village in Bangladesh 
w, 
Number of days 
The labour supply curve described in Figure 5.1 has an important difference 
with the conventional model of labour supply described in the previous section. It 
had been noted that if leisure is a normal good, the supply curve of labour will be 
wage responsive. 
A horizontal supply of labour as in Figure 5.1 would be possible if the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and income and also between leisure and 
housework were constant. 
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Constancy of opportunity cost of labour in terms of the marginal utility of 
leisure is plausible for workers living in poverty. If employment for the whole year 
does not generate enough income to satisfy the basic physical requirements of life, 
leisure will not be desired and the marginal utility of leisure will not rise as more 
market employment is taken. 
Her roles in housework and self employment represent alternative opportunity 
costs of a woman's labour. These components of opportunity costs of labour must 
also be constant, if labour supply is perfectly elastic at the fixed reservation wage. 
This implies that, the marginal valuation of these activities will be constant or zero. 
These implications are not unrealistic. The marginal product of housework and 
self employment activities may well be constant (and equal to their average product) 
as the same work is repeated every day. Those with babies need to arrange for their 
care. Though there is no monetary cost, making an altemative arrangement (to 
request neighbours or relatives) needs an effort. But the cost of doing so may be 
viewed as constant. 
Most women entering the wage labour market do not possess appropriate 
capital, so there is no scope for productive self employment. They engage, however, 
in gleaning leftover crops in the field or in collecting fruits and vegetables, fishing 
etc. which do not require capital and are likely to have a very low and fixed 
productivity. For those who do not do this work, the opportunity cost in terms of self 
employment is zero. 
There is likely to be a psychic cost in entering wage employment. This psychic 
cost occurs even for poor women because in the rural societies of Bangladesh the 
wage employment of women is considered to be less prestigious than housework and 
self employment. Even without such loss of prestige, there may be a psychic cost of 
wage employment (Sen 1975, Papenek 1981). Papanek (1981) describes it as the 
'psychic cost of taking orders'. This psychic cost needs to be compensated for by the 
wages received. 
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The loss of prestige is relevant as the woman participates in wage employment 
in any year and not for any specific day. Therefore the question arises: how would 
they incorporate this loss of prestige in their resrvation wage per day? It may be done 
by including an average daily compensation on the basis of some expected days of 
employment Reservation wages thus formed, would imply that women prefer to 
maximise the number of days for which they obtain employment at that reservation 
wage. 
A small detail about reservation wage needs to be mentioned here. When the 
reservation wage is perceived to be fixed for her entire range of work, it should 
include a mark up over and above the opportunity cost of time. This makes her wage 
employment profitable. When for a worker, reservation wage rises as she works 
more days (or hours), equilibrium equates wage rate with reservation wage, without 
any mark up. This is possible because at that wage rate the earlier units of days 
worked (apart from the marginal unit) have a disutility less than the wage rate and 
thus yield a surplus. In the case of a constant disutility, if the wage rate just equals 
the alternatives foregone, then it does not matter whether one takes up wage 
employment or engages in the alternative opportunities. In the presence of a mark up 
in the wage rate, it pays an individual to take up as much employment as possible. In 
the absence of knowledge about what determines this mark up, it is assumed to be a 
fixed (small) proportion of the actual opportunity cost. 
The reservation wage will reflect the highest among the altemative opportunity 
costs in terms of housework or self employment plus the psychic cost of being 
engaged in wage employment and the addition of a small mark up. 
Considering such a fixed opportunity cost of labour, the labour supply of a 
worker will be given by a horizontal line segment at the height of her reservation 
wage, extending up to the point of the maximum number of workdays. After that 
point supply becomes inelastic because of physical limits of labour supply. 
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An assumption has to be made about the maximum possible supply that can be 
assumed to come from a worker. Although it could be 365 standard days, according 
to their statements, this is unlikely to be the case in reality. Since these workers are 
now poor and severely underemployed, they may be underestimating their marginal 
utility of leisure. Once they obtain a reasonable amount of employment, their 
marginal utility of leisure may rise and even before the physical limit, the supply 
curve of labour may slope upwards. That this will not happen over a low range of 
days is implied by the fact that a few women who obtained employment for the 
whole year worked for 360 days. 
A perfectly elastic labour supply up to a certain point is contrary to expectations 
in industrial labour markets where, due to an increasing disutility of labour and a 
rising opportunity cost in terms of substitute services for housework, the opportunity 
cost of labour increases with a rise in labour supplied. 
An empirical estimation of the relationship between wage and labour supply in 
a cross section sample such as the present one, may give an inelastic supply curve. If 
wage rates vary between certain ranges above and below W j in Figure 5.1, and all of 
the women supply close to W j S j amount, the points of supply will lie in a wage 
inelastic supply function namely SjS2 in Figure 5.1. Thus the elasticities of labour 
supply given by econometric estimation need to be interpreted with caution. An 
inelastic supply function after an initial elastic supply up to an almost full 
employment level has a different implication than an inelastic supply which starts 
from a quite low absolute level. 
There is no comparable study of female (or male) labour supply elasticities in 
rural labour labour markets in Bangladesh. Bardhan (1984b) and Ryan and Wallace 
(1987) obtained small and insignificant elasticities of days supplied by female 
workers with respect to wage rates. Such inelasticity is not surprising as explained 
above. Bardhan, however, contrasted it with Lewis's (1954) assumption of a 
perfectly elastic labour supply. But Lewis's assumption of an elastic labour supply 
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relates more to the initial elastic part of the labour supply of workers. The total 
excess labour or underemployment in the rural sector, along with the initial elasticity 
of individual labour supply functions, is the basis of the unlimited supply in Lewis's 
model. 
Studies in the context of industrial labour markets obtained wide ranges of 
wage elasticities of female labour supply. Hanoch (1980), Hausman (1980) and 
Schultz (1980) obtained positive elasticities of less than one. Arrufat and Zabalza 
(1986), Cogan (1980), Dooley (1982), Heckman (1976, 1980) obtained elasticities 
greater than one and ranging up to quite high values (the maximum was 15). Only a 
small number of studies obtained negative elasticity of supply (Nakamura and 
Nakamura 1981, Robinson and Tomes 1985). 
Total supply oflabour in the village labour market 
For a village, the total supply of labour at each reservation wage will be given by the 
sum of days available from all workers who start supplying labour at that wage. 
However as wage rates rise, the supply of labour days needs to be taken as the 
cumulative sum of supply from workers with reservation wages less than or equal to 
that specific level. 
The supply of workers will be a rising function of the wage rate. This is 
because, with the rise in wage rates, more and more workers with higher reservation 
wages will enter the labour market. 
If the reservation wage is considered to vary continuously, the supply curve of 
total days by all workers will also be continuous and upward sloping. Since the 
added workers supply up to a maximum possible limit of days at the same wage rate, 
the supply curve of hours is expected to show a high elasticity. 
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5.3 The demand for labour in the female labour market and the equilibrium 
wage rate 
Since the demand for labour is highly seasonal, demand is depicted in terms of two 
seasons, the peak and the slack. The number of such categories could be increased to 
capture some middle ranges; however the nature of the analysis would be essentially 
the same. For simpUcity, only two seasons are included. 
For each season two aspects of demand for labour are distinguished. First, 
there is the demand for workers and second, the demand for labour days. Due to the 
falling marginal productivity of labour, the demand for the number of workers will 
be a decreasing function of the wage rate. Similarly, the demand for labour days (or 
in other words, number of workers each day) will be a decreasing function of the 
wage rate. 
Determination of the equilibrium wage rate: peak season 
In each season, the wage rate and the number of workers employed will be 
determined by the intersection of the functions describing the supply of 'workers' 
and the demand for 'workers' during the season. In Figure 5.2(a), S ^ R ^ shows the 
supply of workers and DvvpQwp shows the demand for workers during the peak 
season. They intersect to give the equilibrium wage rate O W j and the number of 
workers employed is OLj . 
The supply curve of 'workers' is drawn with a discontinuity at point 'P' close to 
the equilibrium point, to reflect the fact that in mral areas few workers are totally 
unemployed in the peak season. Therefore it is likely that the workers who are not 
employed have a much higher supply price. The supply curve of 'days' has a 
corresponding discontinuity at point 'Q'. 
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Figure 5.2 Peak season wage determination in the female labour market on the 
basis of separate demand and supply for workers over a season and on each day 
(a) (b) 
0 Li Number 0 
of workers 
Note: Horizontal axes in figure (a) and (b) do not have the same scale 
Li Sz Number 
of days 
Figure 5.2(b) shows the demand for labour each day (D^pOdp^ supply of 
labour days (S^R^j) as functions of wage rate per day. From the demand and supply 
curves of labour days (in contrast to workers), it can be seen how much of the days 
will be hired at the equilibrium wage rate OW]^ and how much may remain 
unemployed. The total time hired is less than the maximum available at this wage 
rate and there is some underemployment In Figure 5.2(b), OL2 amount of days will 
be used and L2S2 is not hired. 
The underutilisation of days occurs because the equilibrium wage rate equating 
the number of workers demanded during a season with their supply, is not a wage 
rate which would clear the supply of labour every day. The number of workers 
demanded in the peak season is such that their total labour time supplied each day 
cannot be fully utilised. The demand for workers during a season is based on factors 
different firom the demand for labour every day. The reasons of this speciality in 
demand is explained below. 
The peak season is spread over a few weeks. During these weeks, all the 
potential employers will wish to hire workers. As a result the wage rate is bid up so 
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employers are not sure about one another's needs and cannot identify exactly at 
which point in time within the peak period simultaneous demand will be greatest. As 
a consequence the wage rate is kept at the higher level of peak point equilibrium over 
a plateau of peak weeks. 
Within these weeks demand for workers on each day may vary. But it is not a 
practical proposition to arrive at a new equilibrium wage rate each day and employ 
workers offering to work at that wage even if that would be a lower wage rate than 
given by the seasonal equilibrium. The hiring practices in the female labour market 
are responsible for this. Hiring does not take place at a central location where all 
employers and female workers gather and bidding of wage rate takes place, as is 
often the case with the hiring of male casual workers. Given social customs, women 
would be unlikely to go to a market place to offer their services for hire. As a result, 
it takes time and effort to contact a worker when she is required. Zohir (1989) 
argues that daily wage determination and daily employment may not be feasible even 
for the male labour market. 
Hiring in the female labour market is usually done in such a way that the same 
worker continues for a few weeks. They are usually given the responsibility of 
finishing a specific job. Renewed hiring each day would have many problems. The 
workers work within the household premises. Therefore the employment of the 
same worker contributes to familiarity between the worker and the household 
members. The job would have to be explained to a worker everyday if a new worker 
was engaged. 
The overbidding of wage rates to create an excess supply of days over those 
needed is also necessitated by the fact that casual employment causes some 
uncertainty about the availability of workers. This is more important for female 
workers than for male workers. Women with responsibility for child care and 
housework must make arrangements for substitutes before they take up wage 
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employmenL As a result, to meet the requirement of any season, if the actual 
number of workers required simultaneously is 'n', then n+m workers need to be 
retained in the labour market so that at least n are readily available. 
In sum, the marginal benefit of retaining one more female worker are higher 
than the direct marginal productivity of a day of her labour input. As a consequence, 
she is offered a higher wage but is not fully employed. 
Determination of the equilibrium wage rate: slack season 
In the slack season we can think of the employers using only those workers who 
have the lowest reservation wage rates. Employers without urgency for their 
services can spend time informing them and waiting until these workers are free, if 
they had been working with other employers. There are, however, limits to such 
flexibility and situations similar to the peak season arise; a few workers need to be 
retained even if the slack in labour demand is reflected in a lower demand for 
workers as well as their labour days compared to the peak period. This is described 
in figure 5.3. The supply curve is assumed to remain unchanged. 
Figure 5.3 Determination of the wage rate and employment in the slack season 
compared to the peak season 
Wage rate per day 
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In the figure: 
DwpQwp is peak season demand for workers 
DwsQws is slack season demand for workers 
SwRw is the supply of workers 
DdpOdp ^^  P ^ ^ season demand for days 
^dsQds ^^  slack season demand for days 
is the supply of days 
The equilibrium wage rate in the slack season is OW2 which is lower than the peak 
season wage (OWl). However, at this wage rate, the labour days supplied by OL2 
workers are OH2 and from that only OH4 are hired and H4H2 are unemployed. 
H2S2 constitutes seasonal unemployment. 
Clarifications of the notion of unemployment in the models presented 
In the above model, within each season, the workers obtained employment for some 
days at a particular wage rate, offered to work more at the same wage rate, but could 
not obtain additional employment. Thus underemployment during that season may 
be viewed as involuntary (for workers employed at any point of time within that 
season). 
This would imply that the workers who are unemployed during the entire slack 
season are voluntarily unemployed because they have a higher reservation wage than 
the equilibrium wage during that season. 
Since the workers with the same reservation wage are employed in the peak 
season and are unemployed in the slack season, the unit used as the reference period 
is important in the evaluation of the degree of voluntary unemployment. If the year 
was taken as the unit of analysis, underemployment may be calculated on the basis of 
the amount of labour the workers want to supply at a wage rate at which they were 
able to obtain employment at any period of the year. A comparison of this supply 
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with the total amount of employment obtained over the year, gives a measure of 
underemployment. This measure may be considered as an upper limit of what could 
be considered as involuntary underemployment. The existing estimates of 
underemployment defined as the difference between total supply over a year and 
total employment, correspond to this criterion. 
Whether the seasonal unemployment is to be considered voluntary or 
involuntary is, thus, a matter of definition. When the wage rate is below a 
recognised poverty level, the definitional question, however, is not particularly 
relevant for policy. The policy implication of conventional voluntary unemployment 
is that the removal of such unemployment is not a priority. In contrast, removal of 
underemployment among workers whose reservation wage is so low as to be 
inadequate to give them an income above the poverty level, is a matter of immediate 
concern even if their reservation wage is higher than the slack season equilibrium. 
This policy concern follows from the fact that if more employment is generated 
at the existing peak season wage rate, it will remove underemployment among 
seasonally idle workers. In contrast, in the normal case of voluntary 
underemployment, the existing peak season wage rate would not be sufficient to 
attract the underemployed workers to take up more employment. This is because, in 
the usual competidve framework, a worker's reservation wage rises as more hours 
are supplied. At the existing wage rate these workers are better off by not working 
more hours. 
The possibility of an absolute shortage of demand for more labour days, 
provides addidonal reasons for considering the underemployment among these 
workers as involuntary. This possibility will be discussed in Section 5.6. 
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5.4 Explanations of wage variation among female workers 
Reservation wage and interpersonal wage variation 
The models suggested above are able to offer some insights on interpersonal 
variations of wage rates. Since different wage rates prevail in different seasons, the 
average wage rate (calculated over the year) per hour will vary with the seasons 
during which a woman is employed; this in turn will depend on her reservation wage. 
For example, in the peak season wage rates are higher and those with higher 
reservation wages will find employment. 
Even within the same season, workers with different reservation wages may 
work for different wages. Even if an equilibrium wage rate is established, some 
workers may be employed at a lower wage. The reasons for accepting employment 
at a lower than equlibrium wage rate may be explained as follows. 
Since in each season, there will be excess supply of days over demand at the 
equilibrium wage, there will be variations in the amount of employment each worker 
obtains. The possibility therefore arises that the workers with lower reservation 
wages will offer to work at their own reservation wage which is lower than the 
equilibrium rate. They will do so if it enables them to obtain more employment and 
enhance their earnings (if the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage rate 
is greater than unity) compared to what it would be if they worked at the higher 
(equilibrium) wage rate. This will mean that more employment is obtained by the 
workers offering to work at lower wages, as far as practicable. There will however, 
be situations when workers working at a higher wage rate will be working while the 
workers offering to work at a lower wage rate are waiting for employment, because 
of the practice of continuous employment for a given job. 
On the other hand, the wage rate may be pushed down by the employer to the 
level of a woman's reservation wage (which is lower than the equilibrium wage rate) 
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through a process of bargaining. This is possible because the employers with better 
economic standing are likely to be in a better bargaining position in this respect 
compared to workers who are poor and desperately in need of employment. Since 
the employers and employees live in the same village, they know each other 
personally, interact socially and are aware of one another's economic standing. 
When the wage rate is pushed down by the employers, the workers employed at 
the lower wage rates will obtain more employment even though the elasticity of 
employment may be low. When employers push down wages, they will do so 
irrespective of considerations about what is happening to the total earnings of a 
worker. On the contrary, voluntary acceptance of a lower wage (than the equihbrium 
rate) will occur when this enhances a worker's earnings. Therefore, if it is found that 
the total earnings are not larger for workers obtaining a lower wage rate, it is likely 
that the acceptance of the lower wage rate is not voluntary. This will be tested in the 
next chapter when total employment and earnings are discussed. 
In either of the cases described above, within a season, there will be variations 
of wage rates among workers because each worker is paid her reservation wage and 
reservation wages vary. Thus the factors which influence the reservation wage rate 
for a worker will explain the variation in the wage rate. 
Since the upper limit of the wage rate is set by the forces of demand, this 
framework enables the interplay of demand forces with reservation wage-related 
factors. 
Factors influencing the reservation wage 
i) Family characteristics 
A reservation wage has already been defined to exist because of the alternative 
earning possibilities and the possibility that there is an initial cost (psychic or 
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otherwise) of entering wage employment. The latter will be related to the urgency of 
obtaining wage employment which will in turn depend on the family situation. 
If there are male earners in the family then there will be greater aversion to 
family women entering into wage employment and the women's reservation wages 
will be higher. 
The urgency of taking up wage employment will be influenced by the number 
of dependent members in the family. A larger dependency burden means a greater 
pressure on a family's subsistence needs. The urgency of obtaining employment will 
push down the reservation wage of women from such families. 
Marital status will also influence the reservation wage. Widowed and divorced 
women face fewer social constraints in going out for paid employment. Their social 
prestige is lower than that of married and unmarried women and the fear of loss of 
prestige due to accepting wage employment is also lower. 
It is difficult to judge what factors influence alternative earning opportunities. 
It may differ depending on the area. For male workers who may go outside the 
village to take up wage employment, such alternatives also include the average 
product of employment in various sub-markets of labour which may exist around the 
village (Papanek 1988). 
Opportunity cost in terms of housework will depend on the family 
characteristics which influence the amount of housework required each day and its 
urgency. The number of dependent members and the presence of small children will 
influence the need for housework positively. As mentioned earlier, dependency 
pressure influences the psychic cost as well and has a negative influence on it. 
Which set of factors will influence the wage rate and in which direction, will depend 
on which opportunity costs are higher in determining the reservation wage. 
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ii) Overtime work and wage rates 
The reservation wage concept may be relevant for a day's employment rather than for 
hours worked on one day. Reservation wages may be perceived on a daily basis 
because alternative petty self employment in which these women are engaged may 
not be pursued in the evening or beyond a limited number of hours, particularly if 
they gather foodstuffs which do not command a market or cannot be saved up for the 
next day. Alternative arrangements for childcare and housework are usually made 
for a day and as these are informal and there is no hourly charge,, it may be argued 
that the cost per day does not rise for an extension of a few hours at the margin. In 
that case the reservation wage on an hourly basis will fall when the workday is 
extended. The extended hours of employment may be paid at a lower rate. Kabeer 
provided evidence of the inflexibility of reservation wages to a rise in the hours 
worked per day. For example she quotes the wage worker women's opinion, "If we 
are provided taka 20 per day (we are) prepared to work as long as asked to' 
(1989:25). 
When the extended hours of work have a negative impact on the reservation 
wage per hour, the employers would prefer to employ the workers for longer hours 
than on a part time or shorter hour basis. This is bome out by the data on the length 
of the workday (Table 3.2). In 41 per cent of employed days women were employed 
for ten hours a day or more. 
Another question then arises as to why all the employers do not employ 
workers for the maximum possible hours a day. The variation in the hours worked 
per day depends on the nature of the work and the amount of work the employers 
need at a stretch. For example, employment will be for shorter hours if some pan-
time help in cooking is required and this needs to be done everyday, for a few hours. 
Full time cooking and domestic work may require ten to thirteen hours of work per 
day. Similarly the hours of work per day for a crop processing activity depend on 
whether it can be done in the yard or within the house. In the former case it cannot 
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continue after sunset as there is no provision of electricity for domestic lighting. The 
urgency of completing a task, which depends on the weather and other circumstances 
faced by the employer's family, will influence the number of hours women work 
each day when they are employed. 
An inverse relationship between longer hours of work and the hourly wage rate 
is contrary to the expectations of behaviour in labour markets in industrial countries 
where there is no underemployment and overtime work is paid at a higher rate than 
normal work. This is because in a situation of full employment, additional hours 
have greater marginal disutility and wage is equated to disutility of work. However, 
Altonji and Paxson (1988) studying the impact of hour-wage trade offs for industrial 
countries point out that in a situation of underemployment, workers need less 
compensation for working longer hours. Hart's (1978) analysis for Java also 
confirms our hypothesis of an inverse relationship between hours worked and the 
hourly wage rate. She found that workers accept a long day to increase the total 
hours of employment they obtain and in the process end up with a lower wage rate 
per hour than those who work shorter hours. 
Regional difference and wage variation 
Locational differences in productivity may play a role in determining an equilibrium 
wage rate by influencing the reservation wages. The cultural differences among 
regions may be important in this respect. 
The supply situation may also be influenced by locational differences in 
productivity. Low productivity may be associated with poverty. The larger the 
percentage of households living in poverty, the greater will be the supply of female 
workers at any wage rate. Differences in productivity among areas may influence 
demand and thus will also affect the wage rate. Variations may occur among 
villages or geographic regions, depending on the similarity in demand and supply 
situations. 
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Interlinkage of markets and wage variation 
The interlinkage of markets may cause differences in the observed wage rate. The 
effective wage rate may be different if the interlinked markets are considered 
together. As discussed in Chapter 2, female labour market transactions are often 
linked with credit market transactions. For the workers surveyed, all loans were 
apparently interest free. The workers with a larger loan will therefore be paid a 
lower wage rate if there is an implicit interest charge. 
This effect of interlinkage may be interpreted as a reflection of the Reservation 
wage' concept. Credit-worthiness of a woman worker would be low and she would 
consider the loan as a favour. If she takes employment with another person, she may 
avoid paying the implicit interest charge, but she would not only lose the prospect of 
obtaining further loans from the original employer but also from other employers. 
Since the acceptance of employment with the lender is voluntary, the existence of an 
implicit interest charge on the loan may be interpreted as a lower reservation wage 
for the borrowers than for other workers. 
5.5 Regression analysis to examine the variations in wage rates among female 
workers 
It has been postulated that the wage rate received by a worker will vary with the 
factors influencing the reservation wage and the extent of interlinkage with credit 
markets. An OLS regression analysis was used to examine the influence of the 
relevant variables on the wage rate. 
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The log of average hourly wage rates over the year is the dependent variable.^ 
The factors which influence the variation in the level of the reservation wages are 
included as explanatory variables. 
Family characteristics are specified as: a dummy for having a baby (child below 
age of 5 years); dummy for having a male earner in the family; the number of 
dependent members in the family; and marital status of the worker. 
Marital status is represented by a dummy for the widowed and divorced group 
(having a value of one). These women are considered to be different from unmarried 
and married women in terms of social status. 
A dummy for locational difference is included in the equation. The two nearby 
villages in each district share the same cultural environment and this is likely to 
influence the formation of reservation wages. The level of literacy is very similar for 
the villages in each area. The villages in each area are also similar in terms of 
cropping intensity, which may be taken as an indicator of productivity levels. The 
area dummy has a value of one for the villages of Bhanga which are remote from the 
main city.^ 
To capture the negative influence of longer hours worked per day on the wage 
rate, the length of the work day is included as a dummy variable taking the value of 
one for days consisting of eight hours or longer. 
The extent of interlinkage with the credit market is measured by the value of 
the loan taken by a worker from her employer and used as an explanatory variable in 
the regression. 
5. The female workers surveyed were actually engaged in wage employment. If tlie analysis were 
focussed on the personal characteristics of the workers which explain the formation and variation of 
reservation wages for all women in the four villages studied, the omission of workers who do not 
participate due to high reservation wage would lead to a 'selectivity bias'. But here the interest is in 
the wage variation among the employed workers and this depends on factors related to the 
characteristics of their actual employment, for example, hours worked per day, interlinked market 
etc., together with the personal and family characteristics relevant to the formation of reservation 
wages. Concentration on the women actually employed is thus justified. 
6. Alternatively, each village could be given a separate location dummy. But this will not have any 
meaningful interpretation in terms of the reservation wage or productivity differences because the two 
villages in each area are very similar. 
117 
The results of ordinary least square regression are presented in Table 5.1. 
Having a small baby did not significantly influence wage rates. The reason may be 
that the responsibility for child care does not raise the reservation wage as most of 
the women take a small child to the employer's place or arrange informal child care 
with other members of the family or with neighbours. 
Table 5.1 Factors explaining variations in wage rates among female workers: OLS regression results, including all variables on a priori ground 
Dependent variable: log of wages per hour 
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-Value 
Dummy for area (Bhanga=l) 0.09 2.05*** 
Number of dependents in the family -0.03 -1.89** 
Dummy for male eamers 0.09 1.57* 
Dummy for a baby 0.02 0.52 
Dummy for marital status 
(widowed and divorced = 1) -0.05 -0.95 
Dummy for working 
eight hours or more 
-0.13 -2.76*** 
Value of loan from the employer -0.0002 -1.13 
Constant 0.25 2.85 
Adjusted R^ 0.23 
Value of F 4.31*** 
RESET2 t-value 0.50 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 1.46 
Sample size 77 
Note: **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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The following discussion of the influence of other variables is based on a 
regression which excluded the dummy for having a baby. The results are given in 
Table 5.2. 
The dummy for locational differences has a significant positive coefficient. 
The Bhanga area (having the value of 1 for the dummy variable) is comparatively 
low lying and thus may have more natural vegetation and greater scope for fishing 
and other gleaning and collecting type of activities. Having less contact with bigger 
towns than Mirzapur, and with lower levels of female literacy, it may be more 
conservative and thus generate a higher reservation wage for female workers. These 
effects counteract the effect of low productivity in this area. 
On the other hand, the number of dependents in the family has a negative 
influence on the wage rate. This is significant at the 10% level. This is in 
conformity with our hypothesis that the women with with greater consumption 
pressures arising from larger number of dependents feel greater urgency to take up 
wage employment. 
The dummy variable for having male earners in the family has a significant 
positive coefficient as expected. 
Similarly, the group of divorced and widowed women work for a lower wage 
rate, though the coefficient is not statistically significant. As was mentioned, their 
reservation wage is likely to be lower because they have a lower status. 
The wage rate is seen to be significantly lower for the workers who work longer 
hours per day; the coefficient of the dummy variable for working a standard eight 
hour day or longer is negative and highly significant. 
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Table 5.2 Factors explaining variations in wage rates among female workers: OLS regression results, final equation 
Dependent variable: log of wages per hour 
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-Value 
Dummy for location (Bhanga=l) 0.10 2.46*** 
Number of dependents in the family -0.03 -1.83** 
Dummy for male earners 0.09 1.63** 
Dummy for marital status 
(widowed and divorced = 1) -0.05 -1.06 
Dummy for working 
eight hours or more 
-0.13 -2.75*** 
Value of loan from the employer -0.0002 -1.28* 
Constant 0.25 2.83*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.24 
Value of F 5.04*** 
RESET2 t-value 0.74 
B-P test (chi-sq d.f. 3) 1.46 
Sample size 77 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
120 
Interlinkage with the credit market is seen to have a significant (at 10 per cent 
level) negative influence on the wage rate. 
The implicit average interest rate was calculated from the coefficient of the 
value of loans. For a person working with the lender employer for the average 
number of hours worked by all these women, the rate of interest is 22 per cent. This 
is higher than the institutional interest rate which was 16 per cent in that year. It is 
lower than the effective rate of interest charged by Grameen Bank (the bank which 
gives loans to landless households without collateral) which stands at 25 per cent. 
(Chapter 7 discusses the operational proceedures of Grameen Bank loans and the 
rates of interest charged.) Informal lending by the employer can be seen as ensuring 
the survival of the labour force for the village economy as well as having some 
'social security' function. 
The interest charges are nevertheless necessary to strike a balance between the 
social security aspect and direct economic concerns. If the loans were entirely 
cosdess, the demand for them would go up so that it would be difficult to help 
distressed persons. Costless loans might give the workers an idea that the wage bill 
is too small for the employers and this may encourage a rise in the reservation wage. 
The reason for making the interest charge implicit is usually seen in the 
religious and cultural beliefs among rural Muslims: interest earning is not socially 
acceptable. 
The adjusted R^ in this regression is 0.24. The value of the F statisdc for the 
regression is 5.04 which is significant at less than 1 per cent level. 
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The statistical significance of some of the variables in the equation and R^ is 
small. Some of the characteristics of workers may have contrasting influence on the 
considerations behind status and the urgency of earning an income. In addition, the 
reservation wage of some women may depend on opportunity cost in terms of 
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housework whereas for others it may depend on alternative earnings. Therefore for 
the total sample there will be variation in the importance of each characteristic. 
The suitabihty of this regression has been tested by a number of econometric 
tests. The procedures for the tests used in this study are described in Appendix C. 
The most important test for the present case is the test of functional form for 
non-nested alternatives. This test examines for misspecification resulting from the 
exclusion of important variables and the quadratic forms of the variables. Since we 
do not have much a priori knowledge about which factors may determine the 
reservation wage rate and the role of non linearity of some of the explanatory 
variables, this test helps to determine whether any major omission has occured. 
The test coefficient is insignificant implying that the chosen equation is 
acceptable. The t-statistic for this test and its significance, are reported at the end of 
each regression result against RESET2. 
No significant evidence of the violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity 
was found in terms of the Brusch-Pagan test. The chi-square values of this test and 
their significance are presented at the end of the tables with the regression results. It 
may thus be concluded that the regression equation provides a satisfactory model. 
The above regressions use a log-linear functional form. The choice between a 
linear and log linear form of function should be based on a comparison of superiority 
of one form over the other. The results of this test for the equation in Table 5.2 are 
presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 The comparison of log-linear and linear functions for the 
regression equation to explain variations in wage rates 
Test statistics for the 1.18 
superiority of linear form 
Test statistics for the -0.85 
superiority of log linear form 
Conclusion: Since none of the test statistics are significant, neither form is superior 
to the other. 
These tests show that neither form is superior to the other. Therefore in the tradition 
of other studies of wage determination the results of the log-linear form are used in 
the above analysis. 
5.6 Some extensions and modifications of the proposed model of wage 
determination 
The model proposed in Section 5.3 is based on some specific assumptions which are 
relevant for the female workers in the sample. Some of these assumptions may not 
hold in certain other circumstances. The suggested procedure for arriving at the 
equilibrium can be more useful if it can be modified to take into account situations 
where the assumptions do not hold. These modifications are now considered. 
Uniformity of wage rate 
Many studies consider the village labour market for unskilled work to be 
characterised by uniform wages rather than the variation in wage rates observed 
among the female workers. The process of wage determination suggested in Section 
5.3 may be modified to postulate the existence of a uniform wage rate. Uniform 
wages will prevail if the workers do not offer to work below the equilibrium wage 
rate even if some of them have lower reservation wages. Nor do the employers make 
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an attempt to bargain to bring down wages to the level of reservation wages. 
However, it is not logical that they would not do so if it was profitable. 
An alternative way to postulate a unifonn wage is to introduce modifications in 
the supply schedule for workers and labour days. If the workers have a uniform 
reservation wage, a maximum supply of workers (and days) will be forthcoming at 
the same reservation wage. This is possible for male workers whose altemative cost 
of time is given by altemative earnings opportunities which may be the wage rate in 
employment at the nearest town or market centre and will be the same for all 
unskilled workers. If considerations of status or housework are not relevant, then the 
characteristics of workers will not affect the reservation wage as was the case with 
the sample of female wage workers. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates this situation. 
Figure 5.4 The equilibrium wage rate and employment when workers have a 
uniform reservation wage 
Wage rate per day 
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Note: Horizontal axes in figure (a) and (b) do not have the same scale 
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In figure 5.4(a), D ^ Q ^ shows the demand for workers, W j S ^ shows the supply of 
workers and O W j shows the uniform reservation wage at which O L ^ workers 
supply their labour. With a uniform reservation wage among workers, the 
equilibrium wage rate is the same as the reservation wage. In the figure O W j gives 
the equilibrium wage rate while O L j gives equilibrium employment. A comparison 
of demand for labour days and supply of labour days in Figure 5.4(b) shows that 
I ^ L ^ is the amount of unemployed days at wage rate O W j . 
Wage variation on the basis of productivity differences 
The analysis so far is based on the assumption that there are no productivity 
differences among the workers. This is not a crucial assumption for the analysis and 
with minor modifications, productivity differences between workers can be 
accommodated. 
If workers are heterogeneous in terms of work capacity, their alternative 
earnings will also vary and the reservation wage of workers with higher productivity 
will be proportionately larger. Therefore, when wages paid are equal to the 
reservation wage of each worker, wages will vary depending on a worker's 
productivity. 
When productivity differentials influence the reservation wage, personal 
characteristics of a worker which influence his/her productivity, will cause wage 
variation, even if the labour market is not cleared. Studies based on the competitive 
framework for wage determination found that a person's age, experience etc. are 
important factors in explaining wage variation in labour markets in India or 
Bangladesh. Since there was underemployment in these labour markets, it was 
argued that competitive analysis may not have been applied meaningfully. The 
above framework may provide an alternative rationale to justify the observed 
relationships which were important in male labour markets (Table 4.1). 
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Alternatively, instead of working through the formation of a reservation wage 
by a worker, a productivity differential may play a role in differentiating the wage 
rates of workers through the employers' strategy. Employers may bid up the wages 
of the workers whose work capacity is larger. Workers whose labour power per hour 
is higher, but who have the same reservation wage, would have cheaper labour 
power. These workers will be in demand by all employers and thus the employers 
bid up the price of labour hours from these workers. 
It follows that the more productive workers may obtain more employment. If 
these workers do not raise their reservation wage (or the employers do not bid up 
their wage rate) up to the point of equality with the wage per unit of labour power 
with other workers, the more productive workers may obtain a lower wage rate per 
unit of labour power (but still receive a higher time rate). In that case they will be 
employed preferentially and this may raise their total earnings (depending on the 
relevant elasticities). This would imply that the workers with a higher time rate of 
wage (but lower wage per unit of labour power) obtain more employment. This 
contrasts to the situation in which the reservation wage is unrelated to factors 
influencing productivity (as in the case of female workers), so that workers with a 
lower reservation wage rate and thus a lower time wage obtain more employment. 
Absolute shortage of demand 
In the situation of very low productivity of labour in the traditional rural sectors, one 
could think of a situation that after a certain level, a reduction in the wage rate will 
not increase the demand for labour. This may be described as a situation of absolute 
shortage of demand. 
This may occur in a small geographic region with limited resources and a small 
range of activities. The supervision cost may cause a special case of inflexibility of 
demand. If with a larger volume of employment, the supervision cost increases at 
more than a proportionate rate, the demand for labour may remain fixed after a 
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certain level. This may occur due to the low morale, and thus low productivity, of 
low paid workers. In this case the wage-demand relationship is akin to the efficiency 
wage theory. 
However, the increase in supervision cost may be due to other reasons and will 
not be functionally related to wage rates but to the actual number of workers who are 
employed. When more labour is employed, the workers need to be engaged in 
diverse types of activity like cleaning orchards, mending fences around kitchen 
gardens, land improvement etc. These are performed over a dispersed area and one 
employer cannot supervise all the workers. In the absence of supervisory labour, 
supervision is inadequate. A specific example may be that at periods of weeding a 
crop, there may still be scope to employ workers for the improvement of land which 
remained fallow in that season. This may not be practicable because one employer-
supervisor cannot supervise both tasks. 
In such cases employment will be fixed at a maximum level. The wage rate 
will be determined at the level which is just sufficient to achieve that supply. 
Figure 5.5 describes this situation. 
Wage rate per day 
Figure 5.5 The equilibrium 
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DDLj shows the demand for workers at various wage rates and SS shows the 
supply of workers at each vvage rate. Employment cannot be greater than OL j even 
if the reservation wage among the workers is close to zero. At O L j employment, 
wage rates will range between OS and O W j depending on whether employers can 
bargain to push wages down to the level of the reservation wages of workers or 
whether the workers can bargain to keep them as high as possible to generate the 
maximum amount of employment OLj . 
An absolute shortage of demand is likely, especially in the female labour 
market, where women are employed only in a small proportion of jobs. The 
employers interviewed reported that an important reason for not employing women 
in low productive activities at low wage rates is the problem of supervision. 
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Chapter 6 
Determinants of employment among female wage workers 
6.1 Distinction between a labour supply analysis and the determinants of 
employment 
If workers do not face involuntary underemployment, the amount of paid 
employment taken up by workers represents their supply of labour to the market at 
an exogenously given wage rate. The analysis of the labour supply function is 
therefore equivalent to an analysis of the determinants of employment. 
If involuntary underemployment exists, the labour supply is not identical with 
employment. In such cases, labour supply will be the sum of the amount of 
employment and unemployment for a worker. Therefore the determinants of 
employment and the labour supply function require separate analysis. 
The nature of the labour supply function for the workers surveyed was 
discussed in Chapter 5. In this chapter the variation in employment and its 
implications will be analysed. 
The existence of involuntary unemployment implies that the total employment 
available is shared by the workers. The amount of employment obtained by a worker 
in such a case will be based on factors which affect the share of total employment 
going to a worker. In other words, factors influencing the variation in the amount of 
employment obtained by a worker will operate through the allocation of employment 
to each worker. This will depend importantly on the employers' convenience and 
demand. 
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Many researchers implicitly assume that the labour market clears and then 
proceed to explain the amount of employment obtained by a worker in terms of the 
labour supply function. If the labour supply is defined as the amount of employment 
and there is involuntary unemployment, the analysis of the labour supply function 
may give misleading results. The analysis described as labour supply will merely be 
an analysis of the factors influencing the amount of employment which are in fact 
likely to be determined by factors related to demand, rather than by supply. 
Such inappropriate interpretation will result in misleading conclusions because 
most factors work on the demand side in an opposite fashion to the way they operate 
on the supply side. For example, as the wage rate increases, the supply of labour 
among poor workers is likely to increase. In contrast, the effect of a higher wage 
rate for workers may, from the employers' reactions, result in a lower amount of 
employment. 
6.2 A review of studies of the determinants of employment of the workers in 
India and Bangladesh 
The presence of underemployment is of great importance in interpreting the results 
of a function depicting the relationship between employment and other variables. 
Only a small number of studies of the determinants of employment for wage 
labourers in the rural labour markets of Bangladesh and India are available. These 
are now discussed to illustrate the confusion that has arisen in distinguishing the 
determinants of employment from the determinants of labour supply. 
Rosenzweig(1984) estimated a relationship between the amount of employment 
and its determining variables for landowning and landless male and female wage 
workers in India. He used Indian data from a National Sample Survey for 1970-71. 
He found a significant negative coefficient for own wage in the equation for male 
workers and a positive but not significant coefficient for this variable in the equation 
for landless female workers. In relation to the cross effects of male wages. 
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Rosenzweig found the estimated gross male wage effects on female employment in 
both landless and landholding households to be negative and significant. 
He interpreted the result as a labour supply function. He described these effects 
of own wage rate and husband's wage rate as ^consistent with the United States 
(labour supply function analysis) results (Rosen 1976, Rosen and Welch 1971, 
Schultz 1975)' (Rosenzweig 1984:239). 
Such apparent similarities between a group of extremely poor workers in a 
developing country and the relatively affluent workers in an industrial country 
should make us cautious in interpreting the results. On a priori grounds it is expected 
that for poor wage labourers, the labour supply should respond positively to own 
wages. For the same reason, the impact of male wages on female employment 
should not be significant. 
The negative or insignificant responsiveness of labour supply to own wage rates 
as obtained by Rosenzweig may be due to his definition of labour supply in terms of 
the days of employment. Rosenzweig did not take into account unemployment. The 
presence of unemployment as discussed by a large number of other studies of India, 
also on the basis of various rounds of the National Sample Survey, indicates that 
such unemployment must be taken into account in the analysis of the functional 
relationship between wage rates and employment. Visaria (1981) reported 
unemployment rates among female casual labourers as 21 per cent and 22 per cent in 
two states of India. These are based on 1972-73 National Sample Survey data. Datt 
(1989) reports unemployment rates of 16 per cent for landless female workers in 
India, also on the basis of 1972-73 National Sample Survey data. 
As noted earlier, if there is any unemployment, the impact of the wage rate on 
the days of employment may imply a demand side consideration by the employer; an 
inverse relationship follows from such demand considerations. Whenever possible, 
employers would allocate less work to workers who need to be paid a higher wage 
rate. 
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Rahman and Islam (1986) discuss the factors influencing total employment 
among landowning and landless male workers in Bangladesh. To analyse the 
determinants of employment for the landless group, their study takes into account 
only the supply side variables. These include the dependency burden and education. 
They provide the following rationale for the inclusion of these variables which come 
from supply considerations. The dependency burden is seen as important because it 
creates a subsistence pressure to work more hours. Education creates status 
considerations and an aversion to some types of wage employment. It thus may 
reduce labour supply. 
If the variation in employment is entirely due to supply side factors, then there 
cannot be any involuntary unemployment. Yet the study by Rahman and Islam 
(1986) indicates that substantial underemployment exists. The major part of 
employment of the landless workers consists of wage employment. But the analysis 
does not consider any factor that would influence the demand for labour. For 
landowning groups in that study, the demand influencing factors operate in terms of 
the employment generating productive assets owned by the households. If the 
variation of employment is considered from the supply side, the wage rate should 
play an important role in the analysis of employment of wage workers. But wage 
rates are not introduced in the analysis. 
Rahman and Islam (1986) discuss the determinants of female employment 
without disaggregating for landowning and landless workers. Since there were few 
female wage workers in their sample, employment among the female workers is 
expected to consist mostly of family employment. Thus the study cannot throw any 
light on the determination of wage employment among female workers. 
The analysis is inadequate even as a discussion of the determinants of labour 
supply to family enterprise as it does not take into account the relationship of the 
housewife's role to the productive employment role. The analysis therefore does not 
132 
include variables such as family size which would determine the importance of 
housework. In sum, Rahman and Islam's analysis lacks a theoretical framework. 
Hossain (1988b) attempts to analyse variations in employment among 
landowning and landless rural workers. His sample of landless workers consists of 
men and women. Variations in weekly employment are seen in terms of the labour 
supply function. But labour supply cannot be identical with the amount of 
employment because Hossain reports that workers from different landownership 
groups are faced with underemployment ranging from 15 to 30 per cent. Thus the 
function which estimates the relationship between the amount of employment and 
the explanatory variables, will in effect bring out the factors that influence the 
employment obtained by workers rather than their labour supply. 
Hossain's study shows a negative relationship between the amount of wage 
employment and the wage rate. If this is interpreted as a labour supply phenomenon, 
it will give a wrong interpretation as did the Rosenzweig (1984) study. The 
coefficients of the explanatory variables in Hossain's regression (including those for 
the wage rate) may be interpreted to reflect the factors determining demand for 
labour hours from workers with particular characteristics. For example, 
landownership and family size may be regarded as variables which raise the 
recruitment cost of a worker. Their coefficients were negative, which conforms to an 
explanation of employment obtained. 
Khandker (1988), in a study of Bangladesh villages, analyses the amount of 
employment of women as a labour supply function. He assumes a competitive 
framework where any amount of employment may be obtained at the market wage 
rate. He does not deal with underemployment, although as already indicated, all 
studies of women's employment in Bangladesh suggest that underemployment is 
considerable. 
Khandker aggregates the labour input into wage employment and cash 
producing family employment on the grounds that econometrically their aggregation 
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gave better results in explaining participation in economic activity in terms of 
household characteristics than did separate equations. However, the characteristics 
of these two types of employment are completely different. Self employment is 
more compatible with household work and may be taken up even when marginal 
return is lower than the wage rate. Self employment cannot thus be explained in 
terms of wage rates. 
Even if the markets were competitive, and marginal returns from both types of 
income producing activity were equalised, the marginal return from self employment 
is determined to an important degree by the amount of land owned by a family. 
Given the extensive rigidities in rural land markets in Bangladesh, the amount of 
land would be an important factor in explaining the amount of labour input into 
family enterprises not included in Khandker's equations. Since most rural female 
workers have large families, family size is likely to influence the utility of income 
and housework and will influence the labour supply. This was excluded in his 
analysis. Thus even on the assumption of a competitive labour market, Khandker's 
analysis is not acceptable. 
In sum, there has not been a study of the determinants of the amount of wage 
employment obtained by a rural wage worker, especially by a female worker, which 
takes into account underemployment. 
Existing studies are also inadequate as analyses of labour supply functions; in 
the presence of unemployment, labour supply is not equal to the amount of 
employment. There has been no other study of labour supply in rural wage labour 
markets of Bangladesh except the studies on employment reviewed here. 
6.3 Determinants of employment obtained by female workers in Bangladesh 
It was shown in Chapter 5 that the equilibrium wage rate is such that a worker does 
not obtain as much employment as she wants at that wage rate. It was also shown 
that the wage rate varies between workers and between seasons. 
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Those who worked at a lower wage rate, would obtain more days of 
employment. This negative relationship will hold if the women offered to work at 
their own reservation wage, which was lower than the reservation wage of other 
women, in the hope that they would be able to obtain more employment. This 
negative relationship would also be true if the employers bargained to bring each 
workers' wage rate down to her reservation rate. In either case, it would be profitable 
for the employers to offer more employment to the workers working for a lower 
wage. 
The women who have a lower reservation wage are also employed in the slack 
seasons when the high wage workers are excluded. Thus if the whole year is 
considered, women who work for a lower wage rate will obtain more employment. 
The negative relationship will be the more pronounced the more possible it is to 
exclude the higher reservation wage workers in the slack season and the more 
promptly contracts may be renewed within a season to replace the women with 
higher reservation wages. In Chapter 5 it was noted that interseasonal adjustments 
may be achieved easily but intra season adjustments are difficult. 
Once this relationship is empirically determined it will also indicate how far the 
women would be able to enhance their earnings by working at a lower wage rate but 
obtaining a larger number of hours of employment. 
Apart from differences in wage rates, locational variations may influence the 
amount of employment obtained by a worker. The demand for labour days will 
depend posidvely on the level of producdvity in an area. Thus workers in a higher 
productivity area will obtain more employment. 
The supply of workers will also be influenced by locational characteristics. 
Locations with lower productivity, lower per capita income and fewer productive 
assets per head will have greater participation rates in wage employment. Thus 
workers in locations with low productivity are likely to end up with fewer days of 
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employment per head because the number of women desiring work is higher while 
the total demand for labour hours is lower than in areas with higher productivity. 
Other considerations may influence the rationing of employment. It was shown 
in Chapter 4 that productivity differences and variations in human capital did not 
create wage differentials among the women studied. These factors are not important 
in unskilled jobs. Even if the differences were important, they may become 
ineffective when the women with lower reservation wages offer to work at those 
wage rates, or when employers with greater bargaining power enforce wage rates at 
the reservation level. There will then be an advantage in hiring workers who have 
favourable characteristics in terms of human capital (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
Whether these variables influence the amount of employment given to a worker 
needs to be tested. 
Some characteristics of the workers may not be directly related to productivity 
but may have other indirect advantages or disadvantages. These are described by 
recruitment costs. Two such factors are taken into account here: it may be 
inconvenient for an employer to accept a woman who takes a baby to work; she may 
be employed for fewer days than one who does not have a baby. Women with male 
earners in the family may not be readily available for employment and will have a 
higher recruitment cost. They are expected to obtain less employment. 
6.4 Factors determining employment: empirical results 
OLS regression estimates were used to test the determinants of the hours of 
employment obtained by the female workers.^ The results of the equations are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
1. As in the case of OLS regressions for wage variation, the sample analysing the variation of 
employment is that of actually employed women. This would lead to a selectivity bias if a labour 
supply function, where the amount of employment is endogenous, was estimated. The determination 
of employment here, however, is concerned with its allocation by the employers among women who 
are working. 
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Log of hours of employment obtained over the year is used as the dependent 
variable. Explanatory variables include the human capital variables (age, square of 
age and experience), wage rate per hour, dummy variable for having a baby, dummy 
variable for having male earners and a dummy variable for location. None of the 
coefficients of the productivity related factors were significant. This confirms that 
these forces are not operating in the female labour market, not even through the 
employment rationing mechanism. 
Table 6.1 Factors explaining variations in the hours of employment obtained by female wage workers: OLS regression results including all variables on a priori grounds 
Explanatory Dependent variable: log of hours of 
variable employment obtained over the year 
Coefficient t-value 
Age of worker -0.002 -0.08 
Square of age -0.00002 -0.08 
Years of experience -0.009 -1.09 
Wage rate per hour -0.56 -2.52*** 
Dummy for male earners -0.27 -2.01*** 
Dummy for having a baby -0.03 -0.302 
Dummy for location (Bhanga=l)(^) -0.53 -4.45*** 
Constant 8.15 16.82*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.42 
Value of F 8.85*** 
RESET2 t-value 1.12 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 3.46 
Sample size 77 
Note: * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively, 
(a) Bhanga is the area with lower agricultural productivity 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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The equations were therefore reestimated excluding the non significant 
variables (Table 6.2). The results of the regression in Table 6.2 shows that the wage 
coefficient is negative and significant. If underemployment was ignored, it would be 
interpreted from the supply side and would be used to show a backward bending 
labour supply curve as in the studies quoted. Here, we interpret the negative 
coefficient as confirming the hypothesis that the wage rate negatively influences 
demand for labour days from a worker. The variables reflecting recruitment cost 
have negative coefficients. 
Table 6.2 Factors explaining variations in the hours of employment obtained 
by female wage workers: OLS regression results, final equation 
Explanatory Dependent variable: log of hours of 
variable employment obtained over the year 
Coefficient t-value 
Wage rate per hour -0.49 -2.25*** 
Dummy for having male earners -0.33 .2.73*** 
Dummy for area (Bhanga=l)(^) -0.59 -5.98*** 
Constant 7.95 31.02*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.43 
Value of F 19.78*** 
RESET2 t-value 0.89 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 2) 3.88 
Sample size 77 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively, 
(a) Bhanga is the area with lower agricultural productivity. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
The dummy for location has a significant negative coefficient. The location 
with low productivity has the value of one. Lower productivity influences 
employment per worker negatively as expected. It was postulated that in an area 
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with lower productivity, a smaller amount of total employment is shared by a larger 
number of workers, reducing employment per worker. 
Results for the test for appropriateness of functional form, given by RESET2 t-
values are insignificant for both equations in Table 6.1 and 6.2. Therefore the 
functional forms are acceptable. B-P test statistics are also insignificant. Thus there 
is no problem of heteroscedasticity. 
Results of econometric tests comparing the linear and log-linear form of the 
equation in Table 6.2 are presented in Table 6.3. The log-linear form proved 
superior to the other. Therefore the results of the log-linear form of estimation were 
used for the above discussion. This is in conformity with the functional forms used in 
other studies on determinants of employment and labour supply function. 
Table 6.3 The comparison of log-linear and linear functions for the regression 
equation for hours of employment 
Test statistics for the -1.13 
superiority of linear form 
Test statistics for the -1.85** 
superiority of log-linear form 
Conclusion: The log-linear form is superior to the linear form 
Responsiveness of employment to wage rates and productivity differences and 
their implications for total earnings 
Whether women are able to enhance their earnings by working for a lower wage rate 
is indicated by the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage rate. If the 
elasticity is greater than one, the lower wage rate will imply larger total earnings and 
vice versa. From the estimated coefficient, the elasticity of hours of employment is 
calculated as 0.59 at the mean value of the wage rates. The distribution of the value 
of elasticity is presented in Table 6.4. Only one woman worked at a wage rate which 
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gave an elasticity greater than one. For most women, the elasticity was in the range 
of 0.5 to less than one. It may thus be concluded that a lower wage rate did not 
enable the women to raise their earnings even if they were working a larger number 
of hours. This indicates that the acceptance of wage rates at reservation level (which 
is lower than the equilibrium rate) was not voluntary and is likely to have been 
imposed by employers who can bargain to push wage rates down to the reservation 
wage level. 
Table 6.4 Elasticity of wage earnings of female workers with respect to the 
wage rate per hour 
Value of elasticity Number of workers Percentage of workers 
0 .01-0.49 14 18.2 
0.50 - 0.74 58 75.3 
0.75 - 0.99 4 5.2 
1.0 and above 1 1.3 
Total workers 77 100.0 
Average elasticity 0.60 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
As reflected by the coefficient of the location dummy, higher productivity has a 
positive influence on the amount of employment. Therefore the impact of higher 
productivity on total earnings will be positive. In Chapter 5 it was found that a 
worker in the area with higher productivity has a lower wage rate. This may indicate 
that higher productivity may have an indirect negative effect on earnings. It may, 
however, be pointed out that the association was not caused by higher productivity as 
such but was due to other characteristics associated with location which counteracted 
the possible positive effect of higher productivity on the wage rate. 
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Chapter 7 
Self employment and institutional finance: the Grameen Bank 
The last four chapters indicate that wage employment for women fails to alleviate 
poverty among the poor landless households in the villages of Bangladesh. Wage 
rates are low and underemployment is nevertheless high among female workers. 
Providing self employment with the aid of institutional finance has therefore been 
sought. 
The following chapters provide an analysis of the determinants of labour 
allocation of women engaged in self employment and the earnings generated by 
them. This may then be compared to the determination of wage employment and 
wage earnings. 
The Grameen Bank is a specialised financial institution in Bangladesh that 
provides loans to poor households. Women borrowing from this Bank form the 
sample for the analysis of self employment. Since self employment of women 
depends on the provision of finance by the Grameen Bank, the principles and rules of 
operation of the Grameen Bank must be examined. For example, whether a loan 
needs to be repaid or not, and the repayment procedure, will have important 
implications for the way in which labour is allocated and earnings are generated. 
The rate of return from the activities will depend on the interest charged by the 
institution. 
7.1 The Grameen Bank's lending process 
The Grameen Bank is a specialised credit institution created to cater for the credit 
needs of landless families in Bangladesh. It was launched by Dr. Muhammad 
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Yunus, formerly Professor of Economics at Chittagong University now Managing 
Director, Grameen Bank to provide operational mechanisms through which the 
banking system could extend credit to the landless who had no collateral. The 
scheme was launched in 1976 as a pilot project operating in a small area. In 1979 it 
still had only two branches. In November 1979 after three years of experimenting, a 
project was formally established, finance was provided by the Central Bank of 
Bangladesh, and rapid expansion began. In 1982 the project attracted funding from 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and operations were extended. 
In appreciation of the perceived success of the project's banking policies and to 
provide a financial institution for the rural poor, the Government of Bangladesh 
established the Grameen Bank as a scheduled bank in 1983. The Bank has a paid up 
capital of taka 72 million. 75 per cent of the shares are owned by the Bank's 
borrower shareholders and 25 per cent by the government (Hossain 1988a) 
The inability of most financial institutions to finance poor investors is a result 
of two major problems: the inability to reach the target group, and the large scale 
defaults on loan repayments. Another important problem is that poor investors 
cannot offer conventional types of collateral. This increases the risk of lending and 
may imply that the market ceases to exist from the suppliers' side (Binswanger and 
Sillers 1983). 
Considerable scepticism about the operation and usefulness of subsidised 
financial institutions for poor people derive from unsuccessful attempts in a number 
of countries (Pischke 1981). A few studies (Egger 1986, Hossain 1988a, Ray 1987) 
show that the Grameen Bank was able to overcome the difficulties that have led to 
failure in other schemes in the past. 
The first principle which distinguishes the Grameen Bank from other rural 
credit institutions is that it serves only poor clients. It was feared that otherwise the 
richer clients would crowd out the poorer ones; the same banking proceedures would 
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not be suitable for all groups. The processing of loan documents had to be 
minimised if poor clients were to be served. 
To serve the poor the collateral requirement needed to be removed. At the 
same time the risk of non repayment had to be eliminated. The following 
mechanisms have been used to achieve this. 
A unit (branch) of the Bank includes a number of male and female field 
workers (designated as 'Bank Workers') along with a field manager. Such a unit 
covers a small area of 15 to 22 villages. The target group of the Bank consists of 
poor and illiterate persons from households with less than 50 decimals (0.2 ha) of 
land. They are not required to come to the branch of the Bank, to fill in any forms or 
do any other loan processing. They receive banking services through the Bank 
Workers. The female Bank Workers work for the female borrowers while the male 
Bank Workers work with the male borrowers. 
After the establishment of a branch, the field manager and the Bank Workers 
move around in the villages and explain the purpose and procedure of the Bank to 
the prospective clientele. 
To obtain credit, landless men and women have to form groups of five like-
minded people (who can interact for social and economic purposes). Members of 
one family or even close relatives cannot be members of one group. Usually only 
one person from a family can become a member of a Grameen Bank group and 
borrow from the Bank. Each group elects a chairman and a secretary who conducts 
weekly meetings of the group. Men and women form separate groups. A number of 
groups (five or six) form a Centre; the Centre also holds weekly meetings which are 
conducted by an elected Centre chief He/she is responsible for helping the mem'oers 
leam and observe the discipline of the Bank. 
After a group is formed, the Bank Workers teach the members how to sign 
papers and observe the group for a month to see that it conforms to the rules of the 
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Bank about holding weekly meetings. After that two members are given loans. If 
their loan utilisation and repayment behaviour is found satisfactory, after a four to 
ten week period, other members are given loans. The borrowers of the Grameen 
Bank are thus, referred to as members of Grameen Bank. 
Each loan has to be repaid in weekly installments within a year. If one member 
of a group defaults, the other members will not be eligible to obtain another loan 
from the Grameen Bank. Thus there is very considerable group pressure to ensure 
repayment by each member. But group responsibility alone cannot ensure loan 
repayment. The loans have to be found to be remunerative if the borrowers are to 
take repeat loans. Weekly installment payment, group pressure and the profitable 
use of funds supplement each other in ensuring loan repayments. 
The Bank observes general rules on the upper ceiling of loans. This ceiling was 
taka 5,000 in 1985, the year of the survey. Recently, in some of the older branches 
this ceiling has been raised. 
When a loan is given, 5 per cent of the loan amount is retained by the Bank. 
This is a contribution to savings by the group. It is called a group fund. In addition, 
each week each member contributes one taka to this saving in the group fund. The 
members can borrow from this group fund for any purpose, including repayment of 
the Grameen Bank loan itself or for consumption. They are thus helped to avoid 
using the original loan for consumption purposes and to make repayments in adverse 
situations. The loan from the group fund has again to be repaid in weekly 
installments. 
Another fund called the emergency fund is created by the group members with 
a contribution of four per cent of each person's loan. This fund can be used only to 
repay a loan in the case of an emergency created by unforeseen accidents like death, 
theft, or other natural calamity. This fund acts as an insurance component. 
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The interest rate of the Grameen Bank loans is 16 per cent per annum, but the 
effective rate of interest is higher because of the compulsory contribution to the 
group fund and the emergency fund on which the members do not have any direct 
claim. The effective rate of interest stands at 25 per cent when these two are added 
to the nominal interest rate. These payments are seen as interest payments because 
they are compulsory and the expenses are incurred only because members borrow 
money from the bank. 
An alternative estimate of effective interest rate is obtained by taking into 
account the fact that interest payments on Grameen Bank loans start two weeks after 
the disbursement of the loan and all interest payments are based on the total loan. 
Accounting for this and the charges for group fund and emergency fund implies an 
effective rate of interst of 40 per cent. 
The group fund and the emergency fund provide an insurance benefit to the 
borrowers. The loans from these funds are interest free. Therefore the addition of 
these contributions to calculate effective interest rates may be considered to involve 
an upward bias and this needs to be recognised in interpreting conclusions obtained 
by using those effective rates. 
The Bank's field staff play a crucial role in the process of borrowing, loan use 
and repayment. He/she attends the Centre meetings where the loan proposals of the 
members are discussed. With their advice, these are finalised. The branch manager 
then approves the loan. After a loan is approved, the Bank Worker brings and 
transfers the money to the individuals during a weekly meeting. The Bank staff also 
collect repayments by attending the weekly meetings and make all the required 
entries in the pass books. The Bank Workers' presence eliminates the need for the 
borrowers to travel to the office of the Bank. 
In addition to banking facilities, the Bank has undertaken to motivate its clients 
towards achieving better standards of health, nutrition, education for children and a 
community consciousness. For this purpose the Bank staff inform members about 
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health, nutrition, family planning and educational needs. The formation of groups 
and Centres helps to create a feeling of cooperation among the members. This is 
encouraged by the Bank Workers who motivate the members into solving their day 
to day problems by cooperating with each other. This has some impact on the 
regularity of loan repayments. The Grameen Bank undertook these initiatives in a 
response to members' interests. 
The above processes are costly to administer and the Bank's programs and 
operations have to be subsidised. How far such banking may be viable and cost-
effective is yet to be judged. In the expansion phase of the bank, many overhead 
costs have to be incurred which only become efficient after substantial expansion of 
operations. 
During the last few years the Bank has expanded substantially. In 1985 (the 
year of the survey for this study) the Bank operated 226 branches. In 1985 it covered 
5 per cent of the villages in Bangladesh and 24 per cent of the target group 
population in those villages. In 1989, a total of 641 branches have been established, 
which covered nearly 20 per cent of the villages. This may be compared with the 
number of branches of the six major nationally owned banks of Bangladesh which 
ranged between 182 and 1233 in 1984. 
7.2 Operation of the Grameen Bank among rural women 
Institutional finance as a means of generating income earning activities and 
employment for women can be successful only if rural women borrow for self 
employment. Doubts arise because such borrowing deviates from women's 
traditional norms of behaviour. Women in rural Bangladesh are expected to 
contribute labour to the family enterprises but productive assets are owned by male 
family members. Thus when women proceed to obtain loans from an institution, 
their male guardians or even the village leaders may not approve. This may be the 
case with Grameen Bank loans, although the women do not have to go to the Bank, 
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nor do they need collateral. The enthusiasm of a formal institution lending to poor 
people may make the receipients suspicous about its objectives. Rural women have 
been accustomed to neglect and deprivation and/or exploitation by the formal 
institutions as well as by informal social structures. They accept this as natural and 
the pioneering efforts of the Grameen Bank may not be well received. Thus the first 
question that needs to be resolved is whether a reasonable number of women are 
coming forward for loans, and whether the Bank is able to extend its facilities among 
women. 
The progress of the Bank's credit operations among women has two aspects: the 
increase in the number of women joining the Bank and the growth of loans 
disbursed. 
Table 7.1 Grameen Bank membership and loans, 1980-89 
Year Total borrowers Total loan 
(million taka) 
Average loan 
(taka) 
male female male female male female 
1980 8,473 3,171 14.01 3.22 1,653 1,015 
1981 13,451 8,253 22.91 10.62 1,703 1,287 
1982 14,777 9,400 28.44 13.46 1,925 1,432 
1983 25,964 20,991 60.96 38.39 2,348 1,829 
1984 47,229 59,741 152.14 152.22 3,221 2,549 
1985 51,322 101,141 165.48 262.97 3,224 2,600 
1986 52,007 176,605 149.71 392.02 2,879 2,220 
1987 52,683 275,874 165.58 644.45 3,143 2,336 
1988 59,222 413,208 197.81 1082.62 3,340 2,620 
1989 64,406 583,861 207.20 1561.08 3,217 2,674 
Sources: Grameen Bank, Annual Reports, Dhaka, various years; Grameen Bank, Consolidated 
Cumulative Statement, Dhaka, various years; and personal communications wiih the Research and 
Evaluation Department of the Grameen Bank. 
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Table 7.1 shows the trend in the number of female borrowers over the period 
1980 to 1989. During recent years the number of female members increased more 
rapidly than in previous years. Encouraged by the enthusiasm of the female 
members, their better repayment performance than that of male members and their 
use of funds for productive purposes in greater proportion than the male borrowers, 
the Bank has expanded its programmes for women. In 1985 (year of survey for the 
present study) women constituted 66 per cent of all borrowers. 
The average amount of loan obtained by each woman has been increasing, 
though the rise is slow. The increase in female members' access to loans is not 
captured by the average amount because an important factor influencing the amount 
of the loan positively is the length of membership. Therefore, when proportionately 
more loans are given to new members, the average amount will be influenced by new 
borrowers whose loans are smaller. 
The repayment record of the Grameen Bank members is very good, as is to be 
expected in this type of scheme where there is close supervision and intervention 
through field staff. In 1985, the amount not repaid within one year as a percentage 
of total disbursement of loans in 1984 was only 0.06 per cent for all members 
(Grameen Bank 1986). A survey of borrowers by Hossain (1986) showed that only 
0.3 per cent of male and 0.6 per cent of female borrowers' loans were overdue 
beyond one year. 
In addition to its lending facilities, the Bank has been able to mobilise some 
savings directly. This is deposited with the bank. Due to the strict adherence to the 
rules of saving in the group fund, the total amount of savings mobilised so far is 
quite significant for such a poor group of people. The average amount of savings in 
the group fund was taka 331 per woman member in 1985. This may be compared to 
the size of loans by employers to their wage working women, which was only taka 
195 in the same year. 
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The members of the Grameen Bank can borrow money from this group fund 
either for production or for consumption. Since the Bank lends only to landless rural 
people, there is no chance that the poor peoples' savings are diverted to wealthy 
and/or urban people. Hossain (1988a) reported that 23 per cent of the group fund 
savings of women was borrowed directly by group members. Of this 49 per cent was 
used for investment purposes. The rest of the savings in the group fund is being used 
by the Bank in its lending operations. 
A basic issue related to the progress of Grameen Bank and its ability to generate 
employment for the poor households is whether it has been successful in limiting its 
lending operation to the landless households. The Grameen Bank's objective is to 
lend to households owning less than 50 decimals of arable land. In the past many 
programs designed to provide credit to the poor ended up serving the richer 
households in rural areas. 
A few studies (Hossain 1985a, Ray 1987) have shown that Grameen Bank 
membership is confined to poor households as defined by the landownership limit. 
These families were found to have lived in severe to moderate poverty or to have 
been at the risk of slipping into poverty and hardship. These studies did not look 
specifically at the situation of the female members of Grameen Bank. 
In the five villages studied, only 4.6 per cent of the families of female members 
of the Grameen Bank owned more than the landownership limit defined by the Bank. 
In addition to the effort by the staff of the Bank's branches to approve membership to 
only the landless, another factor has been responsible for limiting membership to the 
poor. The Grameen Bank loans bear effective interest rates that are higher than those 
charged by any commercial bank. The loans from commercial banks are more 
attractive to the richer households. The formation of groups and the regular 
meetings of all groups means that if a rich woman wished to become a member of 
the Grameen Bank, she would have to associate with women from poor households. 
This goes against the status of a rich household. 
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7.3 The types of activities for which women borrowed and the characteristics of 
the borrowers 
The two major activities for which women borrowed from the Grameen Bank are 
paddy processing and livestock raising. Table 7.2 shows the distribution of women 
borrowers in the sample by the activities for which they borrowed. 
Table 7.2 Types of activities for which women used their loans from the 
Grameen Bank 
Activity Number 
of 
women 
percentage 
of women 
Total 
capital 
invested 
(taka) 
percentage 
of capital 
Livestock raising 89 67 146,995 44 
Paddy processing 79 60 128,032 38 
Oil prssing 11 8 27,600 8 
Trading 2 1 4,066 1 
Others 19 14 28,851 9 
Total * * 335,544 100 
* some women have multiple entries so that the percentage adds up to more than a hundred 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank members, 1985 
The characteristics of the women who borrowed from the Grameen Bank are similar 
to the female wage workers considered in the previous chapters. The average age of 
these women was 31 years compared to 32 years for the wage workers. The total 
number of earners in these families was 2.38 compared to 2.09 among the families of 
wage workers. Sixty four per cent of these women had a child under the age of 5; 
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this figure was 50 per cent among women wage workers. Self employment appears 
to be more compatible with child care than wage work. The hours worked by these 
women in their entrprise and their earnings and a comparison with the female wage 
workers is presented in detail in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 8 
Determinants of labour allocation of self employed women 
8.1. Theories of peasant farms and labour allocation by self employed workers 
The theories of labour allocation in peasant family farms may be applicable to the 
labour allocation decision of self employed women in enterprises organised with 
Grameen Bank loans. Under the rules of the Bank, these enterprises do not use any 
hired labour. 
These theories use a neo-classical framework to analyse the labour allocation 
decisions of self employed workers. They have similarities to the new household 
economics in that both types of theories are concerned with the labour allocation 
decision when options other than leisure and market work are available. In fact, the 
analysis of time allocation in terms of the new household economics started with the 
observation that, "The line distinguishing the market from the home sector has 
always been vague in less developed countries. The new theory of consumption 
argues that even in developed countries, production at home is no less important' 
(Gronau 1986:273). However, the output of the two types of activities are far from 
being perfect substitutes. Therefore both need to be taken into account to analyse 
the labour allocation of self employed women. 
The theoretical development of peasant family labour allocation issues was 
initiated by Chayanov in the context of Russian peasantry. Interest in the analysis of 
self employment revived during the late 1960s when Sen (1966), Mellor (1969) and 
Nakajima (1969, 1986) made similar contributions to the theory and Chayanov's 
work was translated into English (Chayanov 1966). Chayanov's theory and its 
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applications are discussed in detail as it contains the basic elements of a theory of 
labour allocation of self employed workers and is the earliest among this group of 
studies. 
Chayanov's theory has two aspects: one relates to the process of differentiation 
among self employed peasants and the other relates to the resource allocation process 
on farms. The second aspect is relevant to the present analysis. 
Chayanov pointed out that his framework of analysis was equally relevant for 
non-agricultural enterprises. ^The basic principles of the family farm which we have 
stated do not belong merely to the peasant farm. They are present in any family 
labour economic unit in which work is connected with expenditure of physical effort, 
and earnings are proportional to this expenditure, whether the economic unit be 
artisan, cottage industry or simply any economic activity of family 
labour.'(Chayanov 1966:90). 
Chayanov's model of resource allocation by a family enterprise is based on the 
following key assumptions about households: i) peasant households are family 
labour based farms that do not employ wage labour, ii) workers on such farms do not 
engage themselves in wage employment; iii) supply of land to these households is 
flexible; iv) in such communities a socially determined minimum acceptable per 
capita income exists; and v) labour input per worker has increasing disutility. 
These assumptions make it possible to define a marginal utility of income 
schedule where marginal utility is a declining function of the level of income (MY ^ 
in Figure 8.1). Similariy, the marginal drudgery of earning an income will be a 
rising function of the level of income (LD in Figure 8.1), because the marginal 
disutility of work is assumed to be increasing as more time is spent on work to 
generate a larger income. 
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Figure 8.1 Chayanov's analysis of labour allocation in self employment 
Marginal utility o f i n c o m e 
Marginal disut i l i ty o f labour 
Amount of income 
Given the shapes of these functions, an equilibrium will occur where the 
marginal utility of income is equal to the marginal drudgery of earning that income. 
The equilibrium labour input is derived from the labour required to produce the 
equilibrium amount of income (OYj*) by an enterprise. 
This process led Chayanov to make predictions about the influence of family 
characteristics on labour input and family income. Those related to labour allocation 
are discussed here. 
As the number of consumer units in the family increases (for a given number of 
workers) the marginal utility of income shifts upward, to M2Y2 (Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.2 Chayanov's analysis of the impact of a change in the number of 
consumer units in a family on labour allocation in self employment 
Marginal utility of income 
Marginal disutility of labour 
D2 
D, 
M2 
M, D 
\ q X 
^ 
Y2* Amount of income 
As a result, the new equilibrium Q is at a higher level of income (OY2 ) and a higher 
level of marginal drudgery of labour (OD2) implying a larger amount of labour input 
for the same number of workers. Thus as the ratio of consumers to workers in the 
family increases, per worker labour input will increase. This was borne out by data 
for Russian peasants. 
Criticisms of Chayanov's framework and tests of its applicability have focussed 
on his assumptions of sole dependence on family labour and a flexible supply of land 
(Harrison 1975, Hunt 1979, Rahman, A. 1986). When land is not in flexible supply, 
labour input per acre would be increasing with a rising consumer-worker ratio. 
Thus Chayanov's theory needs major modifications if it is to be applied to situations 
with constraints of land and/or productive capital. The extensive use of wage labour 
in agriculture in most developing countries of Asia is contrary to his other important 
assumption. 
Chayanov's assumption of declining marginal utility of income and the 
increasing disutility of labour is also questionable. Inapplicability of this assumption 
leads to important changes in his conclusions. For example, as Sen (1966) pointed 
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out, it is highly plausible that disutility of labour is constant up to a given level. The 
implication of such constancy is that a reduction in the family's workforce (that is, in 
the consumer-worker ratio) will not lead to a fall in a family's labour input and 
income as predicted. Sen (1966) defines this as a situation of surplus labour. 
Another important shortcoming of Chayanov's theory relates to the omission of 
the role of housework on labour allocation in family farms. Subsistence pressures 
and the influence of a rise in family size on total labour input was assumed to work 
through its impact on the marginal utility of income. The counteracting influence of 
family size that operates through the marginal utility of housework is ignored. As 
family size increases, this will raise the demand for household work, and the 
marginal utility of housework will increase. This may imply a diversion of labour 
input to housework. On balance, whether the labour input in the family farm will 
increase as a result of the increase in family size will depend on the rise in the utility 
of housework on the one hand and the rise in the utility of income on the other hand. 
The peasant labour allocation theory did not take these into account because they 
paid inadequate attention to the contribution of labour input by a family's women 
workers. 
Millar (1975) pointed out that Chayanov's claim that peasants are not involved 
in a profit maximisation process is not true. He argued that, 'As long as each 
exercise of economic discretion is guided by a rational comparison of the differential 
gains and cost.. . the enterprise will attain maximum profit' (Millar 1975:220). 
A few studies applied Chayanov's theory to other developing countries. Hunt 
(1978, 1979) applied the theory to a Kenyan village and found that some of the 
predictions held. Atiur Rahman (1986) made the only application to Bangladesh. 
But Rahman's methodology for testing the applicability of Chayanov's hypotheses is 
not satisfactory. He uses only scattered case studies to conclude that the consumer-
worker ratio did not always vary directly with the family's labour input to its own 
farm. Even if in some cases higher consumer-worker ratios were associated with 
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longer average hours worked, Rahman is not sure whether the deciding factor was 
family size or larger landholding size which was observed among larger families. A 
multi-variate analysis would provide an answer to this question. Rahman did not net 
out the effect of varying consumer-worker ratios for his entire sample and thus his 
conclusions are not statistically meaningful. 
Nakajima (1969, 1986) uses the following framework for an explicit analysis of 
the shift in various parameters faced by the peasant. The self employed workers 
solve the following maximisation problem: (notations have the same meaning as in 
Model A of Chapter 5). 
Max U = U(Yf, Tf) 
Subject to Y f = f ( T f , C ) 
The equilibrium condition is: MUy = f Nakajima's conclusions closely resemble 
those in Chayanov's theory: T o r the family farm in equilibrium the marginal 
productivity of labour equals the marginal valuation of family labour' (Nakajima 
1969:169). 
In Nakajima's framework, it is possible to consider the impact of the size of 
complementary resources not taken into account by Chayanov. When labour and 
land/capital are complementary to each other in the production process, an increase 
in land/capital will influence the marginal product of labour and induce two types of 
impact on total labour input: one is a substitution effect due to complementarity and 
the other is the income effect (the same output can be produced with less labour). 
Thus the total effect, which depends on the balance of these two forces, will be 
uncertain. 
Chayanov's assumption of declining marginal utility of income after reaching 
the socially accepted minimum standard of living, implies that an increase in 
productive assets which raises the output per unit of labour, (other things remaining 
the same) will lead to a decline in per worker labour input. In line with Chayanov's 
assumption. Hart (1978) assumed a homothetic preference structure and predicted 
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that the total change in labour input as a result of increases in productive assets to be 
/ negative. Such negative impacts of increases in productivity will also hold in the 
case of non-homothetic preferences if the marginal utility of income falls more 
sharply and indifference curves become steeper. In this case, non-homothetic choices 
^intensify increases in leisure at higher levels of asset ownership' (Hart 1978:24). 
Mellor (1969) made similar assumption about the preference structure of peasant 
farmers and arrived at similar conclusions. 
The increased level of modem facilities accessible to the villagers and 
improved communication with the city, however, exert an important demonstration 
effect on consumption. The assumption of sharply falling marginal utility of income 
becomes questionable. 
If the marginal utility of income is not declining, the impact of changes in the 
consumer-worker ratio on labour allocation may not be as straightforward as 
Chayanov suggests. Such effects may be zero or insignificant. Sen (1966) uses a 
framework similar to that of Chayanov and Nakajima to analyse the peasant decision 
making process and applies it to an analysis of the existence of surplus labour. In 
equilibrium, the utility of the marginal product of labour equals the marginal 
disutility of labour. Labour is applied up to the point where its marginal product 
equals the real cost of labour. The real cost of labour is defined as the ratio of 
marginal disutility of labour and marginal utility of income. Sen's conclusions about 
the impact of family characteristics on labour allocation by family workers are 
similar to Chayanov's. 
Sen also recognises the possibility that the marginal utility of income and/or the 
marginal disutility of labour may be stationary over some ranges. One of the 
emphases of his analysis was that such stationary phases account for surplus labour. 
In such a situation, the reduction of worker units will not affect the disutility of 
labour and thus there is no reason for labour input or income to change. Sen is of the 
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view that empirical work is required to verify the possibilities that stationary phases 
occur. 
Sen (1966) and Nakajima (1986) also extend the analysis to take into account 
the existence of a competitive labour market. In that case the marginal product of 
the family enterprise will be equal to the market wage rate. However, they did not 
contrast this result and a situation where a wage labour market does not exist, or its 
implications for the relationship between family characteristics and labour allocation 
by family workers. 
None of these studies of peasant labour allocation considered the role of 
housework. As noted, this is a serious shortcoming. 
Jacoby (1990) formulated a model of labour allocation which included an 
exogenous wage rate, the marginal productivity of labour in family enterprises and 
housework as three opportunity costs of labour. If the exogenous wage rate is 
relevant for one group and not for another, their labour supply behaviours need to be 
analysed separately. This was not taken into account in his analysis. In Jacoby's 
sample, the wage rate was not found to be relevant as an opportunity cost. The 
shortcoming of his empirical analysis is that it did not consider labour allocadon in 
self employment independent of other types of labour use. Housework and family 
farm labour was aggregated and its variations were explained. This does not throw 
light on how housework responsibility could affect self employment. 
8.2 A labour allocation model for Grameen Bank financed self employment 
enterprises 
In formulating a model of labour supply decisions with all possible opportunity costs 
of labour, a competitive wage labour market framework is assumed along with 
opportunities for self employment and housework. The model of labour allocation 
developed in Chapter 5 included all these opportunities of employment. This model 
will now be modified by taking into account the possibility that some of the 
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opportunities of labour use may not be relevant for workers in certain situations. 
This modified model may also be viewed as an extension of the peasant labour 
allocation models in that it corrects the omission of housework as an opportunity 
cost. 
A few other studies recognise that, among the poor women in Bangladesh, 
responsbility for housework may reduce their time to participate in wage 
employment and family employment (World Bank 1990, Wallace etal. 1987). 
For the Grameen Bank female borrowers, the market wage rate does not 
represent an exogenously given opportunity cost for the following reasons. First, 
because of underemployment, there is no certainty about the chances of obtaining 
employment. In Chapter 3 to 6 it was shown that the female wage workers cannot 
choose the amount of market employment at the prevailing wage rate. Some studies 
define the opportunity cost of labour as the wage rate weighted by the probability of 
employment However, this is an artificial index which does not represent a fixed 
wage rate at which any amount of employment may be chosen. 
Wage employment is not usually taken up by the Grameen Bank borrowers 
because of its incompatibility with their self employment and housework. The 
incompatibility would not be serious if the Grameen Bank enterprises could rely on 
hired workers while the Grameen Bank member women who organised these 
activities took up wage employment. But according to the rules of the Grameen 
Bank, these enterprises cannot use hired labour. As a result, the women in charge of 
the enterprises cannot take up wage employment. 
The women choose among self employment, housework and leisure. The 
model of labour allocation for this group (Model B) may be developed as follows: 
(notations as in Chapter 5, page 94) 
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Model B 
MaxU = U(Yf,H, L, A) 
Subject to: 
Yf = P f . f (T f ,C) 
H = F(Th, A, B) 
Tf + Tj^ + L = D 
Prices (Pf) are assumed to be the same for all enterprises. The equilibrium condition 
which maximises the utility function subject to the given constraints is given by: 
M U L / M U Y = f ' and M U L / M U ^ = F ' 
The above two conditions together give: 
F '.MUH = f '.MUy = MUL (e) 
In this case, the value of the marginal productivity in self employment and 
housework will determine the amount of income generating employment. 
The equilibrium conditions may be solved to obtain the labour allocation to 
various activities as follows. 
Tf = g ( A , B , C ) (8.1) 
T}, = h ( A , B , C ) (8.2) 
The variations of self employment of workers will depend on the factors which 
influence marginal productivity of self employment, marginal utility and the 
marginal product of housework and the marginal utility of income and leisure. 
These are factors denoted by C, A, B and A respectively. A and B include family 
characteristics like family size, number and age of children etc. C represents capital 
and other supplementary productive resources. 
A sitution where all opportunity costs are relevant, the equilibrium condition 
was ('d.r in Chapter 5) as follows: 
w * . M U Y = F ' . M U H = f ' . M U Y = MUL (d.l) 
The difference between the equilibrium condition (e) and the equilibrium conditions 
in (d.l) is that in the latter case any change in the factors associated with the 
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marginal utility or marginal productivity of housework will not influence the amount 
of labour input in self employment. The adjustments will be made by changing the 
amount of market employment 
This point may be elaborated as follows. The equilibrium condition (d. l ) can 
be written in two parts: 
w = f ' and (i) 
f ' . MUY= F ' . M U f j (ii) 
If there is an increase in say, MUp| there will not be any reallocation between 
self employment and housework because any change in self employment will change 
its marginal productivity. This will disturb the equilibrium condition (i), that this 
marginal productivity is equal to the exogenous market wage rate. Labour input in 
housework will be increased but this will be adjusted to by a reduction in wage 
employment which will maintain the equality w* = f ' undisturbed and restore 
equality f ' . M U y = F ' • MUp^ by changing M U y and F On the contrary, for the 
self employed workers for whom the wage labour market is not relevant, the factors 
which influence the marginal utility of income, housework and leisure will lead to 
variations in the amount of self employment. 
When wage employment is not considered, one may distinguish two types of 
predicted influence of family characteristics on labour allocation in self employment. 
The first is made on the basis of pure peasant labour allocation theories which take 
into account only self employment (and not housework) and the second is based on 
the more general situation where housework and self employment are included as in 
equilibrium condition (e) above. 
Chayanov's theory predicts a positive influence of subsistence pressure in the 
family on the average labour input of workers in the family enterprise. When the 
role of housework is considered this influence becomes indeterminate because 
consumption pressure will not only raise the utility of income as postulated by 
Chayanov, but will also raise the productivity of housework and increase labour 
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input on that account. Therefore, for female workers, the impact on self employment 
is expected to be negative. These comparisons are shown below. 
Alternatives included Impact of an increase in consumer-worker 
in each theory ratio on a worker's labour input in 
self employment 
1) Only self employment Positive (Chayanov 1966, Sen 1966) 
2) Self employment and Zero (Nakajima 1986) 
wage employment 
3) Self employment, wage Zero (Model A: present study. Chapter 5) 
employment and housework 
4) Self employment and Negative for female workers, 
housework Positive for male workers 
(Model B: present study, current Chapter) 
The theory of labour allocation of self employed workers developed here 
suggests that in addition to the impact of family characteristics, a number of other 
factors needs to be considered in explaining the variation in average labour inputs in 
family enterprises. An increase in the productivity of labour will influence labour 
input. This effect will be negative if the assumption of Chayanov-Mellor-Hart holds 
true and the marginal utility of income is falling. On the other hand, the effect will 
be zero or positive if this assumption does not hold and the income effect is 
outweighed by the substitution effect (as the return to labour input rises). If a wage 
labour market exists, an increase in the amount of capital in the self enterprise would 
raise productivity of labour and cause an increase in labour input in this enterprise so 
that an equality between its marginal product and wage rate is revived. 
Other factors which influences the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and leisure will affect the amount of self employment in the Chayanov type model or 
in Model B. This impact will be zero in Model A (Chapter 5). 
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Any factor which enhances income from the enterprise, (for example, a larger 
number of workers) will similarly have a negative effect on labour input per worker 
if the Chayanov-Nakajima-Sen assumption of negative income effects holds. This 
may have zero effect in Model B above, if the assumption of negative income effect 
is not made. It will not have any effect on labour inputs in the more general model 
because changes in wage employment respond to the income effect. 
Factors which influence the marginal rate of substitution between the output of 
housework and leisure (say positively) will influence the labour input in self 
employment negatively in Model B, as equality (e) will be maintained by shifting 
labour input away from self employment. In Chayanov's self employment model and 
in Model A of Chapter 5 where all opportunity costs are relevant, these variables will 
have no impact. 
Thus, predictions concerning the influence of variables on family labour input 
vary depending on the theory adopted. Once the factors influencing labour 
allocation are determined on the basis of empirical data, the results can be used to 
determine which theory and which set of opportunity costs are relevant in a specific 
circumstance. This experiment is done with the Grameen Bank members to confirm 
that the arguments put forward at the beginning of this Chapter are correct; wage 
employment is not a feasible choice for the female workers and housework is a 
relevant opportunity cost. The subsequent analysis shows that personal 
characteristics influence labour allocation in self employment enterprises and thus 
provide evidence that labour allocation is not based on the equality of marginal 
product of self employment with the market wage rate. 
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8.3 Empirical tests of the determinants of variation in the labour input of self 
employed workers 
Testable hypotheses 
The above allocation rules can be used to arrive at empirically testable hypotheses 
about the determinants of the variation in labour input of workers in family 
enterprises financed by the Grameen Bank. Those characteristics of a worker and 
her family which influence various components of the equilibrium condition and thus 
affect labour input in different types of models have been identified. A summary of 
empirically testable hypotheses about the factors influencing labour input of self 
employed workers in the absence of wage employment is presented below. 
One of the important factors influencing the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and leisure is consumption pressure in the family. The number of 
dependents in a family are likely to influence the marginal utility of income 
positively, thereby raising labour supply. 
In the social context of Bangladesh, the marital status of women may have 
implications for the utility of leisure time. Widowed and divorced women are likely 
to have less utility for leisure and thus may contribute more labour input to self 
employment compared to the married and unmarried women. 
An increase in the number of earning members in a family implies that the same 
income per family member may be produced with smaller labour input per worker. 
If the marginal utility of income is declining, each worker will reduce labour input. 
If marginal utility of income is either increasing or constant, labour input per worker 
will not change. 
The amount of capital in the enterprise raises the marginal productivity of 
labour. The impact of an increase in capital (and other productivity raising factors) 
will depend on the balance of the counteracting influences of income and 
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substitution effects of the productivity increases and may be zero, positive or 
negative. 
The effect of changes in the amount of capital may be non-linear. The square 
of the variable is used to allow for this. 
The type of activity may have an income effect because one of the activities, 
namely paddy processing, gives a larger hourly retum (discussed in Chapter 10). 
The net effect will depend on the balance of the substitution and income effects. 
Paddy processing activities may be less compatible with the other activities of male 
workers and they may prefer to work less if this activity is undertaken. The 
percentage of capital used in this activity is taken to represent its influence. Its 
square is used to see whether the direction of influence changes after a given range. 
Other factors influencing the marginal product of labour in the enterprise 
include the enterpreneur's age, education and experience and the impact of the 
variables will be tested. 
Among factors influencing the marginal utility of housework, studies of female 
labour supply in industrial countries have attached most importance to the presence 
of small children. This is expected to be relevant in developing countries as well. 
But self employment activities in developing countries are carried out within 
household premises. Childcare, therefore may not significantly reduce labour 
supply. 
In addition to influencing the marginal utility of income, the number of 
dependent members may increase the need for housework and thus raise the 
marginal utility of housework. Cooking and washing needs increase with the size of 
the family and will reduce labour input into the family's productive enterprises. 
Therefore the net effect of this variable is expected to be negative for female 
workers. For male workers who do not bear housework responsibility, the effect of 
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this variable will be determined by its impact on the marginal utility of income 
which is expected to be positive. 
The variable described as total earners in the family will capture the effect that 
they share housework responsibility and will have a positive influence on women's 
labour input which will counteract the income effect described earlier. ^ 
OLS regressions are used to test these hypotheses. Two equations are estimated 
in order to explain, first, the labour input by female enterpreneurs using Grameen 
Bank loans and second, the labour input by male members in these families. A 
separate equation for the labour input by other female members of the family is not 
considered because the female Grameen Bank members and male family members 
account for 96 per cent of labour input in these enterprises. 
Determinants of the labour input of female enterpreneurs 
Table 8.1 presents the results of the OLS regression intended to explain the 
variations in labour inputs of the female Grameen Bank members.^ Explanatory 
variables are chosen to test the hypotheses considered in the previous section. 
1. To capture this effect it would be more appropriate to use data on total adult members engaged in 
housework. We do not have data on that More importantly, it would be highly collinear with the total 
number of earning members because when self employment of this type is organised, most adult 
persons tend to contribute labour and are counted as earners. 
2. It needs to be noted that these regressions explain labour allocation of women who are members of 
the Grameen Bank and not of other women who are not members and do not have access to capital. 
The factors which explain membership can be addressed separately from the question of labour 
allocation because they are determined by a different set of factors (associated with innovativeness 
and intention to take the risk of borrowing). This analysis is presented in Chapter 10. 
/ 
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Table 8.1. Factors influencing the Grameen Bank female member's labour 
input into Bank financed enterprises: OLS regression results, final 
equation 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: GB female member's labour 
input into the enterprise in previous month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents -2.74 -1.43* 
Dummy for having a small baby 12.35 1.81** 
Number of total eamers in family 1.78 0.55 
Dummy for marital status 20.11 1.98** 
(widowed or divorced=l) 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.037 3.55*** 
Square of capital -0.0000044 -2.55*** 
per cent of capital in paddy activity (prcpdy) 1.73 5.50*** 
Square of (prcpdy) -0.01 -4.10*** 
Years of GB membership -5.37 -1.36* 
Dummy for area 1 14.46 1.48* 
Dummy for area 2 36.97 3 92*** 
Dummy for area 3 -38.90 -2.97*** 
Dummy for area 4 -8.43 -0.86 
Constant 13.31 0.65 
Adjusted R^ 0.55 
Value of F 13.28*** 
RESET2 t-value -1.05 
B-P test-statistic(chi-sq. d.f 3) 2.24 
Sample size 132 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Table 8.1 shows that the number of dependent members has a significant (at 10 
per cent level) negative coefficient as expected. The negative influence of 
dependents through its influence on the marginal utility of housework outweighs its 
positive influence through its impact on the utility of income. This variable was 
significant at the less than 5 per cent level when the equation was reestimated after 
excluding the square of total capital and the square of capital in paddy from the 
explanatory variables, which were suspected of causing problems of 
multicollinearity. The results of this form are presented in Table 8.2 on page 167. 
The following discussion, unless otherwise mentioned, is based on the results 
reported in Table 8.1. 
Among the female wage workers studied (Chapter 5), the dependency burden 
showed a greater influence on utility of income (demonstrated by the urgency of 
taking up employment at lower wages) compared to its positive effect on reservation 
wages by raising housework productivity. 
This contrast may be explained by the fact that those wage workers came from 
even poorer groups who did not own any cultivable land and were thus under greater 
pressure to earn. The self employed women include owners of up to 0.2 hectares of 
land. 
The other variable which influences the marginal utility of housework and 
through that the amount of employment in economic activity, is the presence of a 
small child. A dummy variable having a value of one for women with a small baby 
under the age of five years has a significant positive coefficient which is contrary to 
expectation. This is contrary to the findings for industrial countries. Miller and 
Volker (1983), Ross (1983) and Beggs and Chapman (1988) found that in Australia 
the impact of having children and especially pre-school age children was negative on 
labour force participation of women and the hours they supplied. Cogan (1980) and 
Schultz (1980) found a similar impact on labour supply of women in USA. The 
contrary evidence found for the present sample thus needs some explanation. 
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The negative influence of small children is more likely to be observed for 
women in industrial economies who work for a wage which takes them out of the 
home and thus creates a child care problem. Self employed women do not face this 
problem and the negative influence may not occur. The presence of a child may 
encourage the mother to work more in order to be able to provide for the child. This 
effect is similar to that of an increase in the number of dependent members, but is 
stronger. 
The influence of the number of earners in the family on a woman's labour input 
was examined. This has a positive coefficient which is not significantly different 
from zero. It confirms the non-negative income effect of total earning members in 
the family. 
Next the factors which influence the marginal productivity of labour are 
considered. The amount of capital is the most important variable in this respect. 
This has a significant positive coefficient which shows that the income effect of 
capital in raising productivity is not large enough to outweigh the substitution effects 
of such change.^ 
A recent empirical study (Kumar and Hotchkiss 1988) of the determinants of 
labour allocation by women in family farms of Nepal shows a similar positive impact 
of land (which is equivalent to capital in non-agricultural enterprises) on farm labour 
allocation by women in Nepal. 
The square of capital had a significant negative coefficient which implies that 
the rise in labour input associated with the rise in capital continues only up to a limit. 
From the coefficients of these variables, this limit is calculated as taka 4200. 
The percentage of capital invested in paddy processing is used as an 
explanatory variable because this activity has a relatively higher rate of return to 
3. This variable (total capital) may be suspected of being endogenous in this equation. A test of 
endogeneity for this variable gave an insignificant coefficient (t-statistic of l . l8).The estimation using 
total capital as an exogenous variable was thus justified. A note on the method of this test is 
presented in Appendix C. 
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labour and the effect of this needs to be assessed. This has a significant positive 
coefficient implying that a rise in the return to labour input has a stronger 
substitution effect than an income effect. 
The positive influence continues up to a limit and then has a negative impact as 
is indicated by the negative coefficient of the square of this variable. This may be to 
some extent due to the nature of the work. This activity is physically exhausting and 
after a time, sharply rising disutility of work offsets the utility of income generated 
by the process. 
The length of time a woman has been a member of the Grameen Bank may be 
interpreted to have an income effect because a family's economic situation improves 
with the length of membership. This variable has a negative coefficient which is 
significant at the 10 per cent level. In the equation in Table 8.2, this variable is 
insignificant. Therefore its negative effect may not be concluded with certainty. 
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Table 8.2 Factors influencing the Grameen Bank female members' labour inputs 
into Bank fmanced enterprises: OLS regression results excluding the 
quadratic forms of variables from the equation presented in Table 8.1 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: GB female member's labour 
input into the enterprise in previous month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents 
Dummy for having a small baby 
Number of total earners in family 
Dummy for marital status 
(widowed and divorced=l) 
Total capital in the enterprise 
Per cent of capital in paddy activity 
Years of GB membership 
Dummy for area 1 
Dummy for area 2 
Dummy for area 3 
Dummy for area 4 
Constant 
Adjusted R^ 
Value of F 
RESET2 t-value 
B-P test-statistic(chi-sq. d.f 3) 
Sample size 
-3.50 
13.68 
1.84 
22.61 
0.01 
0.46 
-5.05 
21.46 
35.30 
-44.71 
-0.77 
43.34 
0.45 
10.88*** 
-2.56*** 
3.04 
132 
-1.69** 
1.85** 
0.52 
2 03*** 
4.50*** 
4.26*** 
-1.16 
2.02*** 
3 42*** 
-3.18*** 
-0.07 
2.34*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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The other productivity influencing factors considerd, namely, age and education 
did not have any influence at all, with very low t- statistics. The results of the 
equation containing these variables are reported in Table 8.3. The amount of land 
owned by the household as a supplementary resource to raise productivity (or as an 
alternative source for using a woman's labour) did not have any influence on 
women's labour inputs into the Grameen Bank enterprises (Table 8.3). These 
variables were therefore excluded in the final equation (Table 8.1). 
Four area dummies were included to capture area differences. It is difficult to 
assess the implications of these differences. Three of the area dummies are 
significant. There may be some difference in the motivation factors associated with 
cultural differences or even a difference in the effectiveness of the staff of the 
Grameen Bank branch associated with loan operations. 
The test for functional form given by RESET2 t-values are insignificant for the 
equations in Table 8.1 and 8.3. This test gives a significant t-value for the equation 
in Table 8.2 where the squared value of the variables are excluded. This indicates 
that there is scope for improving this form in Table 8.2 but that the forms in Table 
8.1 and 8.3 are acceptable. None of the equations had a problem of 
heteroscedasticity; B-P tests in all the equations are insignificant. 
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Table 8 3 Factors influencing the Grameen Bank female member's labour inputs 
in the Bank financed enterprises: OLS regression results including all 
variables on a priori grounds 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: GB member woman's labour 
input in the enterprise in last month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents -2.154 -1.07 
Dummy for having a small baby 9.393 1.22 
Number of total earners in family 2.214 0.67 
Dummy for marital status 26.006 2.20*** 
(widowed and divorced=l) 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.035 3.28*** 
Square of capital -.000004 -2 37*** 
Per cent of cap in paddy activity (prcpdy) 1.725 5.40*** 
Square of (prcpdy) -0.014 -4.08*** 
Years of GB membership -4.984 -1.25 
Age of the member -0.489 -0.99 
Years of schooling of the member 1.22 0.68 
Amount of land owned by the household -0.022 -0.18 
Dummy for area 1 13.93 1.40* 
Dummy for area 2 36.693 3.85*** 
Dummy for area 3 -39.74 .2 99*** 
Dummy for area 4 -9.484 -0.94 
Constant 30.024 1.13 
Adjusted R^ 0.54 
Value of F 10.73*** 
RESET2 t-value -0.53 
B-P test-statistic(chi-sq. d.f 3) 2.38 
Sample size 132 
Note: ***, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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These regressions have been estimated in linear forms. Nested tests for log-
linear alternatives of the equation in Table 8.1 shows that linear form is superior. 
The results of the tests are presented in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 The comparison of log-linear and linear functions for the regression 
equation for hours of employment by Grameen Bank member women 
Test statistics for the 3.75*** 
superiority of linear form 
Test statistics for the -0.12 
superiority of log-linear form 
Conclusion: The linear form is superior to the log Hnear-form. 
Determinants of male labour inputs 
Analysis of the determinants of male labour inputs into the Grameen Bank member 
women's enterprises faces additional complications. The models of labour allocation 
are based on the assumption of no market opportunity cost of labour. This poses no 
problem for the analysis of women's labour as the Grameen Bank financed 
enterprises were their only source of employment. But many of the male workers 
were involved in employment for wages. 
Analysis of male labour supply on the basis of models of self employment is 
possible on the assumption that the amount of other employment is given 
exogenously. This assumption is not unreasonable in view of widespread 
underemployment and non market clearing wages. It was argued in Chapter 5 that 
wage employment of women is determined exogenously and not chosen by the 
workers. However, the amount of such exogenously given wage employment would 
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determine the amount of time available for other activities and therefore needs to be 
taken into account in analysing the variation in labour inputs into Grameen Bank 
financed activities. In the absence of such data the present analysis uses the area 
dummies to capture some of this influence as the area difference may be responsible 
for differences in the amount of wage employment obtained by a worker. 
Another complication is introduced because some of the male workers worked 
on a family farm. Since labour allocation among different types of family 
employment will be based on the equality of the marginal productivities, the factors 
which influence marginal productivity of farm employment will influence the labour 
input of male workers into the Grameen Bank financed enterprises. Farm size is one 
of the crucial variables in this respect.'^ 
The same variables (as included in the equation for female labour input, shown 
in Table 8.1), with farm size as an added regressor, are included as explanatory 
variables in the equation on determinants of labour input by male workers. The 
dependent variable is the labour input per male worker in a family and the sample 
consists of only those families which have male working members. 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the results of the regression analysis of the 
determinants of average labour input per male worker. Many of the explanatory 
variables do not have significant coefficients (Table 8.5). 
4. Female workers reported that they did not have any employment on the family farm. The role of 
farm size on women's labour input was, nevertheless, examined by including this variable in the 
regression with other variables used in Table 8.1 and was found insignificant. 
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Table 8.5 Factors mnuencing male labour inputs into Grameen Bank financed enterprises: Results of OLS regression including all variables on a priori grounds 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: Average male labour 
input in the enterprise in last month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of total earners in family -10.12 -2.34*** 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.007 0.51 
Square of capital 0.0000008 -0.38 
Per cent of capital in paddy activity (prcpdy) 0.34 0.82 
Square of (prcpdy) -0.01 -1.39* 
Amount of cultivable land owned -0.05 -0.36 
Number of dependent members -1.31 -0.54 
Dummy for having a baby 6.84 0.76 
Dummy for area 1 -19.80 -1.67** 
Dummy for area 2 -11.01 -1.00 
Dummy for area 3 -29.64 -1.78** 
Dummy for area 4 -10.13 -0.82 
Constant 71.78 3.17*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.09 
Vlaue of F 1.98** 
RESET2 t-value 1.98*** 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 3.72 
Sample size 125 
Note: **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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The number of dependent members, the dummy for having a baby and the size 
of cuhivated land are not significant and have very low t-statistics. The inclusion of 
the irrelevant variables may be responsible for the fact that the RESET2 test is 
significant, suggesting that the variables are not property formulated. Therefore the 
most insignificant ones were excluded and the equation was reestimated. The results 
are presented in Table 8.6 which forms the basis of the following discussion. 
Table 8.6 Factors influencing male labour inputs into the Grameen Bank 
financed enterprises: OLS regression results, final equation 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: average male labour 
input in the enterprise in last month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of total eamers in family -11.26 -2.76*** 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.003 0.93 
Per cent of capital in paddy activity -0.21 -1.73** 
Dummy for area 1 -17.17 -1.52* 
Dummy for area 2 -12.11 -1.12 
Dummy for area 3 -32.15 -2.04*** 
Dummy for area 4 -6.48 -0.56 
Constant 80.20 5.42 
Adjusted R-square 0.10 
Value of F 2 97*** 
RESET2 t-value 1.41 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 3) 4.62 
Sample size 125 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Total capital is included as an explanatory variable in the final equation (Table 
8.6) because this is a variable of central concern. It is retained to examine whether 
its significance improves after excluding irrelevant variables. This equation is 
statistically acceptable because the results of the econometric tests are favourable 
(RESET2 t-value and B-P test is insignificant), although the value of adjusted is 
still low. 
In this equation, the number of earners in the family have a significant negative 
coefficient, which is in contrast to the equation for women's labour input. The 
influence of total capital on average male labour input is positive but not significant. 
These coefficients suggest that the negative income effect dominates male workers' 
labour allocation decisions. In conformity with these negative influences, the 
percentage of capital in paddy processing, which implies higher rates of return, has a 
negative and significant coefficient. This may also be due to the fact that paddy 
processing is not fully compatible with other employment outside the household; 
paddy processing takes place within the household. Two of the area dummies are 
significant: as noted this may mean that the dummies capture the differences in the 
availability of wage employment. 
The differences in the impact of various parameters on the labour allocation 
pattern of male and female workers reflects that the utility functions guiding their 
choices are different. 
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Table 8.7 A comparison of log-linear and linear functions for the regression 
equation for average male employment in Grameen Bank enterprises 
Test statistics for the 0.08 
superiority of linear form 
Test statistics for the 0.85 
superiority of log-linear form 
Conclusion: Since none of the test statistics are significant, neither form is superior 
to the other. 
The nested test for the log-linear versus the linear form did not prove 
superiority of either. The test results are reported in Table 8.7. 
Limitations of the analysis of labour allocation 
The above analysis of the influence of the characteristics of a worker on his/her 
labour allocation is based on the structural equations (8.1 and 8.2) for a worker's 
labour input into each type of activity (self employment for the present analysis). 
The influence of any factor on labour input in self employment is not sufficient to 
indicate the influence of the same characteristics on the allocation between 
housework and leisure and thus whether a change in self employment implies 
changes in leisure or not. This is especially important when any factor which may 
influence the productivity of self employment may also directly or indirectly 
influence housework. For example, when capital in the self employment enterprise 
raises the productivity of labour, the resulting income increase may raise the 
productivity of housework. In rural areas the scope for housework increases with the 
level of income for a family because most of the goods and services produced in 
housework have little or no substitute in the market. 
Thus when capital has a negative impact on labour inputs after a limit, this may 
not imply a negative income effect and more leisure for the person concerned. It 
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may be the result of an increase in housework productivity resulting from a higher 
income. 
An analysis of the labour input into all types of activities would be more helpful 
for an understanding of the influence of labour allocation on the welfare of the 
workers. This would require simultaneous estimation of labour inputs in different 
types of activities as affected by personal and family characteristics. That is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
8.4 Multiple workers in the household and labour allocation 
The above model operates as if the household consists of only one worker. In reality 
most households have more than one worker. How the decision about total labour 
inputs may be taken and what would be the relationship between the labour inputs of 
various workers, therefore, needs to be addressed. 
Most of the earlier analysis of labour allocation is based on the assumption of a 
common utility function. Recently this assumption of identical utility functions has 
been criticised by a number of researchers (Folbre 1986, Guyer and Peters 1987, Sen 
1983, Bruce and Dwyer 1988, Evans 1989). Some of the criticisms are: i) if people 
are selfish in the market, why would they change their entire nuture when they are 
within the family; ii) if individual tastes and preferences vary, how would they be 
aggregated to a family utility function even if the family members wish to be 
selfless; neo-classical economics views such aggregation of preferences as difficult 
and iii) the other side of the problem is how to ensure that family members do not 
"free ride' on the benevolence of other members. 
Studies of peasant farm economics do not enquire into intra family allocations 
of labour input. This question is by-passed on the assumption that the workers in a 
family have the same utility function (Sen 1966). In that case the allocation problem 
is solved by the head of the family who, 'takes decision on behalf of the entire family 
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and tells the individual members what to do' (Sen 1966:426). A second 
interpretation suggested by Sen is that the individual members cooperate to choose 
their labour allocation so that for total labour input, the equality between the 
marginal product of labour and marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
income is achieved. 
Separate utility functions for each worker in the family and labour allocation 
Given the possibility of individual variations in taste, the existence of different utility 
functions among workers within the same family cannot be ignored. There may be 
many reasons for the utility functions to be different. Specifically, because women 
care more about their children's welfare than men, they may have a lower leisure 
preference than men. The Grameen Bank women members who are responsible for 
the regular repayment of loans are prepared to work hard and sacrifice more leisure 
to make their economic projects a success. 
Ashworth and Ulph (1981) attempted to take into account multi-worker 
households with separate utility functions for each worker, in the context of labour 
allocation in wage labour markets. In the case of a multi-worker family with 
restricted scope for family employment as the Grameen Bank members have, labour 
allocation will be based on the solution to the maximisation problem outlined below. 
This model assumes that output in the family enterprise is the result of total labour 
input from two workers. Similarly, housework output is the result of the sum of their 
labour inputs. 
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Model C 
Worker 1 
M a x U i = U i ( Y , H , L i ; A i ) 
s.t Y = f ( T s i + T 3 2 , C ) 
H = F(Thl+Th2,E) 
T s l + T h i + L i = D i 
Worker 2 
Max U2 = U2 (Y, H, L2; A2) 
s.t.Y = f (Ts i+Ts2 , C) 
H = F(Thl+Th2,E) 
Ts2 + T h i + L 2 = D2 
The notations have same meaning as in Model B with 1, 2 denoting the two workers. 
To reduce the number of subscripts, Y is used instead of Yf to denote income from 
self employment. The equilibrium is given by a simultaneous solution of the first 
order conditions for the two workers, which are as follows, 
for worker 1 ^ ^ L l = M U y i - f ' (f. la) 
M U L I = M U H I . f ' (f.lb) 
for worker 2 M U l 2 = • ^ ' 
M U l 2 = MUh2 • F ' (f.2b) 
From these first order conditions, the structural equation for the supply of labour 
hours to self employment enterprise by each worker may be solved as a function of 
the characteristics of each worker which influence their marginal utility of income, 
marginal utility of leisure, marginal utility of housework and the marginal 
productivities of the two types of activities: housework and self employment. 
Thus: T31 = h ( A i , A 2 , C , E ) (8.3) 
Ts2 = g (Ai ,A2 ,C,E) (8.4) 
In this model the labour inputs of the two workers are taken as perfect substitutes in 
each type of production and they are entered additively in the production function. 
The same process of equilibrium may be described when labour inputs are not 
perfect substitutes. Even then the workers will simultaneously decide their labour 
inputs as long as each ones labour input affects the marginal productivity of the 
other. 
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A cooperative or a bargaining solution ? 
When the utility functions are different for the two workers, it may be difficult to 
achieve cooperative equilibrium. Various authors (Pancavel 1986, Manser and 
Brown 1979, 1980) recognise that labour allocation and other family affairs like 
marriage and fertility may involve bargaining as a decision making process. Becker 
(1981) analysed the bargaining process of decision making for labour supply in a 
market employment situation. 
In the labour allocation analysis of a multi worker case as in Model 'C it was 
assumed that total income and only their own leisure enter into each person's utility 
function and that the marginal utility of income and leisure are both positive. It then 
pays an individual to maintain their income level with an increase in the amount of 
his/her leisure (that is, at the cost of raising the labour input of the other worker) and 
each person will be motivated to do so. 
Let worker 1 in a family have a higher bargaining power, while worker 2 has a 
lower bargaining power. Worker 1 with the higher bargaining power may decide 
that worker 2 should contribute a specific amount of labour input which would be 
higher than the labour input worker 2 would be contributing if they cooperated to 
arrive at an equilibrium solution by meeting the equality conditions of f 1 and f.2. 
Worker 1 then chooses his/her labour input to equate his/her margins (of 
opportunity cost). His/her choice is made on the basis of the following maximisation 
process. 
M a x U l = U i (Y, H,L1, Al ) 
s.t Y ^ f C T ^ i + Ts2*,C) 
H = F(Thi+Th2*,E) 
T s l + M + T h i = D i 
where and Tj^2 ^ ^ ^^^ labour inputs of self employment and housework 
dictated to worker 2 and all other notations have same meaning as in Model B and C. 
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The structural equation for his labour input in self employment will be: 
T s l = g ( A i , A 2 , C , E , T , 2 * ' T h 2 * ) (8-5) 
Even if the stronger party effectively dictates the amount of labour input from 
the other, this may be viewed as bargaining rather than coercion as long as the 
weaker party is not compelled to contribute labour in excess of what she/he would 
voluntarily do when the other worker was not working. 
If both parties have similar bargaining power, this bargaining solution cannot 
take place. Each person may try to impose the decision about labour input on the 
other. If there is no cooperation, the limiting case will be that no one works and 
there is no output. The non-cooperative zero income situation is not likely to be 
observed in practice because it is a minimum utility giving situation for both 
workers. The strategies will be revised by allocating labour on the basis of the actual 
utility function and a cooperative solution may be achieved. Thus it is likely that 
when the workers in a family have similar bargaining power or are not certain about 
each other's bargaining strength, there will be a cooperative equilibrium. 
The above models have been formulated for two person cases. They may be 
extended to 'n' person cases. The reason for limiting the model to two persons is 
only to keep the arguments simple. Similarly if there are two groups within the 
households, with each group having the same utility function, the allocation problem 
may be thought of as being between the groups. Male workers and female workers 
within a family may be such groups. 
Whether a bargaining solution prevails, and who would dominate that solution, 
is an empirical question. When a person is bargaining for a larger labour input from 
the other person, he/she does not reveal actual preferences. How far this can be done 
depends on a worker's capacity to V a i t and see'. Thereby the stronger pany compels 
the other worker to contribute labour hours greater than the cooperative solution and 
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this may rise up to a maximum of as much labour as he/she would do if he/she was 
the only worker in the family. j 
In a bargaining solution, the labour input by the lower bargaining power worker 
will not depend on his/her own choice and would not satisfy the marginal criteria in 
conditions f . l . 
The person who has a higher bargaining power will equate his/her margins. 
Therefore, his/her labour allocation will conform to the predictions of labour 
allocation following from the equilibrium conditions. Along with that, the labour 
input of the other person will have a negative impact on the dictating person's labour 
input. These conclusions may be empirically tested. 
On a priori grounds it may be postulated that in a patriarchal society women 
will have a lower bargaining power. In the case of Grameen Bank financed activities 
of this study, the female borrower is responsible for the repayment of loan 
installments; she may be in a weaker bargaining situation, so she may be persuaded 
to contribute more labour input. In general, women in a family have to look at the 
day to day essential needs of the family and especially of the children and therefore 
may be more eager to generate income and thus be in a weaker bargaining situation. 
This question may be resolved empirically from the determinants of male and 
female labour input in these enterprises. 
The possibility of bargaining as a determinant of labour allocation: empirical 
tests 
It has been noted that if the labour input of one worker is dictated by others, then the 
labour input of the worker who is dictated to will not depend on her personal or 
family characteristics as it would in the case of her own decision regarding labour 
input. Since the labour inputs of the female members of the Grameen Bank are 
found to be explained by variations in personal characteristics, the amount of capital 
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etc. it is likely that labour input was not dictated by others. A few variables have 
similarly been identified to explain variations of labour input by male workers. It 
has also been noted that the same factors which influence the marginal rate of 
substitution between labour and leisure, have different types of influences on male 
and female labour inputs (Table 8.1 and 8.6). This reflects that these workers do not 
have identical utility functions. Thus the evidence favours that cooperative solution 
prevails. 
The hypothesis that labour allocation is based on a cooperative situation is 
confirmed by testing the interdependence of male workers' labour inputs with the 
female workers' labour inputs. If the labour input is dictated, the labour input of the 
person who dictates it will depend negatively on the labour input of other workers 
(when the other factors which determine the dictating person's labour input are 
controlled for). The labour input from other workers was included as an independent 
variable (in OLS regressions) along with the factors that have been postulated to be 
relevant in determining labour input. The same exercise is carried out for Grameen 
Bank female member's labour inputs and male workers labour input in those 
enterprises. 
This variable did not have a significant negative influence. In the equation for 
Grameen Bank female member's labour hours, the coefficient of male labour input 
was positive. For male labour inputs the coefficient of female labour hours was 
negative though not significant. These results are presented in Tables 8.8 and 8.9. 
The evidence suggests that cooperative solutions decide the labour inputs in the 
Grameen Bank enterprises. 
RESET2 t-values and B-P test statistics are insignificant for these equations. 
Therefore the functional form is acceptable and the problem of heteroscedasticity is 
absent. 
187 
Table 8.8 Influence of female labour inputs on male labour inputs into the 
Grameen Bank financed enterprises: OLS regression to test 
whether female labour input has been dictated 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: average male labour 
input in the enterprise in last month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of total earners in family -11.59 -2.83*** 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.002 0.52 
Per cent of capital in paddy activity -0.26 -2.01** 
Dummy for area 1 -19.45 -1.69* 
Dummy for area 2 -14.47 -1.31* 
Dummy for area 3 -26.88 -1.63* 
Dummy for area 4 -5.23 -0.45 
Total female labour input -0.10 -1.07 
Constant 75.80 494*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.10 
Value of F 2 j^*** 
RESET2 t-value 1.41 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 3.37 
Sample size 125 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05,0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Table 8.9 Influence of male labour inputs on Grameen Bank female 
members' labour inputs: OLS regression extimates to test whether 
labour inputs of male workers has been dictated 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: GB female member's labour 
input in the enterprise in last month (hours) 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents -2.54 -1.33* 
Dummy for having a small baby 11.72 1.72** 
Number of total earners in family 1.63 0.51 
Dummy for marital status 21.59 2 J2*** 
(widowed or divorced=l) 
Total capital in the enterprise 0.035 3.43*** 
Square of capital -0.0000042 -2.44*** 
Per cent of capital in paddy activity (prcpdy) 1.71 5.45*** 
Square of (prcpdy) -0.01 -3.93*** 
Years of GB membership -5.08 -1.19* 
Dummy for area 1 16.92 1.71** 
Dummy for area 2 37.24 3.96*** 
Dummy for area 3 -35.38 -2.66*** 
Dummy for area 4 -8.06 -.83 
Labour input of male workers 0.10 1.39* 
Constant 7.99 .38 
Adjusted R-square 0.55 
Value of F 12.57*** 
RESET2 t-value -0.48 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 1.97 
Sample size 132 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0 .05,0.10 probability levels respectively 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Chapter 9 
A comparison of the benefits from wage employment and Grameen Bank 
financed self employment 
9.1 A comparison of earnings 
An assessment of the economic gains accruing to female members of the Grameen 
Bank can be made by comparing the outcome of this choice with the alternatives 
available to these women. The most obvious alternative is the opponunity of wage 
employment. 
Comparison between wage employment and Grameen Bank financed self 
employment may be made either in terms of total employment generated or in terms 
of the rate of return per hour of employment or by comparing income from each type 
of employment. While the latter is a better indicator of the private benefits to the 
households, the first may have relevance for employment policy in the context of the 
village labour market. 
In Chapter 8 it was noted that the wage rate does not represent an opportunity 
cost for these women because some women would not enter wage employment even 
if they did not have altemative self employment. For women who did not take up 
wage employment but prefer to accept self employment, any positive retum from 
Grameen Bank financed activities would be acceptable. 
Even for women who would take up wage employment in the absence of 
Grameen Bank finance, the retum from wage employment would not be reflected in 
the prevailing wage rate because these women may not be able to obtain as many 
hours of work as thev would want. 
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It has been noted in the last chapter that even those women who would 
potentially be engaged in wage employment, do not usually combine self 
employment and wage employment. Therefore for such women, the Grameen Bank 
activity would be profitable only if the total earnings arising from these activities are 
greater than the total wage earnings foregone. This comparison does not take into 
account the risk involved in self employment. There is, however, uncertainty in the 
wage labour market about the possibility of getting employment. 
To obtain an indicator of the wage earnings of self employed women who could 
potentially engage in wage employment, earnings of other wage worker women in 
these villages cannot be used. The wage earnings of female wage workers currently 
working in the villages with Grameen Bank branches will not reflect the picture of 
wage earnings of women in the absence of Grameen Bank activities. The reason is 
that the Grameen Bank activities reduce the participation of women in wage 
employment and thus affect the wage rate and the amount of employment available 
to those who are currendy working. This problem can be solved by using, as a 
comparison, the wage earnings of women from the four villages inter\'iewed for the 
first part of the study, for their wage rates and employment were not affected by 
Grameen Bank operadons. 
The income due to a member woman's labour input into the self employment 
enterprise was calculated as follows. From the total net revenue from the Grameen 
Bank acdvities of a family, retum for capital used was deducted on the basis of a 25 
per cent rate of interest. This rate was obtained by adding the actual rate of interest 
charged by Grameen Bank and the payments for the group fund and emergency fund. 
An alternative esdmate of the effective rate of interest is 40 per cent. The radonale 
behind the use of these two effective rates of interest was discussed in Chapter 7. 
Rates of retum from these acdvities are discussed separately on the basis of each of 
the two effecuve rates of interest. 
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Deduction of the return to capital gives the total return to family labour. To 
obtain :he rate of return per hour, the sum earned was divided by total family labour 
input. The rate of return multiplied by total labour hours of the Grameen Bank 
member woman is considered to be her earnings. 
The rate of return for these women was calculated as an average return to male 
plus female labour hours. This will lead to an exaggerated value of the rate of return 
to women's labour if male labour has a higher productivity. In Chapter 10 an 
examination of whether enterprises using male labour input show greater efficiency 
than the enterprises that do not use any male labour is made. No such difference in 
efficiency is in fact found. Thus larger income does not result from higher returns to 
male labour. 
The information on income and employment from Grameen Bank financed 
enterprises relates to the month preceding the time when interviewing this sample 
started. The Grameen Bank members claimed that they put in the same amount of 
labour input each month and that the income flow was even. This was accepted 
because the amount of self employment was an individual's own choice. The 
monthly income and labour input of self employed women is compared with wage 
workers' average income and employment per month as obtained from their whole 
years income and employment; wage employment and earnings from such 
employment varied over the months of a year. 
Table 9.1 shows a comparison of the distribution of earnings per month by the 
female wage workers and the female members of the Grameen Bank when the rate of 
interest used is 25 per cent Table 9.2 gives a similar comparison for an effective 
rate of interest of 40 per cent. 
Wage earnings are concentrated at the lower end of the distribution. Only one 
of the wage workers earned more than taka 292 which is the poverty level income 
per person per month. Table 9.1 shows that 30 per cent (40 cases) of Grameen Bank 
self employed women earned more than that level. Among the self employed 
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women 10 per cent earned enough to maintain two to three persons above the 
poverty level. 
Table 9.1 A comparison of earnings of Grameen Bank women and wage 
worker women with an imputed rate of interest of 25 per cent for 
Grameen Bank women's capital costs 
Monthly earnings Grameen Bank women 
(taka) 
Monthly earnings 
(taka) 
Rate of return 
per hour (taka) 
Cases Per cent 
247 
2.16 
Wage worker women 
Cases Per cent 
less than 146 50 37.9 70 90.9 
147 - 292 42 31.8 6 7.8 
293 - 438 14 10.6 1 1.3 
439 - 584 12 9.1 0 0 
585 - 876 13 9.8 0 0 
877 - 1022 1 0.8 0 0 
Total 132 100.0 77 100.0 
96 
1.20 
(a) The income intervals correspond to 0.5,1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0 and 3.5 times the poverty level income 
per month per person 
Source: Survey among women wage workers and Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
Table 9.1 shows that the average eaming of a self employed woman was taka 
247; this was 2.5 times the average earnings of wage workers (taka 96). In general 
the self employed women had higher earnings than wage workers. 
The average return from activities financed by the Grameen Bank was 2.16 taka 
per hour. This is 80 per cent larger than the average hourly wage rate of wage worker 
women, which was 1.20 taka. This difference is staristically significant. The value of 
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the t-statistic for the test of the difference between average wage and average return 
from self employment is 5.21 which is highly significant. 
Table 9.2 shows that even at an imputed rate of interest of 40 per cent, the 
average rate of return per hour (taka 1.95) compares favourably with female wage 
rate (1.20). The t-statistic for the test of their difference is 4.11 and is significant at 
less than one per cent level. 
Table 9.2 A comparison of earnings of Grameen Bank women and wage 
worker women with an imputed rate of interest of 40 per cent for 
Grameen Bank women's capital costs 
Monthly earnings ^^ ^ 
(taka) 
Grameen Bank women Wage worker women 
Cases Per cent Cases per cent 
-3 to -1 2 2.3 0 0.0 
1 - 146 55 41.7 70 90.9 
147 - 292 39 29.5 6 7.8 
293 - 438 16 12.1 1 1.3 
439 - 584 7 5.3 0 0 
585 - 876 13 9.8 0 0 
Total 132 99.7 77 100.0 
Monthly earnings 228 
(taka) 
Rateofre tum 1.95 
per hour (taka) 
Average earnings 660 
of women in top 10% (13) 
range of earnings (taka) ^^ ^ 
Average earnings 610 
of women in top 20% (26) 
range of eamings (taka) 
96 
1.20 
217 
(7) 
196 
(16) 
(a) The income intervals starling from taka 146 correspond to 0.5, 1.0,1.5,2.0 and 3.0 times the 
poverty level income per month per person. 
(b) The number of cases are given in the parentheses. 
Source: Surveys of wage workers women and Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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The earnings also compare favourably with the wage worker women at this 
imputed rate of interest. Average monthly earnings of female members of the 
Grameen Bank now stand at 228 taka which is 2.4 times the average wage earning. 
At this rate of interest two women have negative returns reflecting losses. In 
the case of wage work, this possibility does not arise. However, in the field of small 
business it is not surprising that two per cent of enterprises make a loss. 
The average eamings of women in the top 20 and 10 per cent range of earnings 
were calculated at an imputed rate of interest of 40 per cent. For the top 20 per cent 
earners, average earning from self employment was taka 610 which is three times the 
eamings of the top 20 per cent wage workers. Grameen Bank members in the top 10 
per cent income range, earned an average of taka 660 which is, again three times the 
average eamings of the top 10 per cent of female wage workers. 
Another impact of these activities on the total contribution to family income 
that is not captured by the retums to labour accruing to the Grameen Bank member 
women is the additional eamings generated by labour inputs to the Grameen Bank 
financed enterprises from other members of the family. These labour inputs would 
not be spent on income generating activities if these enterprises did not exist. The 
labour input of the male members come in their spare time when wage employment 
is not available. Other female members of the family would be unlikely to participate 
in wage employment if these acdvities had not been organised. 
Even if parts of the capital are repaid weekly, the women reponed that total 
capital in the enterprise is kept more or less the same over the year. This is done by 
forced saving. The instalments are paid out of the profit or from other sources (the 
income of other family members). If these activities were not undertaken, such 
reinvestment and forced saving would not arise. When the repayment is from other 
sources, the question may arise as to why this amount would not be invested even if 
the Grameen Bank was not there. The answer lies in the lack of initiative among 
poor families. They are often so poor that they cannot think of how to invest small 
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savings. In such cases, the returns from these forced savings are really due to the 
initial investment made available by the Grameen Bank. 
Is such forced saving desirable for these poor women? It is shown below that 
these women have been able to improve their standard of consumption of food and 
thus forced saving is not at the cost of reduced consumption of basic necessities. 
Financial retums alone do not adequately reflect the achievement of the self 
employed women. The Grameen Bank's activity has various secondary effects and 
social benefits. For example, it raises the decision making power and consciousness 
of women (Rahman, R. 1986). Their success may encourage other poor non member 
women. 
In these analyses, the cost of the funds were accounted for only in terms of 
interest payment. It does not reflect the social cost of funds which includes the 
subsidy required for the loan operations of the Grameen Bank. Social cost benefit 
analysis is beyond the scope of this study. 
9.2 A direct assessment of the benefits of employment and earnings from 
Grameen Bank financed enterprises 
A direct assessment of the economic benefits of Grameen Bank membership is 
obtained by comparing indicators of the consumption of basic necessities by self 
employed women with consumption by other women from comparable landless 
families. Such a comparison is essential, because even if the self employed women 
are working hard and generating an income, the consumption benefits of such 
income may accrue mostiy to other members of the family. In this case the self 
employed women may not necessarily be considered better off ^ An improvement in 
1. Hossain, Jahan and Sobhan (1988) in a study of women in industrial emplo\Tnent in Bangladesh 
obsened that 'The personal gains are too small for the price she pays'(pl31). Ahmed (1987) reports 
cases of Pakistani and Indian wage worker women who were deprived of an equitable share of food 
and other consumption items. 
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consumption standard supplements the evidence on improvement of income. This is 
specially useful in view of the shortcomings of data on income. 
Apart from a comparison between the self employed women and the female 
wage workers, a sample of households from the Grameen Bank villages is studied so 
that Grameen Bank families may be compared with other landless and landowning 
households from the same village. 
Among the female wage workers, 79 per cent reported facing considerable food 
shortages during the year. The Grameen Bank workers claimed that they did not 
face shortages wonh noting. 
For the Grameen Bank village sample, data on the number of meals consumed 
daily during the past week was collected. Another question concerning the amount 
spent on clothing during the last year was also asked. These questions were asked 
not only of the women but also of the husband or the male head of the household 
(when the member woman did not have a husband). These data are compared for the 
Grameen Bank households and other non member households (Table 9.3). 
The non members were classified into groups on the basis of ownership of 
cultivated land. The owners of land below 50 decimals (0.2 ha) of land are eligible 
for Bank membership and are thus comparable with the families with Grameen Bank 
members. 
The women members of the Grameen Bank on the average had a larger number 
of meals and larger expenditure on clothing than the women from other landless 
households. The same is true of the number of meals eaten by the women's 
husbands/male heads of household and their expenditure on clothing. .A comparison 
of the first group with the second (Table 9.3) shows that the number of meals and 
expenditure on clothing for males is larger when a woman is the member of the 
Grameen Bank rather than when he himself is a member. This is because of a 
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greater increase in family income when a female family member joins the Grameen 
Bank. 
Table 9.3 A comparison of the consumption standards of Grameen Bank 
member households with other rural households 
Number of meals 
during last week 
Amount spent (taka) on 
clothing last year 
Household 
group 
Housewife/ 
GB woman 
Male head 
of household 
Housewife/ 
GB woman 
Male head 
of household 
With female GB member 18.2 19.1 351 263 
With male GB member 17.1 18.0 246 223 
Landless without 
GB member 
16.6 16.9 265 242 
No GB member, land 
0.2 ha to 0.4 ha 
18.5 18.2 299 258 
No GB member, land 
above 0.4 ha 
19.7 19.9 465 328 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
The largest landowning households still had the most frequent meals and their 
expenditure on clothing for both persons was highest. This is to be expected because 
the Grameen Bank members are building from a very low base. 
The statistical significance of the differences between the averages are shown in 
Table 9.4. 
The differences in the means of each of the indicators (except expenditure on 
clothing of the male head of households) is significantly larger for families with 
female Grameen Bank members compared to other landless households. 
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Table 9.4 Test for the difference in the indicators of average consumption by 
different groups of households 
Variable: Number of meals taken by the housewife or female the Grameen 
Bank member during previous week 
Characteristics 
of households 
Value of 
average 
Number 
of cases 
t-value for 
difference 
in averages 
With female GB member 
With male GB member 
18.2 
17.1 
27 
37 
1.74** 
With female GB member 
No GB member, landless 
18.2 
16.6 
27 
61 
2.84*** 
With female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.2 to 0.4 ha 
18.2 
18.5 
27 
17 
-0.38 
With Female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.41 ha and over 
18.2 
19.7 
27 
46 
-2.63*** 
Variable: Number of meals taken 
previous week 
by the male head of household during 
Characteristics 
of household 
Value of 
average 
Number 
of cases ^^ ^ 
t-value for 
differences 
in averages 
With female GB member 
With male GB member 
19.1 
18.0 
27 
37 
1.69* 
With female GB member 
No GB member, landless 
19.1 
16.9 
27 
61 
4.12*** 
With female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.2 to 0.4 ha 
19.1 
18.8 
27 
17 
0.29 
With Female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.41 ha and over 
19.1 
19.9 
27 
46 
-1.68* 
(contd on next page) 
199 
Table 9.4 Contd. 
Variable: Expenditure on clothing by the housewife or the female Grameen 
Bank members during previous year 
Characteristics 
of household 
Value of 
average 
Number 
of cases 
t-value for 
differences 
in averages 
Widi female GB member 
With male GB member 
351 
246 
27 
37 
3.61*** 
Widi female GB member 
No GB member, landless 
351 
265 
27 
61 
2 99*** 
With female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.2 to 0.4 ha 
351 
299 
27 
17 
1.43* 
With Female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.41 ha and over 
351 
465 
27 
46 
-2.69*** 
Variable: Expenditure on clothing by the male head of the household during 
previous year 
Characteristics 
of household 
Value of 
average 
Number of 
cases 
t-value for 
differences 
in averages 
With female GB member 
With male GB member 
263 
223 
27 
37 
1.59* 
With female GB member 
No GB member, landless 
263 
242 
27 
61 
.71 
With female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.2 to 0.4 ha 
263 
258 
27 
17 
.15 
With Female GB member 
No GB member, land 0.41 ha and over 
263 
328 
27 
46 
-2 14** 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively, 
(a) The number of cases are also applicable to Table 9.4. Households with female heads were 
excluded from this comparison. 
200 
9.3 Amount of employment among the self employed and the wage worker 
women 
A comparison of the amount of employment between the two types of employed 
women may be useful to see whether the larger rate of retum from self employment 
leads to lower labour input compared to female wage workers. 
The comparison is difficult because many of the self employed workers would 
not have participated in wage employment. This must be kept in mind when 
interpreting Table 9.5. 
Table 9.5 A comparison of the average hours worked during a month by 
wage worker women and self employed women 
Hours worked Wage worker women Self employed women 
Cases Per cent 
of workers 
Cases Per cent 
of workers 
0 1 - 4 2 11 14 18 14 
4 3 - 8 4 41 53 21 16 
85 and above 25 33 93 70 
Total 77 100 132 100 
Average hours 
worked 
84 101 
Source: Survey of women wage workers and Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
It may be noted that average hours of employment in Grameen Bank activities 
is 20 per cent larger. The test of difference between the average hours worked by 
self employed and wage workers shows that it is significantly larger for the self 
employed women, the value of t-statistic being 2.33 (significant at 1 per cent level). 
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Table 9.5 shows that 70 per cent of the Grameen Bank's female members work 
more than 84 hours a month whereas only ?3 per cent of female wage workers 
worked above this level. 
The average amount of labour input per month among the self employed 
women in the highest 50 per cent employment bracket is 160 hours. This is nearly 
double the average hours worked by wage workers. It is 16 per cent below the full 
employment norm considered to be 192 hours (8 hours for 24 days) a month. If 
among the wage worker women, those in the highest 50 per cent employment 
bracket are considered, they worked on average 79 hours per month compared to 160 
hours by the similar group of Grameen Bank members. 
There is thus no evidence that Grameen Bank finance has been responsible for 
reducing the labour inputs of workers. 
The relationship between the factors influencing productivity and the amount of 
labour input in self employment may be used to examine whether underemployment 
is voluntary or not. If productivity raising factors reduce labour input, the 
implicadon is that labour applied is voluntarily curtailed. 
After a certain limit, the impact of capital on labour input was found to be 
negative thus indicadng a voluntary reduction in labour input. This conclusion 
should, however, be viewed with caution. This phase is likely to occur as a result of 
an increase in housework productivity resulting from an increase in the income of a 
worker, as discussed in Chapter 8. In that case, a reducdon in labour input is not 
actually due to an increase in leisure and cannot be identified with voluntary 
idleness. 
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Chapter 10 
Poor women's access to Grameen Bank loans and the efficiency of loan 
use 
Grameen Bank loans will be most effective in helping the poorest households if its 
membership, the amount of loan given and the use of the loan is not biased towards 
families with favourable initial endowments. As has already been noted, the 
Grameen Bank has been successful in confining its membership largely to the 
landless households. Even then, it is useful to examine whether the less poor derive 
more benefits than the poorest. 
10.1 Determinants of the access to finance from Grameen Bank loans 
The question of profitability, borrowing costs and Grameen Bank membership 
Before borrowing from the Grameen Bank, a woman should compare the benefits of 
taking a loan with the returns from alternative activities. The analysis of a landless 
woman's decision to become a member and to borrow will be based on the premise 
that profitable use of borrowed funds is possible. Wage employment has been shown 
to be less remunerative than Grameen Bank financed self employment (Chapter 9). 
For many women wage employment is not a realistic option. Whether a woman 
becomes a member and borrows from Grameen Bank will thus depend on the 
indirect costs of borrowing and the initiatives required on her part. 
It has long been recognised that borrowing costs in formal financial institutions 
may be too high for poor households even if credit is specially offered to them 
(Adams and Nehman 1979, Adams and Vogel 1986). The most important 
component of borrowing costs is the initial cost of obtaining a loan. This cost 
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includes the time and expenses in travelling to banks and the expenses in completing 
the formalities of making an application. This cost also often includes bribes and 
other payments to bank officials. 
These costs are not relevant for Grameen Bank membership. The banking 
arrangements, already described, help to avoid them. 
Some borrowing costs arise, however, in attending regular meetings of the 
group and the 'Centre'. Meetings require time and travel to a central place within the 
village (one person's house or a separate room is designated as the Centre office). 
The cost associated with attendance at these meetings will depend on housework 
responsibilities which in turn depends on family size and the ages of children. 
Larger family size and the presence of a small baby (aged below 5 years) may mean 
that it is difficult for a woman to abide by Bank rules. 
The Grameen Bank is an innovative venture. To accept membership, women 
have not only to be needy but also capable of working as members of an innovative 
group. It may be expected that the more dynamic women among the poor will come 
forward whereas those lacking organisational skills will lag behind. Poor and 
illiterate women lack confidence in their ability to abide by the rules of the Grameen 
Bank and in their potential for carrying out a successful enterprise. The women are 
often discouraged by other conservative villagers. They are told that they will face 
punishment such as imprisonment or deportation if they default (Ray 1987). 
Factors related to dynamism or initiative may thus distinguish members from 
the other poor women who do not become members. Age and educational 
attainment are likely to influence a woman's organisational ability and initiative. 
The latter is an acquired qualification; if it is found to be important for Grameen 
Bank membership, then membership cannot be said to be free from the initial 
endowment situation. In a village society, where educational attainment is very low, 
age is viewed (up to a point) as a factor which increases a person's experience and 
ability to take responsibility. Therefore, age may be positively related to Grameen 
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Bank membership. These personal characteristics may not, however be important in 
explaining membership if they are not good indicators of innovativeness. 
Family characteristics such as having a small child or a large family may 
influence the probability of membership by affecting the urgency of generating 
additional income and thereby influencing the eagerness to take initiative. This may 
counteract the negative influence of these variables in the context of borrowing costs. 
In this respect, the number of male earners may have a negative influence. 
10.2 Test of hypotheses about the probability of membership 
Logit regression analysis is used to examine whether the probability of a woman 
joining the Grameen Bank is systematically influenced by personal and family 
characteristics related to the initiative and borrowing costs that have been considered 
so far. This regression attempts to estimate the coefficients of the following 
equation: 
Log Pj/(1 - P^) = a^ + a j X j + + • • • ^nX^ 
where P^ measures the probability that a housewife will be a member of the Bank 
and X j , X2 . . . Xj^ are the characteristics of housewives. Significant coefficients 
imply that the corresponding variables make significant contribution to the 
probability. These coefficients can be used to calculate Pj for various values of the 
variables. The value of the coefficient shows the contribution of the variable to 
log[Pj/(l-Pj)]. Thereby the coefficients will show the direction (positive or 
negative) of the contribution to Pj, because Pj will change in the same direction as 
log[Pi/(l-Pi)]. 
All the landless households in the Grameen Bank village households sample are 
included in this analysis. The sample of landless families is divided into families 
with and without a Grameen Bank woman member. The housewives of the latter 
group are compared with the women members of the Grameen Bank. 
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The results of logit regression are presented in Table 10.1. A woman's age has 
a positive influence on membership. The square of age has a negative influence as 
expected (initiative declines at a late age). 
Table 10.1 Factors innuencing the probability of a housewife from a landless household becoming a member of the Grameen Bank: results of Logit regression 
Dependent variable: Log P/(l-P) where P is the probability that a housewife becomes a member of Grameen Bank 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Asymptotic 
t-ratio 
Age of a woman 0.47 2.51*** 
Square of age -0.07 -2.61*** 
Her years of schooling -0.15 1.34 
Landownership of the family -0.07 -2.61*** 
Size of family -0.01 -0.01 
No. of male earners -0.04 -0.05 
Having a small baby -0.67 -0.91 
Intercept -7.27 -6.21*** 
Likelihood ratio test (chi-sq. d.f 7) 24.77*** 
Modified R^ (Maddala 1983) 0.17 
Sample size 129 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages,1985. 
Education does not appear to be a prerequisite to becoming a member. Its 
coefficient in the equation is negative (though not significant). Similarly 
landownership does not give any advantage in terms of higher probability of 
membership. The coefficient of this variable is negative and significant. 
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Family characteristics represented by family size^ number of male earners and 
having a baby (less than 5 years old) do not have any significant influence on the 
probability of becoming a member. 
Overall the probability of becoming a member is not determined by a woman's 
initial endowment. This is encouraging. Neither a woman's resource position nor 
her family structure impose any bar against being a borrower. 
10.3 The determinants of the amount of loan received 
The amount of loan taken by an individual is usually regarded as the result of the 
interaction of the forces related to the demand for and supply of such loans. When 
the rate of interest is flexible, the demand for credit and its supply are functions of 
the rates of interest and characteristics of borrowers. The demand and supply 
simultaneously determine the amounts borrowed and the equilibrium rate of interest. 
Iqbal (1983) found this framework useful for the determination of borrowings in 
rural informal credit markets. In Grameen Bank loans, the rate of interest is 
determined institutionally. The demand for and supply of loans will determine the 
amount borrowed by an individual. Therefore the structural equation of a borrowing 
function may be used for the empirical estimation where the amount of loan obtained 
is a function of the factors which influence demand and/or supply of loans. 
The Grameen Bank has a general rule of limiting the amount of a loan at taka 
5,(X)0. If most loans were at the ceiling, it would imply that demand and supply 
forces are not operating. All the member women studied in the five villages received 
loans less than the ceiling. 
There is uncertainty and risk in borrowing money. Repayment according to the 
rules of the Grameen Bank may also be difficult. Therefore the demand for loans 
1. In this analysis family size is used to represent family responsibility whereas in all other analyses, 
number of dependents was used. Grameen Bank membership raises participation of women in 
economic activities and thus reduces dependency burdens. The number of dependents will therefore 
have a negative relationship with membership, but this will reflect the innuence of membership on the 
number of dependents, rather than indicating the reverse causation. 
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may not necessarily extend up to the Bank's ceiling. The amount of loan demanded 
will depend on the characteristics of the borrower which affect first, the profitabilty 
of the investment and second, the willingness and ability of the borrower to take the 
risk of borrowing a high amount. 
The factors which positively influence the profitability of investment for a 
particular borrower will also increase her credit worthiness and work on the supply 
side to increase the amount of the loan. Similarly, her ability to accept the 
responsibility of a larger loan will not only generate a larger dem.and, but will also 
influence the supply side so that she will be trusted with a larger fund. 
The specific characteristics of the borrowers which may influence the amount 
of loans either through the demand or the supply side are considered next. 
The profitability of loan use by a borrower may be affected by his/her access to 
supplementary resources. Land is the most important among these. The amount of 
land (even below the limit which defines landlessness for the purpose of the Bank) 
may work as a supplementary resource and exert influence on the borrower's ability 
to use the loan productively and repay regularly. This will influence the amount of 
loan obtained. 
Another important resource is the availability of family labour. An enterprise 
using a Grameen Bank loan cannot rely on hired labour and therefore the number of 
family workers is considered to be an important asset. 
A woman's family characteristics may influence her intention to take the 
responsibility for a larger loan. Factors that raise a woman's family responsibilities 
will increase the opponunity cost of her labour. This will lead to an attempt by her 
to substitute the investment of borrowed funds for her own labour input and thus 
increase her willingness to borrow a larger amount. Relatively larger dependency 
burdens and having small children are two of these factors. 
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From the supply side these factors may influence the lender positively. If the 
Bank considers that the dependency burden from family members implies greater 
enthusiasm and more responsible behaviour, it will tend to lend more. On the other 
hand, a positive relationship between the dependency burden and the amount of loan 
may be regarded as an outcome of distributive considerations by the bank if the 
above demand side force only is operating, that is, capital is being substituted for 
own labour input. That distributive considerations are not relevant is indicated by 
the fact that the substitution of labour is not taking place over the range up to taka 
4200 (Chapter 8). Four per cent of borrowers (5 cases) obtained loans above that 
level. 
A relatively large loan requires a capacity for book keeping, implying that 
members with this ability can take bigger loans. A woman's age and education may 
influence her ability positively. It has already been noted that age is important 
because it may represent experience. Moreover, age may influence a woman's 
ability to take on workloads. Age may thus have a positive impact, at least up to a 
limit. Schooling would also help, as this provides basic training in arithmetic for 
book keeping. Years of schooling may be a proxy for overall ability; the more 
talented are likely to continue at school the longest. 
The supply of loans takes into account expected repayment performance. 
Repayment depends on the productive use of the loan and on the willingness of the 
borrower to continue her membership with the Bank. The only way to assess 
repayment success is by ex post judgement. Thus those who successfully make 
repayments not only obtain another loan, but may obtain a larger loan as they earn 
the confidence of the Bank Workers. The number of years of membership is thus 
expected to have a positive impact on the size of a loan. 
Length of membership also implies an increase in the experience of using a 
loan and may positively influence the amount of loan demanded. 
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The hypotheses postulated are tested by an OLS regression where the log of the 
amount of loan obtained is the dependent variable. All borrower women from the 
five selected villages were included in this analysis. The results are presented in 
Table 10.2. Explanatory variables are chosen to test the hypotheses mentioned 
above. 
Among the personal characteristics are included age and years of schooling. To 
take into account the non linear effects of age, the square of age is included as a 
dependent variable. A family's resource position is measured by the amount of 
arable land owned and the strength of the labour force is represented by the total 
number of earning members in the family. Family responsibility is represented by 
the number of dependent members in the family and the presence of a small baby. In 
addition to the personal and family characteristics, the length of membership in the 
Grameen Bank is included to evaluate the effect of experience. 
Age has a positive and significant (only at 10 per cent) influence on the amount 
of loans (Table 10.2). The square of age has a negative coefficient, though this is not 
statistically significant. The implication of a negative coefficient is that the amount 
of the loan continues to rise up to an age limit. A further rise in age has a negative 
impact. This limit is calculated using the coefficients of age and its square. The 
amount of loan rises up to the age of 38 years. 
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Table 10.2 Factors inttuencing the amount of loan obtained by the female 
members of Grameen Bank: OLS regression results including all 
variables on a priori grounds 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent variable: log of current 
amount of loan obtained by a woman 
Coefficient t-value 
Grameen Bank member's age 0.03 1.27* 
Square of age 0.0004 -1.15 
Her years of schooling 0.04 2.33*** 
Quantity of arable land owned 0.0002 .15 
Number of total earners in family 0.002 .07 
Number of dependents 0.02 1.24 
Dummy for having a small baby -0.01 .21 
Years of Grameen Bank membership 0.12 3.34*** 
Dummy for area 1 -0.50 -5.49*** 
Dummy for area 2 -0.04 -.52 
Dummy for area 3 -0.08 -.73 
Dummy for area 4 -0.04 -.43 
Constant 6.95 17.44*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.40 
Value of F 9.28*** 
RESET2 t-vale 0.37 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 3) 3.93 
Sample size 151 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages,1985. 
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Years of schooling have positive coefficients and are significant at the 1 per 
cent level. In contrast, education did not influence the probability of becoming a 
member of the Grameen Bank. Thus education plays an important role in enabling a 
woman to obtain a larger loan even if it does not help her to become a member. 
Becoming a member is not only determined by the women's own qualifications, but 
by the circumstances which lead to the formation of a group. 
Ownership of cultivable land does not have any influence on the amount of the 
loan. This variable did not have a positive influence on the probability of becoming 
a member. This implies that Grameen Bank operations are not biased by initial asset 
positions. 
The coefficient of the number of earning members in the family is not 
significant though it is positive as expected. 
The total number of dependents has a positive coefficient. It is significant when 
the regression is run excluding the variables which are totally insignificant. The 
dummy for having a small baby is not significant and has a very small value for the t 
statistics. 
The length of membership has a large positive and highly significant coefficient 
in these equations. Thus continuation of membership does not lead to a saturation of 
demand. Experience increases both the demand for and supply of loans as postulated 
and raises the amount of loan obtained. 
Area dummies for locational differences are included in the equation. 
Individual branches may have their own supply considerations and area differences 
may influence the attitude of the borrowers. Village 1 has a significant negative 
coefficient. 
Table 10.3 presents the results of the regression when the variables with very 
small t-statistics are excluded. The sign and significance of the remaining variables 
are very similar to those in Table 10.2. 
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Table 10.3 Factors influencing the amount of loan obtained by the female 
members of Grameen Bank: OLS regression results, final equation 
Explanatory 
variable Dependent variable: log of current amount of loan obtained by a woman 
Coefficient t-value 
Number of dependents 0.02 1.32* 
GB member's age 0.03 1.31* 
Square of age -0.0004 -1.19 
Years of schooling 0.04 2.38*** 
Years of GB membership 0.12 3 39*** 
Dummy for area 1 -0.50 -5 79*** 
Dummy for area 2 -0.04 -0.53 
Dummy for area 3 -0.08 -0.73 
Dummy for area 4 -0.04 -0.53 
Constant 6.98 19.47*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.41 
Value of F 12.63*** 
RESET2 (t-value) 0.33 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 3) 2.72 
Sample size 151 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Non-significant coefficients of RESET2 test and B-P test confirm the 
acceptability of the regressions in Table 10.2 and 10.3. 
A test was carried out for superiority between the log-linear form of the 
equation used in Table 10.2 and the corresponding linear form. The results of the 
test between linear and log-linear form are reported in Table 10.4. The results did 
not prove superiority of either form. Since the test statistic for superiority of log-
linear form approaches significance, this form was used in the discussion. 
Table 10.4 The comparison of log-linear and linear functions for the regression 
equation for the amount ofloan from the Grameen Bank 
Test statistics for the -0.34 
superiority of linear form 
Test statistics for the 1.34 
superiority of log-linear form 
Conclusion: Since none of the test statistics are significant, neither of the forms show 
a superiority over the other. However the t-statistic for the log-linear form 
approaches significance 
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10.4 Utilisation of loan and the efficiency of resource use 
Among 151 female borrowers, 132 were found to organise productive activities with 
the help of loans from the Bank. For the other borrowers the funds were either 
invested by male members of the family or used for consumption. Since only 12 per 
cent of the borrowers were not actively involved in organising productive activities 
themselves, this was not a focus of the study. 
Influence of Initial endowment on efficiency of resource use 
When female Grameen Bank members use loans for organising productive activities, 
the benefits from these activities may depend on whether the efficiency of utilisation 
of resources is determined by the family's characteristics. Since the enterprises 
financed by the Grameen Bank operate within the constraint that they cannot use any 
hired labour, and the female members are responsible for housework for which no 
market substitute exists, the initial endowment of a family may influence the 
efficiency with which resources are used. The impact of the personal and family 
characteristics of the female members of Grameen Bank (along with the variation in 
capital and labour input) on the total output (gross revenue) in the Bank financed 
enterprises needs to be assessed. The relationship of gross revenue to family 
characteristics and labour and capital, defined as the gross revenue function, is 
comparable to a production funtion. Gross revenue measures output in value terms 
in contrast to the physical output in a production function. 
Use of the gross revenue function requires that all enterprises face the same 
prices. This would be realistic for enterprises within a single village. But this study 
covers five villages. Dummies for locational difference are therefore included. Most 
production function studies implicitly make the assumption of constant prices in 
valuing material inputs and capital. 
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The gross revenue and the inputs were measured for the month previous to the 
interview. The family characteristics taken into account in the gross revenue 
function are, age and education of the member-enterpreneur, landownership of the 
family, whether the enterprise uses any male labour, total earners in the family, 
number of dependent members in the family and whether the member woman has a 
baby (less than 5 years old). 
The gross revenue function is more meaningful when it is estimated for a 
specific type of activity. The gross revenue function is estimated separately for the 
two most important types of activities among the borrower women. These are paddy 
processing and livestock raising. These two together account for 70 per cent of the 
investment of the women in the sample for this study. From total Grameen Bank 
loans, 55 per cent was for these two activities (Hossain 1988a). In the present 
sample of Grameen Bank loan users, 89 women were engaged in Uvestock raising 
and 79 women were engaged in paddy processing (some of the women were 
involved in both activities). 
A brief description of these activities is required to understand the gross 
revenue functions. In paddy processing, raw paddy is purchased and processed into 
rice. Processing involves parboiling, drying, husking and separating the clean rice 
from husk. This rice is then marketed. Gross revenue is the total sale proceeds of 
rice and other by-products. 
In livestock raising, a milch cow or dry stock is purchased, raised and sold. 
Sale of milk would be an additional source of revenue. The animals are grazed in the 
fallow lands or publicly owned lands. Purchased feed is used to supplement free 
feeds such as grass and water hyacinths collected by the women. 
Capital in these activities is cash investment in the enterprise including all raw 
materials and capital services. Most enterprises did not involve any fixed capital. 
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Labour input consists of the total hours from all workers. For these unskilled 
jobs where men and women were found to perform similar types of work, there is no 
reason why labour input f rom male and female workers should be distinguished. It 
may be desirable to disaggregate male and female labour inputs even in unskilled 
jobs, if there is genderwise division of labour (Kumar and Hotchkiss 1988). Tests 
for justification for aggregating labour inputs are provided at the end of this section. 
Form of the function chosen 
The gross revenue function will show the rate of substitution between the inputs and 
the marginal contribution of capital and labour to revenue. The form of the gross 
revenue function used should give ranges of possible values for these parameters that 
are acceptable on a priori grounds. Many studies of agricultural production functions 
use the Cobb-Dougals form. The parameters of this function are easy to interpret. 
However, in this form the elasticity of substitution is restricted to one and flexibility 
is not allowed. Similarly, the marginal productivity of the factors is restricted to 
positive values. The use of Cobb-Douglas production functions has been widely 
criticised for these reasons. Altemadve forms used are translogarithmic and 
transcendental functions. These forms allow flexibility in the values of the 
elasticities of substitution between factor inputs. They also allow marginal 
productivity of the factor inputs to be positive or negative. While such flexibility is 
often desirable, in the present case, there is justification for using the Cobb-Douglas 
form for livestock raising because it is rational to limit the value of marginal 
productivity to the positive range. There is no reason to apply labour or give extra 
feeds when marginal product is negative. The damage is easily visible. Of course, it 
is possible that mismanagement causes a loss of value, but that cannot be captured 
directly and should not be identified with excessive labour or capital input. 
No previous study of production functions for paddy processing or livestock 
raising is available for Bangladesh. Therefore it is not possible to form any a priori 
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ideas about which functional forms would be most suitable. One study (Alderman 
1987) used the Cobb-Douglas form to estimate a livestock production function in 
India and obtained satisfactory results. A few studies of agricultural production 
functions in Bangladesh relied on the Cobb-Douglas form alone (Khan 1981, Masum 
1981, Khandker et al. 1987). Shahabuddin (1985) compared the suitability of the 
Cobb-Douglas, translogarithmic and transcendental forms of the production function 
for production technology of some agricultural crops in Bangladesh. For most crops 
Cobb-Douglas provided the best description of technology, but for some of the crops 
the translog form of function was a better alternative. 
For paddy processing, the gross revenue function will be estimated using three 
altemative forms and the superiority of any one of them will be judged on the basis 
of statistical tests. For livestock raising, only the Cobb-Douglas form will be 
estimated. 
The estimating forms of these functions are Usted below: 
Cobb-Douglas: LogY = Lx)gA -f- a^ LogL + a2 LogC -H bj D j (eq 1) 
Transcendental: LogY = LogA -f- a j LogL -i- a2 LogC -t- a3 L + 34 C -i- bj Dj (eq 2) 
Translog: LogY = LogA + a^ LogL -f- a2 LogC + a3 LogC . LogL -h 
34 l/2(LogL)2 + a5 l/2(LogC)2 bj Dj (eq 3) 
Where: Y is gross revenue 
L is labour, C is capital 
Log L and Log C are natural logarithms of L and C respectively 
Log A is the intercept 
D j represents the enterpreneur's personal and family characteristics 
a | , a2, 33, a4, a^, bj are estimated coefficients 
Results of gross revenue function estimates 
For paddy processing, three forms of the function have been estimated. In estimating 
the translog forms of the function, high multicollinearity between some of the terms 
and their squares is suspected. Therefore the equation was estimated in two forms: 
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one (eq 3) where all variables were included and the other (eq 4) where (log C)^ and 
(log were dropped from the estimating equations. 
From these the most suitable one is selected on the basis of statistical 
superiority. The choice of functional form when one form simply adds more 
regressors over the other forms (as translog and transcendental add more regressors 
over the Cobb-Douglas form) can be made by the F-test for the improvement in R^ 
after adding regressors. An F-test shows that the Cobb-Douglas form of the gross 
revenue function for paddy processing is superior to the others. R^ in equations 1, 2, 
3, 4 was 0.9928, 0.9929, 0.9932, 0.9930 respectively. The values of F statistics for 
added regressors in eq2, eq3, and eq4 are 1.08 (d.f. 2, 64), 1.46 (d.f. 3, 63), and 1.07 
(d.f. 1, 65) respectively. None are significant. 
The results of the estimated functions are presented in Table 10.5 and Table 
10.6 for paddy processing and Table 10.7 for livestock raising. 
The coefficients for both capital and labour are in plausible ranges in the Cobb-
Douglas form of the function. Both inputs have significant positive coefficients in 
the gross revenue function for paddy and livestock. 
Some of the results of these estimations may appear to be unusual. All the 
equations have very high R^ which is not frequently found in cross section 
regression analysis. The reason is that, in the present case, the inputs are used as 
broad aggregates and cover almost everything that could influence output. As a 
consequence, the equation should have a high explanatory power. Some of the other 
studies of production functions found similar high R^ (Khandker 1987). Studies of 
production functions which give lower R^ generally reflect the omission of 
important inputs in the production process. 
The coefficient of capital has a very small standard error and thus a very high 
value of the t-statistic which implies that output is to an important extent determined 
by capital. 
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Table 10.5 Cobb-Douglas and transcendental forms of gross revenue function estimates for paddy processing to test the efficiency effect of entrepreneur's characteristics 
dependent variable: log of gross 
revenue from paddy processing 
Explanatory variable Cobb-Douglas form Transcendental form 
Coefficients t-value Coefficients t-value 
Log of labour 0.04 1.69** 0.14 1.71** 
Log of capital 0.94 84.80*** 0.91 29 09*** 
Labour — — -0.001 -1.30* 
Capital — — 0.00002 0.83 
Dummy for area 1 0.10 5.54*** 0.10 5.20*** 
Dummy for area 2 0.08 ^ 53*** 0.07 3 32*** 
Dummy for area 3 -0.13 -1.95** -0.13 -1.83** 
Dummy for area 4 0.05 2 7]^*** 0.04 2 19** 
Dummy for positive 
male labour input 
0.002 0.15 0.003 0.17 
Dummy for having baby 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.74 
Total earners in the family 0.001 0.13 0.003 0.42 
Age of the GB member 0.0001 0.07 0.0001 0.11 
Years of schooling -0.0004 -0.13 0.001 0.22 
Land owned by the family -0.0001 0.23 0.00005 0.17 
Number of dependent 
members 
0.001 0.32 0.002 0.44 
Intercept 0.45 3.62*** 0.24 0.82 
Adjusted R^ 0.99 0.99 
Value of F 691.88*** 599.16*** 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 1) 0.79 0.47 
Sample size 79 79 
Note; **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
- not applicable. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
220 
Table 10.6 Translog form of gross revenue function estimates for paddy processing to test the efficiency effect of entrepreneur's characteristics 
Dependent variable: log of gross 
revenue from paddy processing 
Explanatory variable Equation (3) Equation (4) 
Coefficients t-value Coefficients t-value 
Log of labour (Log L) 0.73 1.74** 0.17 1.08 
Log of capital (Log C) 0.75 3.39*** 1.03 9.34*** 
(Log L)2 -0.10 -1.16 — — 
(Log C)2 0.04 1.29* — 
Log L * Log C -0.03 -.96 -0.02 -0.86 
Dummy for area 1 0.10 5.20 0.10 5.43*** 
Dummy for area 2 0.07 3.42*** 0.08 3.60*** 
Dummy for area 3 -0.10 -1.39 -0.12 -1.75** 
Dummy for area 4 0.04 2.01*** 0.05 2.55*** 
Dummy for positive 
male labour input 
0.003 .15 -0.0006 -0.04 
Dummy for having baby 0.01 .76 0.008 0.56 
Total earners in the family 0.001 .18 0.001 0.17 
Age of the GB member 0.0001 .16 0.00003 0.03 
Years of schooling 0.0007 .24 -0.0003 -0.09 
Land owned by the family 0.00002 .06 0.00004 0.14 
Number of dependent 
members 
0.001 .41 0.002 0.44 
Intercept -0.44 -.50 -0.19 -0.25 
Adjusted R^ 
Value of F 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f. 1) 
Sample size 
0.99 
563.14*** 
1.58 
79 
0.99 
639.97*** 
0.47 
79 
Note: **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
- not applicable 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985 
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Table 10.7 Cobb-Douglas form of gross revenue function estimates for livestock raising to test the efficiency effect of entrepreneur's characteristics 
Dependent variable: log of gross revenue from 
livestock raising 
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-value 
Log of labour 0.01 1.78** 
Log of capital 1.005 161.64*** 
Dummy for area 1 0.005 0.67 
Dummy for area 2 0.03 3.09*** 
Dummy for area 3 -0.01 -0.76 
Dummy for area 4 0.004 0.64 
Dummy for positive 
male labour input 
0.001 0.13 
Dummy for having baby 0.001 0.14 
Total earners in the family -0.002 -0.67 
Age of the GB member -0.0004 -0.99 
Years of schooling of 
the GB member 
-0.001 -0.70 
Land owned by the family -0.00006 -0.88 
Number of dependent members 0.0003 0.17 
Intercept -0.04 -0.65 
Adjusted R^ 0.99 
Value of F 2972.16*** 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 1) 1.78 
Sample size 89 
Note: ***, **, * denotes one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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If the coefficient of labour was not significant, this would imply a nearly linear 
relationship between capital and gross value. However, labour also has a significant 
coefficient in the function. 
The coefficients of the variables related to the personal and family 
characteristics are insignificant. No obvious inefficiency is related to these factors. 
The justification of the aggregation of male and female labour inputs 
If male labour input has any impact on efficiency, the dummy variable for using 
male labour will be significant. In that case it is required that male and female 
labour inputs are disaggregated. Since the dummy for having male labour input has 
a non-significant coefficient in all the above equations, it confirms the hypothesis 
that male and female labour inputs are substitutable. 
A superior methodology to test the justification of the aggregation of male and 
female labour inputs is to use them in a disaggregated form and estimate gross 
revenue functions in order to examine hypotheses related to separability of these 
inputs and the difference in their substitutability with other inputs. In the translog 
form of the function, this implies a test involving the equality of their coefficients in 
the multiplicative term with capital. 
In the present case, there are problems in conducting this test. Male labour 
input is zero for some of the enterprises. Therefore in neither the Cobb-Douglas 
form, nor in the translog form, can male labour input be used as a separate input 
(because in those functional forms, it appears in log form). Only in transcendental 
form may such an input be included by identifying essential and non-essential inputs. 
The sign and significance of each type of labour input and their comparison with the 
coefficient of aggregated labour input can provide insights about whether 
disaggregation has changed the results significantly and is thus preferable. It should 
be mentioned that this test is not based on conclusive statistical superiority because 
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the variables in this equation are now different from the equation with aggregated 
labour input. The estimating form now is as follows: 
LogY = LogA + a j LogFL + ^^ LogC + a3 FL + a4 C + a5ML + a^ (ML)^ 
Where FL is female labour and ML is male labour. Other symbols have the same 
meaning as in Section 10.4. Male labour can take the value of zero. This equation is 
estimated for paddy processing only. It has been mentioned that the use of 
transcendental form is not justified for livestock raising. 
The results of this form are presented in Table 10.8. The coefficients of male 
and female labour inputs and their logarithms are not significant. When Labour 
input was aggregated, its coefficients were significant (Tables 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.9, 
10.10). This implies that it is preferable to aggregate them. This is in conformity 
with the conclusion derived from the insignificant coefficient of the dummy variable 
for use of male labour input, in the gross revenue functions. 
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Table 10.8 Gross revenue function (transcendental form) estimates for paddy 
processing to test the significance of disaggregated labour input 
dependent variable: log of gross revenue from 
paddy processing 
Explanatory variables Coefficients t-statistics 
Capital -.000009 .54 
Log of capital (Lncap) .92 31.68*** 
Female labour hours -.004 -.55 
Lx)g of female labour hours .08 .97 
Male labour hours .003 .27 
Square of male labour hours -.000002 -.11 
Dummy for area 1 .09 5.04*** 
Dummy for area 2 .07 3.25*** 
Dummy for area 3 -.12 -2.03** 
Dummy for area 4 .04 
Intercept .44 1.68** 
Adjusted R^ .99 
Value of F 926.79*** 
B-P test (d.f. 1) 1.11 
Sample size 79 
Note: **, * denote one tailed significance at .01, .05 and .10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey in Grameen Bank villages. 
Final equations for gross revenue functions 
In the second round, the gross revenue functions are estimated only with the factor 
inputs and the area dummies. In this round only the Cobb-Douglas form has been 
estimated. These results are reported in Table 10.9 and 10.10 for paddy processing 
and livestock raising respectively. The results of Table 10.9 and 10.10 are used to 
estimate the marginal value products of labour and capital. 
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The coefficients of log of labour and log of capital are significant in these final 
equations. After excluding the iirelevant dummy variables, the t-values of for these 
variables are now larger than they were in equations including those dummy 
variables. 
In all of the gross revenue functions, B-P test gave insignificant values; thus 
there are no problems of heteroscedasticity in these regressions. 
Table 10.9 Gross revenue function (Cobb-Douglas form) estimates for paddy 
processing, excluding entrepreneur's characteristics 
Dependent variable: log of gross revenue from 
paddy processing 
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-value 
Log of labour 0.04 2.06** 
Log of capital 0.94 94.14*** 
Dummy for area 1 0.10 6.82*** 
Dummy for area 2 0.07 4 Q-y*** 
Dummy for area 3 -0.13 -2.68*** 
Dummy for area 4 0.05 2.93*** 
Intercept 0.45 4.1-7*** 
Adjusted R^ 0.99 
Value of F 1641.80*** 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 1) 0.87 
Sample size 79 
Note: * denote one tailed significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Table 10.10 Gross revenue function (Cobb-Douglas form) estimates for 
livestock raising excluding entrepreneur's characteristics 
Dependent variable: log of gross revenue from 
livestock raising 
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-value 
Log of labour 0.01 1.87** 
Log of capital 1.004 169.67*** 
Dummy for area 1 0.01 0.99 
Dummy for area 2 0.04 3.34*** 
Dummy for area 3 -0.01 -0.79 
Dummy for area 4 0.005 0.76 
Intercept -0.04 -0.76 
Adjusted R^ 0.99 
Value of F 6559.07*** 
B-P test (chi-sq. d.f 1) 1.60 
Sample size 89 
Note: ***, **, * denote one tailed significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 probability levels respectively. 
Source: Survey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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The marginal value product of capital was computed from these functions as 
1.2 taka and 1.06 taka for paddy processing and livestock raising respectively. These 
are much higher than the 25 per cent rate of interest charged. The marginal value 
product of labour was computed for each enterprise. These were found to be lower 
than the market wage rate for almost all cases (Table 10.11). The average of 
marginal value product in paddy processing and livestock raising was 0.68 and 0.32 
taka respectively. Thus labour is being used to a point at which the marginal value 
product in each activity is much lower than the market wage rate. This is not 
inconsistent because the allocation of labour by such an enterprise (discussed in 
Chapter 8) is not based on a comparison of the value of marginal product with the 
wage rate. 
Table 10.11 Marginal value product of labour and capital in the Grameen Bank 
enterprises (taka) 
Marginal product 
of inputs (in taka) 
Livestock 
raising 
Paddy 
processing 
Capital (per taka) 1.06 1.20 
Labour (per hour) 0.32 0.68 
Marginal product of 
labour between: Number of cases 
0.01 to less than 0.60^ 78 39 
0.61 to less than 1.20 11 35 
1.21 and above 0 5 
a) These groups show less than half of wage rate, up to half and more than the wage rate. Wage rate 
considered is the average wage of women wage workers obtained from Chapter 3. 
Source: Sur^•ey of Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Chapter 11 
Major conclusions, policy implications and suggestions for further 
research 
Wage employment in the traditional sector 
The female wage labour market in Bangladesh is characterised by very low wage 
rates which are lower than the poverty level. Average employment is low compared 
to both the standard norm of supply and actual supply. Women's inability to obtain 
more employment, even at such low wage rates, implies that creation of more 
producdve employment for women is an urgent policy concem. 
Existing theories of wage determination are not applicable to these women. An 
altemative explanation of wage determination which used a modified supply-demand 
framework and seasonal equilibrium was found to be useful. Seasonal equilibrium 
was found to be consistent with involuntary underemployment as defined by 
standard criteria. 
All women did not, however, receive the equilibrium wage rate. Wage rates 
were pushed down to reservation wage rates (the minimum acceptable to the 
women). This was the result of the stronger bargaining power of the employers. 
Personal and family characteristics influencing the reservation wage rate of 
workers thus explained variations in wage rates among the women studied. This 
contrasts with attempts to explain wage variations in terms of competitive market 
theories, efficiency wage considerations or cooperative bargaining by workers. 
Variation in wage rates due to various reservation wage levels can incorporate 
human capital factors along with other forces influencing reservation levels. This 
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enables human capital factors to play a role even when the labour market does not 
clear. 
It was argued that in the presence of involuntary underemployment, the amount 
of employment obtained by a woman would be determined by demand forces. 
Accordingly, women working for lower wage rates were found to obtain more 
employment Agricultural productivity in an area influenced demand positively, 
increasing the amount of employment. Elasticity of employment with respect to the 
wage rate was, however, less than 1 and women did not benefit through higher wage 
earnings by accepting lower than equilibrium wage rates. This analysis clarified the 
misconception of earlier studies which interpreted the negative (or non-positive) 
relationships between wage rates and employment in India or Bangladesh as 
reflections of negative wage elasticity of labour supply or what was traditionally 
known as the backward sloping supply curve of labour. Such an interpretation gives 
misleading policy implications. 
Results regarding the determinants of wage rates and wage employment 
indicate that policies related to the expansion of employment and eamings of rural 
women in traditional wage occupations are difficult to imagine. Variables which 
influence wage rates are mainly the personal and family characteristics (number of 
dependents, number of male earners, marital status of worker, etc.) of the workers, 
and these are not easily amenable to policy changes. Another important factor which 
had a negative influence on the wage rate was the number of hours worked per day. 
Unless there is enough employment, working hours per day cannot be influenced by 
the regulation of hours worked. Interlinkage with the credit market affected wage 
rates but the implicit interest rate was not very high. 
The influence of agricultural productivity on wage rates could not be 
ascertained because area differences, which were used to represent the level of 
agricultural productivity, captured other counteracting influences on wage rates. 
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Moreover, this study covered only two regions. The study of wage variations over 
more areas would properly capture the influence of productivity on wage rates. 
Areas with higher agricultural productivity were found to generate more wage 
employment per worker. Higher productivity would thus improve the earnings of 
female wage workers. The extent to which productivity differences influenced 
employment and earnings, however, could not be quantified or directly estimated in 
this study confined to two areas. 
Policies that improve agricultural productivity are desirable on many grounds. 
To what extent these policies can enhance women's earnings needs to be researched. 
Research is also needed to indicate the limits to the expansion of employment and 
earnings by improving productivity levels of all existing activities, in addition to 
agriculture. This is also needed to confirm the claim that was made on the basis of 
indirect evidence that the inflexibility of total demand for female workers with 
respect to wage is responsible for involuntary underemployment. 
Grameen Bank financed self employment 
Self employment of a woman in a Grameen Bank financed enterprise is determined 
by the opportunity cost of housework and the productivity of labour in self 
employment An increase in the amount of capital increases the women's labour 
input by raising productivity. This indicates scope for generating more employment 
by improving the productivity of self employment activities through other means, for 
example, improvements in social and physical infra-structure. 
The rise of women's labour input continues up to a capital input of taka 4200. 
Therefore the Bank's practice of maintaining an upper ceiling on the amount of loans 
is justified. The current upper ceiling is taka 5,000 which is 19 per cent higher than 
the size of the capital at which labour input reaches a maximum. The loan sizes for 
female borrowers usually do not reach the ceiling. 
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A comparison of wage workers and self employed women shows that the latter 
group on average earns a higher income. The benefits of self employment to women 
financed by the Grameen Bank were also felt in terms of an improvement in their 
standards of consumption of food and clothing. The other positive feature of self 
employment is that the access to such finance and ensuing self employment is not 
biased by the initial endowment of a woman and her family. 
Access to the Bank's credit was not biased, but the amount of loan obtained was 
seen to be significantly related to the educational attainment of the female borrowers. 
This points towards the importance of human capital in generating off-farm 
employment. Education for rural women deserves high priority for this as well as for 
social reasons. 
It was found that 12 per cent of the female borrowers did not themselves use the 
borrowed funds in organising productive activities. It is worth exploring whether the 
percentage of women who divert funds for investment by male members increases as 
the Bank extends a greater percentage of its loans to women and as the proportion of 
female members among total members of the Bank rises (as it has in recent years). 
The marginal product of labour in Grameen Bank activities was much lower 
than the average wage rate of women. Wage rates did not indicate the opportunity 
cost of labour as involuntary underemployment prevailed. 
The marginal revenue product of capital in the Grameen Bank financed 
enterprises was higher than the rate of interest charged. This does not, however, 
provide sufficient grounds for expanding capital in these enterprises. In a capital 
scarce and labour surplus economy, the objective of providing subsidised capital is to 
enhance the income of poor families and to encourage the productive utilisation of 
their labour by raising its productivity. Therefore an expansion in capital is justified 
only if it does not reduce the labour inputs of the workers. This was found to be true 
for women members of the Grameen Bank. A reduction in the labour input 
consequent upon an increase in capital implies a negative income effect of the 
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increasing productivity of labour. In other words, capital is being substituted for 
labour to maintain income. This is not desirable. 
The question of expanding the size of loans for the same borrowers has to be 
decided by comparing social benefits of this expansion with other uses of the funds 
(as well as the social costs of lending). Alternatives include the expansion of credit 
facilities to more landless borrowers in the same area or in new areas or to wage 
labour based industries. 
Generation of self employment through external finance has its limits and 
associated costs. The limits to the expansion of self employment by the Grameen 
Bank finance have not been identified in this study. 
An important limitation to the expansion of the Grameen Bank may result from 
demand constraints when such enterprises are expanded to larger numbers of 
households in an area. An investigation of the limitations of demand was beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Osmani (1989) points out the possible sources of limitations of 
demand. A few studies (Chowdhury 1986, Osmani and Deb 1986) show that 
demand constraints exist for rural industrial products (in areas where the Grameen 
Bank has not been operating). Such constraints may pose limits to the Grameen 
Bank's expansion since it lends for similar activities. Rahman and Hossain (1989) 
and Hossain (1985a), arrived at more optimistic results, suggesting that the 
operations of the Grameen Bank financed enterprises will not face a constraint of 
demand in the near future. 
Demand constraints will be more important for expansion within the same 
village or in neighbouring villages than in new areas because the former will serve 
the demand in the same locality. Such limits will be eased by financing a variety of 
activities so that they may generate reciprocal demands within an area. More 
research to provide direct empirical evidence on the limits to expansion of off-farm 
activities in the areas with Grameen Bank enterprises are needed. 
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A comparison of the benefits of Grameen Bank financed employment with 
alternative uses of such funds for generating employment for poor workers is also 
required. 
More important constraints on the expansion of the Bank are the social costs of 
loans in the form of subsidies required for its operation. A study by Hossain (1988a) 
points out that the bank operations need to be subsidised. The magnitude of the 
subsidy will depend on the fixed cost of operation compared to the expansion of 
business and thus will depend on the age of the establishment. More research is 
required in this area to reveal the impact of expanding the Bank's operation within 
existing areas and into new areas. 
In a resource poor country, a subsidised operation by the Grameen Bank must 
be justified on other than merely distributive grounds. One strong point about the 
Bank is that the low income group is operating under the discipline of regular loan 
repayments which, it is hoped, has long term development implications. In 
Bangladesh the problem of default on bank loans (at lower rates of interest than 
those charged by the Grameen Bank) by large industrialists (Sobhan and Sen 1989) 
points to the conclusion that policy issues related to the rate of interest and the 
subsidy of loan operations needs to be discussed for the economy as a whole. The 
case against subsidised loans should not be applied in the first instance to a poor 
group of beneficiaries who are at least repaying their debt. 
Other problems may relate to the overall impact of these activities on the 
village economy. Difficulties may arise if the pressure of demand for wage goods, 
especially food, which result from enhanced income and better standards of basic 
consumption levels by the borrowing families, does not find a response in higher 
agricultural productivity. If food production does not increase, this increased 
demand will result in higher prices which will swallow the effects of the enhanced 
income. Such a stage has not been reached as yet because the Bank covers only a 
small percentage of villages. Increases in food and overall productivity in 
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agriculture is also essential to enhance income and thus demand for goods and 
services produced by the Grameen Bank financed enterprises. 
This study only took into account the immediate economic gains of Grameen 
Bank financed self employment for women. Non-economic and long term benefits 
will include the enhancement of women's social roles (Rahman, R. 1986). These 
changes may exert a second round of influences on the socio-economic development 
of society. The exemplary observance of loan repayments by a group of assetless 
and uneducated women in their endeavour to achieve a better standard of living may 
not only spread among non-member families, but may have a positive impact on 
other women and the rural society overall. 
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Appendix A 
2.A.1 An English version of the questionnaires used to survey the wage vt'orker 
women 
Questionnaire for data from female wage workers 
A. Demographic and family characteristics of the worker: 
1. Worker identification number (village and serial number of worker) 
2. Name 
3. Age 
4. Marital status 
5. Family size 
6. Age of the youngest child 
7. Number of children bom to the respondent 
8. Years of schooling 
9. Relationship to head of the household 
10. Type of family in which she lives (relationships to other family 
members living in the household) 
11. Who takes care of the child when respondent goes to work 
B. Husband/male head of households' (if she is not head of household) 
characteristics: 
12. Age 
13. Years of schooling 
14. Occupation 
C. Economic situation of the family: 
15. Total land owned by the family 
16. CulUvable land owned by the family 
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17. Other types of productive land owned by the family 
18. Other productive assets owned by the family 
19. Value of other productive assets owned 
20. Total number of male earners in the family 
21. Male income during last year 
22. Number of days for which she faced food shortage during last year 
D. Details about her employment and wage: 
23. For how many years has she been involved in wage employment 
24. Number of employers for whom she worked during last year 
25. Amount of loan which she owes to her employer 
26. Did she have any kinship relations with her employer 
27. For each month during the last year the following information was 
obtained about her employment and wage: 
Number of days for which she worked 
Number of hours worked during each day 
Description of the work done 
Total amount of wage paid in cash 
Number of meals given as a component of wage 
Other non-meal kind payment 
Price and value of non-meal wage 
Terms of employment 
E. Opinion on some aspects of wage employment: 
28. For how many days was she willing to work during the year at the 
wage she received 
29. Will she take up employment for field operations in village 
agriculture 
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Questions asked of the employer: 
1. Why did they not employ women in field operations 
2. Why do they not give more employment to women at lowest possible 
wages 
3. Why do they pay wages in meals 
4. How many women did they employ simultaneously at any time last 
year 
238 
2.A.1 An English version of the questionnaires used to survey the Grameen 
Bank member women 
A. General information on the household: 
1. Household identification (Village and serial number of the 
interviewee) 
2. Grameen Bank membership status: 
No one is member/ female member/ male member 
3. Type of household (relationships to other members living in the 
household) 
4. Household's total own land 
5. Total cultivated land 
6. Total family members 
7. Male earning members 
8. Female earning members 
B. Characteristics of the respondent woman: 
9. Relationship to head of household 
10. Respondent's main occupation 
11. Secondary occupation 
12. Age of respondent 
13. Marital status 
14. Years of schooling 
15. Age of last child 
16. Total hours of work last month for various types of directly income 
generating activities which are not financed by Grameen Bank 
17. Total income from this work 
C. Characteristics of the head of the household: 
18. Education of head of household 
19. Main occupation of household head 
20. Age 
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D. Standard of living 
21. Number of meals taken by husband during the last week 
(How many meals were taken each day of the last week was asked, and 
the answer was organised as follows 
number of days with one meal 
number of days with two meals 
number of days with three meals) 
22. Number of meals taken by the Grameen Bank member 
woman/housewife (for families which did not have female Grameen 
Bank member) during last week 
(How many meals were taken each day of the last week was asked and 
the answer was organised as follows 
number of days with one meal 
number of days with two meals 
number of days with three meals) 
23. Purchase of clothing for the woman during last year: 
number of sarees (women's main dress) 
total amount on spent on sarees 
number of shoes 
amount spent on shoes 
items of winter clothing 
amount spent on winter clothing 
number of other items 
amount spent on other items 
24. Purchase of clothing for the husband during last one year: 
number of lungi (substitute for trousers) 
amount spent on lungi 
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how many shirts 
amount spent on shirts 
items of winter clothing 
amount spent on winter clothing 
pairs of shoes 
amount spent on shoes 
other items 
amount spent on other items 
E. Details of the woman's economic activities financed by the Grameen Bank loan 
(asked only to Grameen Bank member women) 
25. How long she has been a member of Grameen Bank (borrower from 
Grameen Bank) 
26. Total loan taken this year 
F. Details of activities on which loan was used by the woman: 
27. Name of first activity 
28. Information on this enterprise: 
fixed capital 
current capital 
monthly gross value of sales 
her total time input in this activity during last month 
total hours of husband on that work during that month 
other male workers' time input during that month 
other female workers' time input during that month 
29. Name of second head activity 
30. Information on this enterprise: 
fixed capital 
current capital 
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monthly gross value of sales 
her total time input during last month 
total hours of husband on that work during that month 
other male workers' time input during that month 
other female workers' time input during that month 
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Appendix B 
Table B.l Mean and standard deviation of the variables used for regression 
analysis of employment and wage of women workers 
Variable Mean(^) Satndard deviation 
Age in years 32.30 10.32 
Square of age 1148.43 785.87 
Number of members in family 4.57 1.77 
Number of male earners 1.09 0.78 
Number of dependent members 3.48 1.49 
How many years in wage employment 10.04 7.36 
Amount of loan 76.04 140.40 
Total days worked 111.42 68.76 
Log of total days worked 4.57 0.51 
Total hours worked 1006.73 627.95 
Log of total hours worked 6.72 0.54 
Total earnings during a year 1145.88 625.55 
Wage per hour 1.20 0.23 
Log of wage per hour .16 0.19 
Hours worked per day 9.03 1.54 
Percentage of employment 
obtained as regular employment 
5.19 22.34 
Dummy for having a small child 0.47 0.50 
Dummy for having male earners 0.80 0.40 
Dummy for working eight hours or 
more on a day 
0.75 0.43 
Dummy for marital status 0.31 0.47 
Dummy for area 0.57 0.50 
(a) These data arc from the wage worker women's sample of 77 women and the averages for each 
variable is for the whole sample. 
Source: Survey of wage worker women, 1985. 
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Table B.2 Mean and standard deviation of the variables used for regression analysis of Grameen Bank member women's employment and earnings 
Data related to 'all borrower women's sample (151 cases) 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Total amount of loan 2458.00 989.10 
Log of total loan 7.72 0.44 
Age in years 31.36 8.63 
Square of age 1057.67 593.77 
Years of schooling 0.62 1.82 
Number of dependent members 2.55 1.71 
Total number of earners 2.38 1.00 
Amount of land owned (ha) 0.05 0.11 
Years of GB membership 2.30 0.94 
Dummy for having a baby 0.64 0.48 
Dummy for area 1 0.20 0.40 
Dummy for area 2 0.20 0.40 
Dummy for area 3 0.10 0.30 
Dummy for area 4 0.20 0.40 
contd. 
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Table B.2 contd 
Data related to 'loan user women's sample (132 cases) 
GB enterprises with male workers (125 cases) 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Age in years 30.80 8.43 
Square of age 1019.38 578.24 
Years of schooling 0.54 1.79 
Total number of earners 2.42 0.97 
Amount of land owned (ha) 0.04 0.11 
Number of dependent members 2.47 1.67 
Dummy for having a baby 0.65 0.48 
Years of GB membership 2.24 0.93 
Total capital in the enterprise 2542.29 1119.53 
Log of total capital 7.72 0.56 
Percentage of capital in paddy processing 34.73 33.7 
Square of percentage of capital in paddy 2337.41 2996.97 
Total hours of labour per month in 100.81 49.87 
the GB enterprises by the member women 
Log of total hours by the member women 4.42 0.76 
Dummy for marital status 0.11 0.31 
Male workers labour input in GB enterprise 50.09 46.48 
Dummy for area 1 0.22 0.42 
Dummy for area 2 0.19 0.39 
Dummy for area 3 0.08 0.27 
Dummy for area 4 0.23 0.42 
Average hours of l^^pur per month by a male 
in a GB enterprise 
Log of average hours of male labour input 
in a GB enterprise 
Total Female workers hours in GB enterprise 
44.05 
3.73 
107. 59 
43.53 
0.77 
50.57 
(b) Values of mean and standard deviation for other variables used in the regression 
analysis for these enterprises are very close to the values of mean and standard 
deviation for the same variables (mentioned above) used in the regression for the 
loan users' sample. contd. 
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Table B.2 contd. 
Data related to 'paddy processing enterprises (79 cases) 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Gross revenue from paddy processing 1944.36 1015.39 
Log of gross revenue 7.45 0.51 
Capital in paddy processing 1542.16 854.35 
Lx)g of capital in paddy processing 7.20 0.54 
Labour hours per month on paddy 112.35 35.79 
Log of labour hours 4.31 0.68 
Log of square of capital 26.08 3.84 
Log of square of labour hours 10.95 1.54 
Log of the product of capital and labour 33.67 3.78 
Female workers labour input 109.27 36.76 
Log of female workers labour input 4.63 .36 
Male workers labour input 13.16 20.05 
Square of male workers labour input 570.19 1086.69 
Dummy for area 1 0.30 0.46 
Dummy for area 2 0.14 0.35 
Dummy for area 3 0.01 0.11 
Dummy for area 4 0.33 0.47 
Dummy for positive male labour input 0.78 0.40 
Dummy for having a baby 0.63 0.48 
Total earners in the family 2.37 0.89 
Age of the GB member 30.24 8.38 
Years of schooling of the GB member 0.71 2.08 
Land owned by the family (ha) 0.02 0.06 
Number of dependent members 2.35 1.75 
Contd. 
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Table B.2 Contd. 
Data related to livestock raising enterprises (89 cases) 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Gross revenue from livestock raising 1871.50 823.58 
Log of gross revenue 7.43 0.46 
Capital in Livestock raising 1764.00 768.09 
Log of capital in Livestock raising 7.38 0.46 
Labour hours per month on livestock 96.13 42.55 
Log of labour hours on livestock raising 4.48 0.40 
Dummy for area 1 0.31 0.47 
Dummy for area 2 0.07 0.25 
Dummy for area 3 0.10 0.30 
Dummy for area 4 0.22 0.42 
Dummy for positive male labour input 0.91 0.29 
Dummy for having a baby 0.62 0.49 
Total earners in the family 2.31 0.83 
Age of the GB member 30.27 8.15 
Years of schooling of the GB member 0.58 1.89 
Land owned by the family (ha) 0.04 0.11 
Number of dependent members 2.53 1.66 
Source: Survey in Grameen Bank villages, 1985. 
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Appendix C 
Notes on the econometric tests for the suitability of the ordinary least square 
regressions equations 
C.l Nested test for linear versus log-linear form of function 
Sometimes there are obvious economic reasons for choosing a particular functional 
form. For example, in the production function analysis, the choice between 
functional forms is based on economic reasons. When there is no specific reason to 
choose a particular functional form, the choice is usually between a linear and a log-
linear form. Which of these should be chosen is based on the test for alternadve 
forms. The test used in this study is described as follows (Beggs 1988, Maddala 
1988). 
Let the alternadve forms to be tested be given by: 
Ho: log y = a j + b jx + u j 
H p y = a2 + b2X + U2 
Once these two forms are esdmated, the predicted values of log y and y can be 
obtained from the first and second equations respectively. The predicted value of y 
from the log-linear form is exp(log y) and the predicted value of log y from the linear 
equation is log y. 
Next, two artificial equadons are estimated. These are: 
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log y = A + B2 X + C [y -exp(logy)] + e j 
y = A + B2X + D [logy - logy] + &2 
The test is based on the significance of the coefficients C and D. If C = 0, the log-
linear form is chosen as being better. If D = 0, then the linear from is chosen as 
being better. If neither of the coefficients are significant, there is no statistical 
ground for prefering either. If both of the tests give significant results, there is scope 
for improvement in both. 
C.2 Test for unspecified alternative functional forms 
Each form of function may be tested against unspecified alternatives. This will test 
whether the relevant explanatory variables have been included in the equation or 
whether there is scope for inclusion of other variables and specifically for higher 
powers of the included variables. This is called the RESET2 test (Beggs 1988). The 
method is as follows. The equation is augmented by its predicted value and if the 
estimation of this equation gives a significant t-value of the coefficient of the 
predicted value as an explanatory variable, the original function is inadequate. 
C.3 Test for the presence of heteroscedasticity 
In this thesis, the presence of heteroscedasicity is tested for by formulating explicit 
functional form models of the disturbance term variance and the Breusch Pagan test 
is applied. The method of the test is to regress the squared residuals from an OLS 
regression on the chosen set of explanatory variables. The number of sample 
observation times the R^ from this secondary regression has a chi-square distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of non-constant variables in the 
regression for the squared residuals. If this test statistic is not significant, the 
hypothesis that there is no significant heteroscedasticity in the data is accepted. 
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In modelling the regression equation for the squared residual in the equations in 
this study, the predicted value from the equation is included as a regressor. Along 
with that any other variable that may be relevant in each context is included. The 
degrees of freedom in each case of the test is included in parenthesis when the test 
result is reported for an equation at the end of each OLS regression. 
C.4 Test for endogeneity of an explanatory variable 
This test is conducted if any one or more of the explanatory variables included in an 
OLS regression are suspected to be endogenous, that is, they are determined by other 
variables used as explanatory variables in the same equation. For this purpose the 
suspected variable is estimated by OLS regression where all the exogenous variables 
in the original equation are used as explanatory variables together with other 
exogenous variables which may determine variation of the suspected variable. The 
predicted value of this variable from the estimated equation is used as an added 
regressor in the original regression. If the added regressor is significant, the variable 
suspected is creating significant endogeneity. 
Let Y = f(xl, x2, x3 . . . xn) be the original equation. 
If the purpose is to test the endogeneity of x2, we estimate the following equation: 
x2 = g(xl ,x3 zl , z2 etc.) 
If X2 is the predicted value of x2, then the test is conducted by estimating the 
equation: 
Y = h(xl ,x2,x3, xn,X2) 
If the coefficient of X2 is significant, endogeneity exists. 
When testing for more than one variable, an equation is estimated for each of 
the variables and their predicted values are used as added regressors in the original 
equation. In this case an F-test for the improvement of R-square for this group of 
added regressors provides an appropriate test. 
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